Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ocasio and other police officers routed damaged vehicles from accident scenes to an auto repair shop in exchange for kickbacks. He was charged with obtaining money from the shopowners under color of official right (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951), and conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 371. The court rejected his argument that—because the Act prohibits the obtaining of property “from another”—a Hobbs Act conspiracy requires proof that the alleged conspirators agreed to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy. The Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. A defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Act based on proof that he reached an agreement with the owner of the property in question to obtain that property under color of official right. The general federal conspiracy statute, under which Ocasio was convicted, makes it a crime to “conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States.” It is sufficient that the conspirator agreed that the underlying crime be committed by a member of the conspiracy capable of committing it. Ocasio and the shopowners shared a common purpose that officers would obtain property “from another” (shopowners) under color of official right. The Court noted that its decision does not transform every bribe of a public official into conspiracy to commit extortion. View "Ocasio v. United States" on Justia Law

Molina-Martinez pleaded guilty to being unlawfully present in the U.S. after being deported following an aggravated felony conviction. The Guidelines range in his presentence report was 77-96 months. The Probation Office recommended a 77-month sentence; the government requested 96 months. The court, with little explanation, sentenced him to 77 months. On appeal, Molina-Martinez argued for the first time that the range should have been 70-87 months. The Fifth Circuit agreed that the court used an incorrect range but found that Molina-Martinez could not satisfy FRCP 52(b)’s requirement that the error affected his substantial rights, stating that a defendant whose sentence falls within the correct range must, on appeal, identify “additional evidence” showing that use of the incorrect range actually affected his sentence. The Supreme Court reversed. Courts reviewing Guidelines errors cannot apply a categorical “additional evidence” rule where a court applied an incorrect range but sentenced the defendant within the correct range. A defendant who shows mistaken application of an incorrect, higher range will, generally, have demonstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome, sufficient for relief if Rule 52(b)’s other requirements are met. In this case, given the sentence imposed, and that the court said nothing to suggest that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the range, there is at least a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed another sentence had it known that 70 months was the lowest sentence the Commission deemed appropriate. The Court noted that its holding is consistent with the approach taken by most Courts of Appeals and that remanding for resentencing is less costly than remanding for retrial. View "Molina-Martinez v. United States" on Justia Law

Possession of a firearm by a felon is punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment, 18 U.SC. 922(g), 924(a)(2), but the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) increases that sentence to a mandatory 15-years-to-life if the offender has three or more prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony.” The definition of “violent felony” includes a “residual clause,” covering any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Welch's ACCA sentence, holding that his prior Florida conviction for robbery qualified as a “violent felony” under the residual clause. The district court denied collateral relief. In Johnson (2013), the Supreme Court held the residual clause unconstitutional for vagueness. The Eleventh Circuit denied Welch a certificate of appealability three weeks before the Johnson opinion. The Supreme Court vacated: Johnson announced a new substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review and, on the record, reasonable jurists could at least debate whether Welch should obtain relief. Substantive rules alter “the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes,” while procedural rules “regulate only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Since Johnson made the residual clause invalid, it can no longer mandate or authorize any sentence; the decision had nothing to do with the range of permissible methods a court might use to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced. View "Welch v. United States" on Justia Law

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) makes it a crime for certain sex offenders to “knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration,” 18 U.S.C. 2250(a)(3), and requires that offenders who move to a different state “shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status,” inform, in person, at least one "jurisdiction involved" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 16913(a) of all changes to required information. Section 16913(a) refers to “each jurisdiction where the offender resides, . . . is an employee, and . . . is a student.” Nichols, a registered sex offender, moved from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his registration, was arrested, and returned to the U.S. The Tenth Circuit affirmed his SORNA conviction, holding that Kansas, remained a SORNA “jurisdiction involved.” The Supreme Court reversed. Section16913(a) uses the present tense. Nichols once resided in Kansas; after moving, he “resides” in the Philippines. The Philippines is not a SORNA “jurisdiction.” Nichols could not have appeared in person in Kansas “after” leaving the state. SORNA’s drafters could have required sex offenders to deregister in their departure jurisdiction before leaving the country had that been their intent. The Court noted that recent federal legislation, with existing registration requirements, offer reassurance that sex offenders will not be able to escape punishment for leaving the country without notifying their departure jurisdictions. View "Nichols v. United States" on Justia Law

Michigan law enforcement received an anonymous tip that two white males were traveling on I–96 in a white Audi, possibly carrying cocaine. Officers spotted a vehicle matching that description and pulled it over for speeding. Etherton was driving; Pollie was a passenger. A search uncovered 125.2 grams of cocaine in the driver side door. Pollie testified, with a plea agreement, that he had accompanied Etherton, not knowing that Etherton intended to obtain cocaine; that, in Detroit, Etherton left him alone at a restaurant for 45 minutes; and that, while returning to Grand Rapids, Etherton revealed he had obtained the drugs. Officers described the content of the tip; on the third recounting, Etherton’s counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The prosecutor agreed to move on, but, at closing, again described the tip. The court instructed the jury that “the tip was not evidence,” but was admitted “only to show why the police did what they did.” Etherton’s conviction was affirmed. State courts denied post-conviction relief, rejecting arguments that admission of the tip violated the Confrontation Clause; that counsel was ineffective for failing to object; and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the Confrontation Clause and ineffective assistance claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed denial of federal habeas relief. The Supreme Court reversed, citing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) standard of review. A “fairminded jurist” could conclude that repetition of the tip did not establish that the uncontested facts it conveyed were submitted for their truth and that Etherton was not prejudiced when the tip and Pollie’s testimony corresponded on uncontested facts. It would not be objectively unreasonable for a fair-minded judge to conclude that failure to raise a challenge was because the facts in the tip were uncontested and consistent with Etherton’s defense. View "Woods v. Etherton" on Justia Law

Under 18 U.S.C. 1345(a)(2), a court may freeze, before trial, assets belonging to a defendant accused of violations of federal health care or banking laws, including: property “obtained as a result of ” the crime; property “traceable” to the crime; and other “property of equivalent value.” Luis was charged with fraudulently obtaining nearly $45 million through crimes related to health care. To preserve $2 million remaining in Luis’ possession for payment of restitution and criminal penalties, the government secured a pretrial order prohibiting Luis from dissipating her assets, including assets unrelated to her alleged crimes. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the order. The Supreme Court vacated, holding that the pretrial restraint of untainted assets needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. The right to counsel of choice is “fundamental” and the property at issue is untainted--it belongs to Luis. The government’s interest in its punishment of choice and the victim’s interest in restitution are important, but, compared to the right to counsel, “they seem to lie somewhat further from the heart of a fair, effective criminal justice system.” The constitutional line between a criminal defendant’s tainted funds and innocent funds needed to pay for counsel should prove workable. Without pretrial protection for some of a defendant’s assets, the government could nullify the right to counsel of choice, eviscerating the Sixth Amendment’s meaning and purpose. The modern, judicially created right to government-appointed counsel does not obviate those concerns. View "Luis v. United States" on Justia Law

Walber was murdered in 1998. Two years later, Scott, then incarcerated, contacted authorities and initially reported that Wearry and others had confessed to shooting and driving over Walber, leaving his body on Blahut Road. Walber had not been shot; his body was found on Crisp Road. Scott changed his story in material ways four times. Another witness, Brown, recanted a prior inconsistent statement and agreed to testify. The prosecution stated that Brown “is doing 15 years on a drug charge… hasn’t asked for a thing” and “has no deal on the table.” Although the state presented no physical evidence, it offered additional circumstantial, but somewhat inconsistent, evidence linking Wearry to Walber. Three women testified that Wearry had been at a wedding reception 40 miles away. The bride testified that the reception had ended around 9:00, potentially leaving time for Wearry to have committed the crime. Jail employees testified that they had overheard Wearry say that he was present at the crime. The jury convicted Wearry of capital murder and sentenced him to death. After unsuccessful direct appeal, it emerged that the prosecution had withheld police records showed that two inmates had made statements that cast doubt on Scott’s credibility and that, contrary to the prosecution’s assertions, Brown wanted a deal for testifying. Police had told Brown that they would “‘talk to the D. A..’” Wearry’s trial attorney admitted at the state collateral-review hearing that he had conducted no investigation. Collateral-review counsel found many witnesses lacking any personal relationship with Wearry to corroborate his alibi until 11 pm. The lower courts and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the Brady claim, finding that the state withheld material evidence, and did not reach the ineffective assistance claim. View "Wearry v. Cain" on Justia Law

Lockhart pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4). Because Lockhart had a prior state-court conviction for first-degree sexual abuse involving his adult girlfriend, his PSR concluded that he was subject to the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement provided in U.S.S.G. 2252(b)(2), which is triggered by prior state convictions for crimes “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” The Second Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed imposition of the mandatory minimum. The “rule of the last antecedent,” a canon of statutory interpretation stating that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows,” clarifies that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies only the immediately preceding noun phrase “abusive sexual conduct” and that the phrases “aggravated sexual abuse” and “sexual abuse” are not so restricted. The section’s context reinforces the rule’s application in this case. The Court rejected an argument in favor of the rule of lenity, which is used to resolve ambiguity only when the ordinary canons have revealed no satisfactory construction. View "Lockhart v. United States" on Justia Law

Montgomery was 17 years old in 1963, when he killed a deputy in Louisiana. The jury returned a verdict of “guilty without capital punishment,” which carried an automatic sentence of life without parole. Nearly 50 years later, the Supreme Court decided, in Miller v. Alabama, that mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The trial court denied his motion for relief. His application for a supervisory writ was denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which had previously held that Miller does not have retroactive effect in state collateral review. The Supreme Court reversed. Courts must give retroactive effect to new watershed procedural rules and to substantive rules of constitutional law. Substantive constitutional rules include “rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct” and “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law, which is retroactive because it necessarily carries a significant risk that a defendant faces a punishment that the law cannot impose. A state may remedy a Miller violation by extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. This would neither impose an onerous burden nor disturb the finality of state convictions and would afford someone like Montgomery, who may have evolved from a troubled, misguided youth to a model member of the prison community, the opportunity to demonstrate the truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change. View "Montgomery v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Musacchio resigned as president of ETS in 2004, but with help from the former head of ETS’s information-technology department, he accessed ETS’s computer system without authorization through early 2006. In 2010, Musacchio was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C), which makes it a crime if a person “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access” and thereby “obtains . . . information from any protected computer.” A 2012 superseding indictment changed the access date to “[o]n or about” November 23–25, 2005. Musacchio never raised the 5-year statute of limitations. The government did not object to jury instructions referring to: “intentionally access a computer without authorization and exceed authorized access” although the conjunction “and” added an additional element. The jury found Musacchio guilty. In affirming his conviction, the Fifth Circuit assessed Musacchio’s sufficiency challenge against the charged elements of the conspiracy count rather than against the heightened jury instruction, and concluded that he had waived his statute-of-limitations defense. The Supreme Court affirmed. A sufficiency challenge should be assessed against the elements of the charged crime, not against the elements set forth in an erroneous jury instruction. Sufficiency review essentially addresses whether the case was strong enough to reach the jury. Musacchio did not dispute that he was properly charged with conspiracy to obtain unauthorized access or that the evidence was sufficient to convict him of the charged crime. A defendant cannot successfully raise section 3282(a)’s statute-of-limitations bar for the first time on appeal. The history of section 3282(a)’s limitations bar confirms that the provision does not impose a jurisdictional limit. View "Musacchio v. United States" on Justia Law