Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A Kansas jury sentenced Gleason to death for killings to cover up a robbery. Another Kansas jury sentenced the Carr brothers to death after they were convicted of rape, kidnapping, and five execution-style shootings. The Kansas Supreme Court vacated the death sentences, holding that the sentencing instructions violated the Eighth Amendment and that the Carrs’ rights to individualized capital sentencing determinations was violated. The Supreme Court reversed. The Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent do not require capital-sentencing courts to instruct a jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Ambiguity in capital-sentencing instructions constitutes constitutional error only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevented consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. The instructions at issue clarified that both the existence of aggravating circumstances and the conclusion that they outweigh mitigating circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but that mitigating circumstances must merely be “found to exist.” No juror would reasonably speculate that “beyond a reasonable doubt” was the correct burden for mitigating circumstances. The Constitution did not require severance of the Carrs’ joint sentencing proceedings. Claiming that admission of mitigating evidence by one Carr brother could have “so infected” jury consideration of the other’s sentence as to amount to a due process denial was “beyond the pale.” Joint proceedings are often preferable when the joined defendants’ criminal conduct arises out of a single chain of events. Limiting instructions, like those given in the Carrs’ proceeding, often suffice to cure any risk of prejudice. View "Kansas v. Carr" on Justia Law

Under Florida law, the maximum sentence a capital felon may receive based on a conviction alone is life imprisonment. He may be sentenced to death only after an additional sentencing proceeding, Fla. Stat. 775.082(1), with an evidentiary hearing before a jury. The jury renders an “advisory sentence.” Notwithstanding that recommendation, the judge must independently find and weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances before entering a sentence of life or death. A jury convicted Hurst of first-degree murder and recommended the death penalty. On remand, the jury again recommended death; the judge again found the facts necessary to sentence Hurst to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Hurst’s argument that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment under the 2015 Supreme Court holding, Ring v. Arizona, that an Arizona sentencing scheme was unconstitutional for allowing a judge, rather than the jury, to find the facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Florida’s sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment. Any fact that “expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict” is an “element” that must be submitted to a jury. That Florida provides an advisory jury is immaterial. The judge’s role is central and singular under Florida law. View "Hurst v. Florida" on Justia Law

The 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that prisoners qualified to proceed in forma pauperis must pay an initial partial filing fee of “20 percent of the greater of ” the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account or the average monthly balance of the account over the preceding six months, 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1). They must pay the remainder in monthly installments of “20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” The initial fee is assessed on a per-case basis and may not be exacted if the prisoner has no means to pay it; no monthly installments are required unless the prisoner has more than $10 in his account. Bruce, a federal inmate and a frequent litigant, argued that monthly payments do not become due until obligations previously incurred in other cases were satisfied. The D.C. Circuit disagreed, holding that Bruce’s monthly payments were due simultaneously with monthly payments for earlier cases. A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. Section 1915(b)(2) calls for simultaneous, not sequential, recoupment of multiple monthly installment payments. The Court rejected Bruce’s reliance on the contrast between the singular “clerk” and the plural “fees” as those nouns appear in the statute, which requires payments to be forwarded “to the clerk of the court . . . until the filing fees are paid.” Section 1915’s text and context support the per-case approach. View "Bruce v. Samuels" on Justia Law

Sergeant Baker, with a warrant, approached Leija’s car at a restaurant and stated that he was under arrest. Leija sped onto I-27. Leija led Baker and Texas Trooper Rodriguez on an 18-minute chase at 85-110 mph. Leija twice called dispatch, claiming to have a gun and threatening to shoot the officers. The dispatcher broadcast Leija’s threats and a report that Leija might be intoxicated. Officer Ducheneaux, who was trained in using tire spike strips, manned a spike strip beneath an overpass. Trooper Mullenix drove to that overpass, where he radioed a plan to shoot and disable the car. Rodriguez responded “10– 4.” Mullenix asked the dispatcher to inform his supervisor, Byrd, of his plan Before receiving a response, Mullenix took a shooting position. Byrd responded to “see if the spikes work first.” Whether Mullenix heard the response is disputed. Deputy Shipman informed Mullenix that another officer was beneath the overpass. Approximately three minutes after Mullenix took his position, he spotted Leija’s vehicle and fired six shots. Leija’s car engaged the spikes, hit the median, and rolled. Leija was killed by Mullenix’s shots. Apparently, no shots hit the radiator, hood, or engine block. Leija’s estate sued Mullenix under 42 U. S. C. 1983. Mullenix unsuccessfully sought summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that immediacy of risk was a disputed fact. The Supreme Court reversed on the qualified immunity question, declining to address whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation. Mullenix confronted a reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding capture through high-speed vehicular flight, who twice had threatened to shoot police officers, and who was moments away from encountering an officer; whatever the wisdom of Mullenix’s choice, Supreme Court precedents do not indicate that he “beyond debate” acted unreasonably. View "Mullenix v. Luna" on Justia Law

Riley was stopped for a traffic violation, which led to his arrest on weapons charges. An officer searching Riley incident to the arrest seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket, accessed information on the phone, and noticed repeated use of a term associated with a street gang. At the police station two hours later, a detective specializing in gangs further examined the phone’s digital contents. Based in part on photographs found, the state charged Riley in connection with a shooting and sought an enhanced sentence based on gang membership. The trial court denied a motion to suppress. His conviction was affirmed. Wurie was arrested after police observed him participate in an apparent drug sale. At the station, the officers seized a cell phone from Wurie’s person and noticed that the phone was receiving calls from a source identified as “my house” on its screen. The officers opened the phone, accessed its call log, and traced that number to what they suspected was Wurie’s apartment. They secured a warrant and found drugs, a firearm and ammunition, and cash in the ensuing search. Wurie was charged with drug and firearm offenses. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Wurie was convicted. The First Circuit reversed and vacated the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed as to Riley and affirmed as to Wurie. The police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested. The exception for searches incident to arrest does not apply; such searches must be limited to the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, where it is justified by the interests in officer safety and in preventing evidence destruction. A search of digital information on a cell phone implicates substantially greater individual privacy interests than a brief physical search; data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate an escape. To the extent that a search of cell phone data might warn officers of an impending danger,, such a concern is better addressed under case-specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances. There is little indication that either remote wiping or encryption is prevalent or that the opportunity to perform a search incident to arrest would be an effective solution. View "Riley v. California" on Justia Law

The bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1344(2), makes it a crime to “knowingly execut[e] a scheme ... to obtain” property owned by, or under the custody of, a bank “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses.” Loughrin was charged with bank fraud after he was caught forging stolen checks, using them to buy goods at a Target store, and then returning the goods for cash. The district court declined to give Loughrin’s proposed jury instruction that section 1344(2) required proof of “intent to defraud a financial institution.” A jury convicted Loughrin. The Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Section 1344(2) does not require proof that a defendant intended to defraud a financial institution, but requires only that a defendant intended to obtain bank property and that this was accomplished “by means of” a false statement. Imposing Loughrin’s proposed requirement would prevent the law from applying to cases falling within the statute’s clear terms, such as frauds directed against a third-party custodian of bank-owned property. The Court rejected Loughrin’s argument that without an element of intent to defraud a bank, section 1344(2) would apply to every minor fraud in which the victim happens to pay by check, stating that the statutory language limits application to cases in which the misrepresentation has some real connection to a federally insured bank, and thus to the pertinent federal interest. View "Loughrin v. United States" on Justia Law

Abramski offered to purchase a gun for his uncle. Form 4473 asked whether he was the “actual transferee/buyer” of the gun and warned that a straw purchaser (buying a gun on behalf of another) was not the actual buyer. Abramski falsely answered that he was the actual buyer. Abramski was convicted for knowingly making false statements “with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale” of a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), and for making a false statement “with respect to the information required ... to be kept” in the gun dealer’s records, section 924(a)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the misrepresentation was material and rejecting Abramski’s argument that federal gun laws are unconcerned with straw arrangements. While the law regulates licensed dealer’s transactions with “persons” or “transferees” without specifying whether that language refers to the straw buyer or the actual purchaser, read in light of the statute’s context, structure, and purpose, the language clearly refers to the true buyer rather than the straw. The law establishes an elaborate system of in-person identification and background checks to ensure that guns are kept out of the hands of felons and other prohibited purchasers and imposes record-keeping requirements to assist authorities in investigating serious crimes through the tracing of guns tor buyers. The provisions would mean little if they could be avoided simply by enlisting the aid of an intermediary to execute the paperwork. The statute’s language is thus best read in context to refer to the actual rather than nominal buyer. While Abramski’s uncle could, possibly, have legally bought a gun for himself, Abramski’s false statement prevented the dealer from insisting that the true buyer appear in person, provide identifying information, show a photo ID, and submit to a background check. The dealer could not have lawfully sold the gun had it known that Abramski was not the true buyer, so the misstatement was material to the lawfulness of the sale. View "Abramski v. United States" on Justia Law

Bond sought revenge for her husband’s affair by spreading toxic chemicals on Haynes’s car, mailbox, and door knob, in hopes that Haynes would develop a rash. Haynes suffered a minor chemical burn that she treated by rinsing with water. Federal prosecutors charged Bond with violating the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, which forbids any person knowingly to possess or use "any chemical weapon,” 18 U.S.C. 229(a)(1). A “chemical weapon” is “[a]toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter.” A “toxic chemical” is “any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals … regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.” “[P]urposes not prohibited by this chapter” is defined as“[a]ny peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity,” and other specific purposes. Bond pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal. On remand, the Third Circuit rejected her Tenth Amendment argument and an argument that section 229 does not reach her conduct. The Supreme Court reversed. Section 229 does not reach Bond’s simple assault. Seeing “no need to interpret the scope of the international Chemical Weapons Convention,” the Court stated that Bond was prosecuted under a federal statute, which, unlike the treaty, must be read consistent with the principles of federalism. There is no indication that Congress intended to reach purely local crimes; an ordinary speaker would not describe Bond’s feud-driven act of spreading irritating chemicals as involving a “chemical weapon.” The chemicals at issue here bear little resemblance to those whose prohibition was the object of an international Convention. Pennsylvania’s laws are sufficient to prosecute assaults like Bond’s, and the “global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard.“ View "Bond v. United States" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the execution of persons with intellectual disability, Hall asked a Florida state court to vacate his sentence, presenting evidence that included an IQ test score of 71. The court denied relief, determining that a Florida statute mandated that he show an IQ score of 70 or below before being permitted to present any additional intellectual disability evidence. The state’s highest court rejected Hall’s appeal, finding the 70-point threshold constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Florida’s rule disregards established medical practice that an individual score is best understood as a range. While nothing in its statute precludes Florida from considering an IQ test’s standard error of measurement, a statistical fact reflecting the test’s inherent imprecision, the interpretation of the Florida Supreme Court takes an IQ score as conclusive evidence of intellectual capacity. The interpretation fails to recognize that measurement’s inherent imprecision and bars consideration of other relevant evidence, e.g., deficits in adaptive functioning, including evidence of past performance, environment, and upbringing. Current thinking does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane. When a defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits. View "Hall v. Florida" on Justia Law

Martinez was indicted in 2006 on charges of aggravated battery and mob action against the state. After significant delays, caused by both sides, his trial was set to begin on May 17, 2010. His counsel was ready; the prosecution was not because it was unable to locate its complaining witnesses. The court delayed swearing the jurors, but ultimately told the state that it could at that point either have the jury sworn or move to dismiss its case. After several hours, the court swore in the jury and asked the state to present its first witness. It declined to present any evidence or participate in the trial. Martinez successfully moved for a directed not-guilty verdict. The court rejected a motion for a continuance, noting that the prosecution had named other witnesses and that the missing witnesses should have been relatively easy to locate. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the state’s appeal, on the theory that jeopardy never attached because Martinez “was never at risk of conviction.” The Supreme Court reversed, citing the ”bright-line rule” that “jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn.” Martinez may not be retried. View "Martinez v. Illinois" on Justia Law