Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Long-time drug user Banka died after a binge that included use of heroin purchased from Burrage. Burrage pleaded not guilty to charges that he had unlawfully distributed heroin and that “death ... resulted from the use of th[at] substance,” which carries a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). Medical experts testified that Banka might have died even if he had not taken the heroin. The court instructed the jury that the prosecution had to prove only that heroin was a contributing cause of death. The jury convicted Burrage, and the court sentenced him to 20 years. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of death or serious bodily injury, the penalty enhancement does not apply unless such use is a “but-for” cause of the death or injury. The Court declined to address cases in which multiple sufficient causes independently, but concurrently, produce death, because there was no evidence that Banka’s heroin use was an independently sufficient cause of his death. Congress could have written the statute to refer to a “substantial” or “contributing” factor in producing death, but instead used language that imports but-for causality. View "Burrage v. United States" on Justia Law

After Cheever was charged with capital murder, the Kansas Supreme Court found the state death penalty scheme unconstitutional. State prosecutors dismissed their charges to allow federal authorities to prosecute Cheever, who filed notice of intent to introduce expert evidence that methamphetamine intoxication negated his ability to form specific intent. The district court ordered Cheever to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. The federal case was eventually dismissed. In the meantime, the Supreme Court found the Kansas death penalty scheme constitutional. The state brought a second prosecution. Cheever raised a voluntary intoxication defense, offering expert testimony regarding his methamphetamine use. The prosecution sought to present testimony from the expert who had examined Cheever by the federal court order. Defense counsel argued that since Cheever had not agreed to the examination, introduction of the testimony would violate the Fifth Amendment. The trial court allowed the testimony. The jury found Cheever guilty and imposed a death sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court vacated the conviction. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated and remanded. If a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state, the prosecution may present psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. The rule is not limited to situations where the evaluation was requested jointly by the defense and the prosecution, nor does it matter whether state law referred to extreme emotional disturbance as an affirmative defense. The Court rejected an argument that Cheever did not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege because voluntary intoxication is not a mental disease or defect under state law. Mental status, rather than “Mental disease or defect” is the salient issue. When a criminal defendant chooses to testify, the Fifth Amendment does not allow him to refuse to answer related cross-examination questions. Excluding the testimony would have undermined the core truth-seeking function of trial. View "Kansas v. Cheever" on Justia Law

Titlow and Rogers were charged with the murder of Rogers’s husband. After explaining to Titlow that the evidence could support a first-degree murder conviction, Titlow’s attorney negotiated a manslaughter plea in exchange for testimony against Rogers. Three days before trial, Titlow retained a new attorney, Toca, who demanded a lower sentence in exchange for the plea and testimony. The prosecutor rejected the proposal. Titlow withdrew the plea. Rogers was acquitted. Titlow was convicted of second-degree murder. On direct appeal, Titlow argued that Toca provided ineffective assistance by advising plea withdrawal without determining the strength of the evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that Toca’s actions were reasonable, given his client’s claims of innocence. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the factual predicate for the state court’s decision, that the plea withdrawal was based on Titlow’s assertion of innocence, unreasonable, given Toca’s explanation at the withdrawal hearing that the plea offer was higher than the Michigan guidelines sentencing range. The Supreme Court reversed, applying the “doubly deferential” standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The record supports a factual finding that Toca advised withdrawal of the guilty plea only after Titlow’s proclamation of innocence. Titlow passed a polygraph test, discussed the case with a jailer who advised against pleading guilty if Titlow was innocent, and hired Toca days before the trial at which Titlow was to self-incriminate. The facts strongly suggest that Titlow had second thoughts about confessing and proclaimed her innocence. The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that Toca was ineffective because the record contained no evidence that he gave constitutionally adequate advice is contrary to the principle that counsel should be “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance.” That Toca failed to retrieve the file from former counsel before withdrawing the plea cannot overcome that presumption. Titlow admitted in open court that former counsel had explained that the evidence would support a first-degree murder conviction. Toca justifiably relied on this to conclude that Titlow understood the strength of the prosecution’s case. View "Burt v. Titlow" on Justia Law

Officer Stanton and his partner responded to a call about a disturbance involving a person with a baseball bat. Stanton was familiar with the LaMesa neighborhood, known for gang violence. The officers, wearing uniforms and driving a marked police vehicle, approached the location and noticed men walking in the street. Seeing the police car, two men turned into an apartment complex. Patrick crossed the street about 25 yards in front of Stanton’s car and ran toward a residence. Stanton did not see a baseball bat, but considered Patrick’s behavior suspicious and decided to investigate. Stanton exited his car, called out “police,” and ordered Patrick to stop. Patrick did not stop, but “looked directly at Stanton,” and went through the gate of the six-foot wooden fence enclosing Sims’ front yard. Stanton believed that Patrick had committed a jailable misdemeanor by disobeying his order, “fear[ed] for [his] safety” and made the “split-second decision” to kick open the gate. Sims was behind the gate when it flew open, striking and injuring Sims. Sims sued, 42 U. S. C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to Stanton. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Stanton’s warrantless entry was unconstitutional because Sims had the same expectation of privacy in her curtilage as in her home itself, there was no immediate danger, and Patrick had committed only a minor offense; under clearly established law Stanton’s pursuit of Patrick did not justify warrantless entry and Stanton was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that courts nationwide are divided on whether an officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a home without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that suspect. The Ninth Circuit read “too broadly” Supreme Court precedent that did not involve hot pursuit. The Court did not determine whether Stanton’s entry was constitutional; Stanton may have been mistaken in believing his actions were justified, but was not “plainly incompetent.” View "Stanton v. Sims" on Justia Law

The Comptroller is sole trustee and chooses investments for the employee pension fund of the state of New York and its local governments. The Comptroller’s general counsel recommended against investing in a fund managed by FA; the general counsel then received anonymous e-mails demanding that he recommend the investment and threatening to disclose information about the general counsel’s alleged affair. Some of the e-mails were traced to the home computer of Sekhar, a managing partner of FA, who was convicted of attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The Act defines “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” The jury specified that the property at issue was the general counsel’s recommendation to approve the investment. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Attempting to compel a person to recommend that his employer approve an investment does not constitute “the obtaining of property from another” under the Hobbs Act. Congress generally intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses. Extortion historically required the obtaining of items of value, typically cash, from the victim. The Act’s text requires not only deprivation, but the acquisition of property; the property, therefore, must be transferable. No fluent English-speaker would say that “petitioner obtained and exercised the general counsel’s right to make a recommendation,” any more than he would say that a person “obtained and exercised another’s right to free speech.” View "Sekhar v. United States" on Justia Law

Kebodeaux was convicted by special court-martial of a federal sex offense. After serving his sentence and receiving a bad-conduct discharge from the Air Force, he moved to Texas where he registered with state authorities as a sex offender. Congress later enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which requires federal sex offenders to register in the states where they live, study, and work, 42 U.S.C. 16913(a). SORNA applies to offenders who, when SORNA became law, had completed their sentences. When Kebodeaux moved within Texas and failed to update his registration, the federal government prosecuted him and the district court convicted him under SORNA. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that SORNA’s registration requirements, as applied to Kebodeaux, fall within the scope of congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress did not apply SORNA to an individual who was, before its enactment, “unconditionally released,” but to an individual already subject to federal registration requirements. SORNA somewhat modified registration requirements to which Kebodeaux was already subject, to make more uniform "a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration requirements." At the time of his offense and conviction, Kebodeaux was subject to the Wetterling Act, which imposed similar registration requirements and was promulgated under the Military Regulation Clause (Art. I, s. 8, cl. 14), and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The same power that authorized Congress to promulgate the Uniform Code of Military Justice and punish Kebodeaux’s crime also authorized Congress to make the civil registration requirement at issue a consequence of conviction. Imposing a civil registration requirement that would apply upon the release of an offender like Kebodeaux is “eminently reasonable,” as is assignment of a special role to the federal government in ensuring compliance with federal sex offender registration requirements. View "United States v. Kebodeaux" on Justia Law

Based on the 1978 strangling death of a 74-year-old, Schad was convicted in 1985 of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After extensive Arizona state and federal court proceedings, the Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari and for rehearing. Schad immediately moved for a stay pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in a separate en banc case The Ninth Circuit denied the motion, stating that an indefinite stay “would unduly interfere with Arizona’s execution process,” but also declined to issue its mandate as normally required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(d)(2)(D). The court instead, sua sponte, construed Schad’s motion as a motion to reconsider a motion that it had denied six months earlier and remanded to the district court. Arizona then set an execution date. Based on its review of that previously rejected motion, the Ninth Circuit issued a stay a few days before Schad’s scheduled execution. The Supreme Court granted Arizona’s petition to vacate the stay and remanded with instructions to issue the mandate immediately, without any further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit did not demonstrate that exceptional circumstances justified withholding its mandate; its failure to issue its mandate constituted an abuse of discretion. View "Ryan v. Schad" on Justia Law

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) increases the sentences of federal defendants who have three prior convictions “for a violent felony,” including “burglary, arson, or extortion,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Under the “categorical approach” courts compare the statutory elements of a prior conviction with the elements of the “generic” crime, the offense as commonly understood. If the statutory elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense, a prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. A “modified categorical approach” is employed when a prior conviction is for violating a “divisible statute” that sets out one or more elements in the alternative, such as burglary involving entry into a building or an automobile. That approach permits the court to consult certain documents, such as indictments and jury instructions, to determine which alternative element was the basis of the prior conviction. Descamps, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, had three prior convictions, including one under a California statute, which provides that a “person who enters” certain locations “with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.” The district court concluded that the conviction could serve as an ACCA predicate. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Instead of reviewing extra-statutory documents only to determine which alternative element was the basis for the conviction, the Ninth Circuit examined those materials to discover what the defendant actually did. Generic unlawful entry is not an element, or an alternative element of, the California law, so a conviction under that statute is never for generic burglary and ACCA enhancement was improper. The modified categorical approach does not apply to statutes that contain a single, indivisible set of elements. An elements-centric categorical approach is consistent with ACCA’s text and history, avoids Sixth Amendment concerns arising from sentencing courts’ making factual findings that properly belong to juries, and averts “the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach.” View "Descamps v. United States" on Justia Law

Alleyne was convicted using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. The sentences increases to a seven-year minimum if the firearm is brandished, 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and to a 10-year minimum if it is discharged, 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The jury form indicated that Alleyne had “[u]sed or carried a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence,” but not that the firearm was “[b]randished.” Alleyne objected to a sentencing report recommendation of a seven-year term, arguing that the jury did not find brandishing beyond a reasonable doubt and that raising his mandatory minimum sentence based on a judge’s finding of brandishing would violate his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The district court overruled the objection. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, overruling Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 and applying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime and any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury. Defining facts that increase a mandatory minimum as part of the substantive offense enables a defendant to predict the applicable penalty from the face of the indictment and preserves the jury’s role as intermediary between the state and criminal defendants. Because the fact of brandishing aggravates the prescribed range of allowable sentences, it constitutes an element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the jury, regardless of what sentence the defendant might have received had a different range been applicable. The Court noted that its ruling does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury. View "Alleyne v. United States" on Justia Law

Without being placed in custody or receiving Miranda warnings, the defendant voluntarily answered questions about a murder. He fell silent when asked whether ballistics testing would match his shotgun to casings found at the murder scene. At trial in Texas state court, over defendant’s objection, the prosecution used his failure to answer as evidence of guilt. Defendant was convicted and state courts of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the defendant did not expressly invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to the question. A witness who desires the protection of the privilege must claim it at the time he relies on it. A defendant need not take the stand and assert the privilege at trial, but there is no comparable unqualified right not to speak during a police interview. Failure to invoke the privilege must be excused if governmental coercion makes its forfeiture involuntary, but this defendant agreed to accompany officers to the station and was free to leave at any time. Neither silence nor official suspicion is sufficient by itself to relieve a witness of the obligation to expressly invoke the privilege and they do not do so together. The Court rejected arguments that reliance on the Fifth Amendment privilege is the most likely explanation for silence in a case like this, stating that such silence is “insolubly ambiguous,” and that it would be unfair to require a suspect unschooled in the particulars of legal doctrine to do anything more than remain silent in order to invoke his “right to remain silent.” View "Salinas v. Texas" on Justia Law