Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1998, defendant allegedly forced his way into the apartment of his former girlfriend, Heathmon,raped and hit her, stole a ring, and dragged her outside by the neck and hair. A witness confronted him and defendant fled. Police observed injuries to Heathmon’s neck and scalp, consistent with her account. Defendant was arrested. Although he did not testify at trial, his statements to police were admitted into evidence. He claimed that the sex was consensual and denied dragging Heathmon, but admitted that she might have felt threatened and that he hit her. Before trial, Heathmon sent the judge a letter recanting her accusations and stating that she would not testify. She went into hiding, but police took her into custody as a material witness. Heatthmon disavowed the letter and agreed to testify. She stated that defendant’s associates had forced her to write the letter and had threatened to hurt her if she testified. At trial, the defense sought to introduce testimony and police reports showing that Heathmon had called the police on prior occasions claiming that defendant had raped or assaulted her. Police were unable to corroborate many of those allegations. Although the court gave the defense wide latitude to cross¬examine Heathmon, it refused to admit the police reports or to allow the defense to call involved officers as witnesses. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. After exhausting state remedies, defendant filed a federal habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The district court denied relief, but a divided Ninth Circuit reversed, finding violation of defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, and that the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision was reasonable. The Constitution grants broad latitude in establishing rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. The Nevada statute generally precludes admission of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime, Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.085(3). The state has “good reason[s]” for limiting use of extrinsic evidence, and its statute is akin to the widely accepted rule of evidence. The statute has an exception for previous fabricated sexual assault accusations, but the defendant must file written notice, and the trial court must hold a hearing. Defendant did not file the requisite notice. No decision of the Supreme Court clearly establishes that the notice requirement is unconstitutional. Some of the evidence that defendant sought to introduce concerned prior incidents that did not involve alleged sexual assault; the state court reasoned that the proffered evidence had little impeachment value because it showed simply that the victim’s reports could not be corroborated. The admission of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness’ conduct to impeach the witness may confuse the jury, unfairly embarrass the victim, surprise the prosecution, and unduly prolong a trial. The Supreme Court has never held that the Confrontation Clause entitles a criminal defendant to introduce extrinsic evidence for impeachment. View "Nevada v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After his arrest on first- and second-degree assault charges, King was processed through a Wicomico County, Maryland, facility, where personnel used a cheek swab to take a DNA sample pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act (Act), which authorizes officers to collect DNA samples from persons charged with violent crimes. A sample may not be added to a database before an individual is arraigned, and it must be destroyed if he is not convicted. Only identity information may be added to the database. King’s swab was matched to an unsolved 2003 rape. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the DNA match. The Maryland Court of Appeals set aside his conviction, finding portions of the Act authorizing DNA collection from felony arrestees unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed. Taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold and bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, for a serious offense. DNA testing involves minimal intrusion that may significantly improve both the criminal justice system and police investigative practices; it is quick and painless and requires no intrusion beneath the skin. When probable cause exists to remove an individual from the normal channels of society and hold him in legal custody, DNA identification plays a critical role in serving interests in properly identifying who has been arrested, ensuring that the custody of an arrestee does not create inordinate risks for staff, for the existing detainee population, and for a new detainee, and in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available for trials. Identifying an arrestee as the perpetrator of some heinous crime may have the salutary effect of freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned. The Court noted that the test does not reveal an arrestee’s genetic traits and is unlikely to reveal any private medical information. View "Maryland v. King" on Justia Law

Trevino was convicted of capital murder in Texas state court and sentenced to death. Neither new counsel appointed for direct appeal nor new counsel appointed for state collateral review raised the claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating circumstances. When that claim was finally raised in Trevino’s federal habeas petition, the district court stayed proceedings so Trevino could raise it in state court. The state court found the claim procedurally defaulted. The federal court concluded that this failure was an independent and adequate state ground barring federal courts from considering the claim. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court subsequently held, in Martinez v. Ryan, that “a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the [State’s] initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” Martinez concerned a prisoner from Arizona, where state law required the prisoner to raise the claim during his first state collateral review proceeding. Texas law does not require a defendant to raise his ineffective-assistance claim on collateral review and the Fifth Circuit subsequently held that Martinez was inapplicable to Texas cases. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Where, as here, state procedures make it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise an ineffective-¬assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal, the Martinez exception applies. Texas procedures make it nearly impossible for an ineffective-assistance claim to be presented on direct review; a writ of habeas corpus is normally needed to gather the facts necessary for evaluating such claims. Were Martinez not to apply, the Texas procedural system would create significant unfairness. The Court noted Texas courts’ own “well-supported determination that collateral review normally is the preferred procedural route for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.” Failure to consider a lawyer’s “ineffectiveness” during an initial-review collateral proceeding as a potential “cause” for excusing a procedural default will deprive the defendant of any opportunity for review of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. View "Trevino v. Thaler" on Justia Law

Henderson was stabbed to death after leaving a party with Perkins and Jones. Perkins was charged with murder. Jones testified that Perkins alone committed the murder while Jones watched. Perkins testified that Jones and Henderson left him during the evening, and that he later saw Jones with blood on his clothing. Perkins was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 gives a state prisoner one year to file a federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U. S. C. 244(d)(1)(A). If the petition alleges newly-discovered evidence, the filing deadline is one year from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim ... could have been discovered through ... due diligence.” More than 11 years after his conviction became final in 1997, Perkins filed his federal habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To overcome AEDPA’s time limitations, he asserted newly discovered evidence of actual innocence in the form of three affidavits, the most recent dated July 16, 2002, each pointing to Jones as the murderer. The district court found that, even if the affidavits could be characterized as evidence newly discovered, Perkins had failed to show diligence entitling him to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s limitations period, and, alternatively, that Perkins had not shown that, taking account of all the evidence, no reasonable juror would have convicted him. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Perkins’ actual-innocence claim allowed him to present his ineffective-assistance claim as if it had been filed on time. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. A federal habeas court, faced with an actual-innocence gateway claim, should count unjustifiable delay on a habeas petitioner’s part, not as an absolute barrier to relief, but as a factor in determining whether actual innocence has been reliably shown. A petitioner invoking the miscarriage of justice exception must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Unexplained delay in presenting new evidence bears on the determination whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing. The district court’s appraisal of Perkins’ petition as insufficient to meet the demanding Schlup standard for actual innocence should be dispositive, absent cause to upset that evaluation. View "McQuiggin v. Perkins" on Justia Law

In 1993, Lancaster, a former police officer with a long history of severe mental-health problems, killed his girlfriend. At his jury trial in Michigan state court, Lancaster asserted a defense of diminished capacity. Under then-prevailing Michigan Court of Appeals precedent, the diminished-capacity defense permitted a legally sane defendant to present evidence of mental illness to negate the specific intent required to commit a particular crime. The jury convicted him of first-degree murder. Lancaster later obtained federal habeas relief. By the time of Lancaster’s retrial, the Michigan Supreme Court had rejected the diminished-capacity defense in its 2001 decision, Carpenter. The judge at his second trial applied Carpenter and disallowed renewal of his diminished-capacity defense. Lancaster was again convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Lancaster’s argument that retroactive application of Carpenter violated due process. Lancaster reasserted his due process claim in a federal habeas petition. The district court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that Lancaster is not entitled to federal habeas relief. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ rejection of Lancaster’s due process claim does not represent an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, 28 U. S. C.2254(d)(1). In Carpenter, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected a diminished-capacity defense, reasonably finding the defense to have no origin in an on-point statute. The Supreme Court has never found a due process violation where a state supreme court, squarely addressing a particular issue for the first time, rejected a consistent line of lower court decisions based on the supreme court’s reasonable interpretation of a controlling statute. Fair-minded jurists could conclude that a state supreme court decision of that order is not “unexpected and indefensible by reference to [existing] law.” View "Metrish v. Lancaster" on Justia Law

Moncrieffe, a Jamaican citizen legally in the U.S., was found with 1.3 grams of marijuana in his car. He pleaded guilty under Georgia law to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a noncitizen convicted of an “aggravated felony” is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and ineligible for discretionary relief. The INA lists as an “aggravated felony” “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,” including conviction of an offense that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes punishable as a felony (by more than one year’s imprisonment). A state conviction is a felony punishable under the CSA only if it involves conduct punishable as a felony under federal law. Possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a CSA offense, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. An Immigration Judge ordered Moncrieffe removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting reliance on section 841(b)(4), which makes marijuana distribution punishable as a misdemeanor if the offense involves a small amount for no remuneration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. If a noncitizen’s conviction for marijuana distribution fails to establish that the offense involved either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, it is not an aggravated felony under the INA. The Court employed the “categorical approach,” examining what the state conviction necessarily involved and not the facts underlying the case, and presuming that the conviction involved the least of the acts criminalized. Conviction under Georgia’s statute, alone, does not reveal whether either remuneration or more than a small amount was involved, so Moncrieffe’s conviction could correspond to either the CSA felony or the CSA misdemeanor. The Court rejected an argument that section 841(b)(4) was merely a mitigating sentencing factor, not an element of the offense. The government’s proposal that noncitizens be allowed, during immigration proceedings, to demonstrate that their convictions involved only a small amount of marijuana and no remuneration is inconsistent with the INA’s text and the categorical approach and would burden immigration courts and the noncitizens involved. Escaping aggravated felony treatment does not necessarily mean escaping deportation, because any marijuana distribution offense renders a noncitizen deportable as a controlled substances offender, but with an opportunity seek relief from removal. View "Moncrieffe v. Holder" on Justia Law

McNeely, stopped for speeding and crossing the centerline, declined to take a breath test to measure his blood alcohol concentration (BAC). He was arrested and taken to a hospital. The officer never attempted to secure a search warrant. McNeely refused to consent, but the officer directed a lab technician to take a sample. McNeely’s BAC tested above the legal limit, and he was charged with driving while intoxicated. The trial court suppressed the test result, concluding that the exigency exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because, apart from the fact that McNeely’s blood alcohol was dissipating, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an emergency. The Missouri Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. The Court looked to the “totality of circumstances,” declining to announce a per se rule. When officers in drunk-driving investigations can reasonably obtain a warrant before having a blood sample drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so. Circumstances may make obtaining a warrant impractical such that dissipation will support an exigency, but that is a reason to decide each case on its facts. Blood testing is different in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases; BAC evidence naturally dissipates in a gradual and relatively predictable manner. Because an officer must typically obtain a trained medical professional’s assistance before having a blood test conducted, some delay between the time of the arrest and time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether a warrant is obtained. View "Missouri v. McNeely" on Justia Law

Rodgers was charged with making criminal threats, assault with a firearm, and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Before arraignment, he executed a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, electing to represent himself. Before his preliminary hearing, Rodgers retained counsel. Two months later, he fired his lawyer and again waived counsel. Two months after that, Rodgers again changed his mind and asked the court to appoint an attorney. The court did so. Shortly before trial, he again surrendered his right to counsel. He proceeded to trial pro se. In June 2003, a California jury returned a verdict of guilty. After the verdict was read, Rodgers requested an attorney to help him move for a new trial. When offered a chance to supplement or explain his motion at a later hearing, Rodgers declined to do so. The trial court denied the request for counsel and the motion for a new trial. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentence. The federal district court denied habeas corpus. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that, in light of the tension between the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of “the right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process,” and its concurrent promise of “a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when [defendant] voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so,” it cannot be said that California’s approach was contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Court’s assistance-of-counsel cases. The Court expressed no view on the merits of the underlying Sixth Amendment principle. View "Marshall v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the government’s sovereign immunity from tort suits, but excepts from that waiver certain intentional torts, 28 U. S. C. 2680(h). Section 2680(h) contains a proviso that extends the waiver of immunity to claims for six intentional torts, including assault and battery, that are based on the “acts or omissions” of an “investigative or law enforcement officer” “who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests.” A federal prisoner, sued the United States under the FTCA, alleging assault and battery by correctional officers. The district court granted the government summary judgment; the Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the “law enforcement proviso” applies only to tortious conduct that occurs during the course of executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. The Supreme Court reversed. The law enforcement proviso extends to law enforcement officers’ acts or omissions that arise within the scope of employment, regardless of whether the officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. Congress intended immunity determinations to depend on a federal officer’s legal authority, not on a particular exercise of that authority. Nor does the proviso indicate that a waiver of immunity requires the officer to be engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity. View "Millbrook v. United States" on Justia Law

Police took a drug-sniffing dog to Jardines’ front porch, where the dog gave a positive alert for narcotics. The officers then obtained a warrant for a search, which revealed marijuana plants. Jardines was charged with trafficking in cannabis. The Supreme Court of Florida approved the trial court’s suppression of the evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. The investigation of Jardines' home was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. When the Government obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment has "undoubtedly occurred." The right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion is the "very core” of the Fourth Amendment. The area immediately surrounding and associated with the home, the curtilage, is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area to which the activity of home life extends. The officers' entry was not explicitly or implicitly invited. Officers need not "shield their eyes" when passing a home on public thoroughfares but "no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave." A police officer without a warrant may approach a home in hopes of speaking to occupants, because that is “no more than any private citizen might do” but the scope of a license is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose, and there is no customary invitation to enter the curtilage simply to conduct a search. View "Florida v. Jardines" on Justia Law