Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the government’s sovereign immunity from tort suits, but excepts from that waiver certain intentional torts, 28 U. S. C. 2680(h). Section 2680(h) contains a proviso that extends the waiver of immunity to claims for six intentional torts, including assault and battery, that are based on the “acts or omissions” of an “investigative or law enforcement officer” “who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests.” A federal prisoner, sued the United States under the FTCA, alleging assault and battery by correctional officers. The district court granted the government summary judgment; the Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the “law enforcement proviso” applies only to tortious conduct that occurs during the course of executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. The Supreme Court reversed. The law enforcement proviso extends to law enforcement officers’ acts or omissions that arise within the scope of employment, regardless of whether the officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. Congress intended immunity determinations to depend on a federal officer’s legal authority, not on a particular exercise of that authority. Nor does the proviso indicate that a waiver of immunity requires the officer to be engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity. View "Millbrook v. United States" on Justia Law

Police took a drug-sniffing dog to Jardines’ front porch, where the dog gave a positive alert for narcotics. The officers then obtained a warrant for a search, which revealed marijuana plants. Jardines was charged with trafficking in cannabis. The Supreme Court of Florida approved the trial court’s suppression of the evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. The investigation of Jardines' home was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. When the Government obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment has "undoubtedly occurred." The right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion is the "very core” of the Fourth Amendment. The area immediately surrounding and associated with the home, the curtilage, is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area to which the activity of home life extends. The officers' entry was not explicitly or implicitly invited. Officers need not "shield their eyes" when passing a home on public thoroughfares but "no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave." A police officer without a warrant may approach a home in hopes of speaking to occupants, because that is “no more than any private citizen might do” but the scope of a license is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose, and there is no customary invitation to enter the curtilage simply to conduct a search. View "Florida v. Jardines" on Justia Law

A California jury convicted Williams of murder. On direct appeal she claimed that questioning and dismissal of a juror during deliberations violated the Sixth Amendment and California law. Holding that the juror had been properly dismissed for bias, the California Court of Appeal quoted a Supreme Court definition of “impartiality,” but did not expressly acknowledge that it was deciding a Sixth Amendment issue. The state’s highest court remanded in light of its intervening decision that a trial court abused its discretion by dismissing, for failure to deliberate, a juror who appeared to disagree with the rest of the jury. Reaffirming its prior decision, the court of appeal discussed that decision and again failed to expressly acknowledge the federal claim. Williams ought federal habeas relief. The district court applied the deferential standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act for claims already “adjudicated on the merits in State court,” 28 U. S. C. 2254(d). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state court had not considered Williams’ Sixth Amendment claim, reviewed that claim de novo, and found violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed. When a state court rules against a defendant in an opinion that rejects some of the defendant’s claims but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits for purposes of AEDPA. Applying that rebuttable presumption, the Ninth Circuit erred. Several facts indicate that the state court did consider the Sixth Amendment claim. View "Johnson v. Williams" on Justia Law

The district court increased the length of Henderson’s sentence so he could participate in a prison drug rehabilitation program. Henderson’s counsel did not object to the sentence, but, on appeal, Henderson claimed plain error. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided, in Tapia v. United States, that it is error for a court to impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment pro¬gram or otherwise to promote rehabilitation. The Fifth Circuit determined that Rule 52(b) did not give it authority to correct the error, reasoning that an error is “plain” only if it was clear under law at the time of trial. The Supreme Court reversed. Regardless of whether a legal question was settled or unsettled at the time of trial, an error is “plain” under Rule 52(b) if it was plain at the time of appellate review. If “plain error” covers trial court decisions that were plainly correct when made and those that were plainly incorrect when made, it should cover cases where the law was unsettled. A “time of review” interpretation furthers the basic principle that “an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,” works little harm upon the competing principle that insists that counsel call a potential error to the trial court’s attention, and is consistent with Rule 52(b)’s purpose of creating a fairness-based exception to the general requirement that an objection be made at trial to preserve a claim of error. View "Henderson v. United States" on Justia Law

After the State of Michigan rested its case at Evans’ arson trial, the court granted a directed verdict of acquittal, concluding that the state had failed to prove that the burned building was not a dwelling, a fact the court mistakenly believed was an “element” of the statutory offense. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for retrial. In affirming, the state’s highest court held that a directed verdict based on an error of law that did not resolve a factual element of the charged offense was not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. The Supreme Court reversed; the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. An acquittal encompasses any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense. Unlike procedural rulings, which lead to dismissals or mistrials on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, acquittals are substantive rulings that conclude proceedings absolutely, and raise significant double jeopardy concerns. The trial court clearly evaluated the state’s evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. The acquittal was the product of an erroneous interpretation of governing legal principles, but that error affects only the accuracy of the determination to acquit, not its essential character. View "Evans v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Officer Wheetley pulled Harris over for a routine traffic stop. Wheetley sought consent to search Harris’s truck, based on Harris’s nervousness and seeing an open beer can. When Harris refused, Wheetley executed a sniff test with his trained narcotics dog, Aldo, who alerted at the driver’s-side door, leading Wheetley to conclude that he had probable cause to search. The search turned up nothing Aldo was trained to detect, but did reveal ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine. Harris was charged with illegal possession of those ingredients. In a subsequent stop while Harris was out on bail, Aldo again alerted on Harris’s truck but nothing of interest was found. The trial court denied a motion to suppress. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that if an officer failed to keep records of field performance, including how many times a dog falsely alerted, he could never have probable cause to think the dog a reliable indicator of drugs. The Supreme Court reversed. Training and testing records supported Aldo’s reliability in detecting drugs and Harris failed to undermine that evidence, so Wheetley had probable cause to search. Whether an officer has probable cause depends on the totality of the circumstances, not rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries. Requiring the state to introduce comprehensive documentation of a dog’s prior hits and misses in the field is the antithesis of a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Field records may sometimes be relevant, but the court should evaluate all the evidence, and should not prescribe an inflexible set of requirements. View "Florida v. Harris" on Justia Law

While police were preparing to execute a search warrant for a basement apartment, detectives in an unmarked car outside the apartment saw two men, later identified as Bailey and Middleton, leave the gated area above the apartment, get in a car, and drive away. The detectives followed for about a mile, then stopped the car. They found keys during a pat-down search of Bailey, who said that he resided in the apartment. He later denied it when informed of the search. The men were handcuffed and driven to the apartment, where the search team had found a gun and illicit drugs. One of Bailey’s keys unlocked the apartment’s door. The district court denied Bailey’s motion to suppress the key and statement, holding that Bailey’s detention was justified under Michigan v. Summers, as a detention incident to execution of a search warrant, and, in the alternative, that the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio. Bailey was convicted. The Second Circuit affirmed, without ruling on the Terry claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for determination of whether Terry applies. The rule in Summers, permitting detention even if there is no particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a specific danger to officers, is limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. None of the law enforcement interests identified in Summers applies with similar force to the detention of recent occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. View "Bailey v. United States" on Justia Law

Smith claimed that drug conspiracy charges under 21 U. S. C.846 and 18 U. S. C. 1962(d), were barred by 18 U. S. C.3282’s five-year statute of limitations. The district court instructed the jury to convict Smith if the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracies existed, that Smith was a member, and that the conspiracies continued within the limitations period. As to the affirmative defense of withdrawal, the court instructed the jury that Smith had the burden to prove withdrawal outside the limitations period by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith was convicted. The D. C. Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed. Allocating to the defendant the burden of proving withdrawal does not violate the Due Process Clause. Unless an affirmative defense negates an element of the crime, the government has no constitutional duty to overcome the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Withdrawal does not negate an element of conspiracy but only terminates a defendant’s liability for co-conspirators’ post-withdrawal acts. Withdrawal that occurs beyond the limitations period provides a complete defense to prosecution, but that does not give the prosecution a constitutional responsibility to prove that he did not withdraw. Because the statutes do not address the burden of proof for withdrawal, it is presumed that the common law rule applies.. A conspiracy continues until it is terminated or, as to a particular defendant, until that defendant withdraws and the burden of establishing withdrawal rests upon the defendant. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

Gonzales, an Arizona death row inmate, sought federal habeas relief. Counsel sought a stay, contending that mental incompetence prevented Gonzales from rationally communicating with or assisting counsel, and that 18 U. S. C.3599(a)(2) requires a stay when a petitioner is adjudged incompetent. The district court denied a stay, finding that Gonzales’ claims were record based or resolvable as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit held that Gonzales had a right to a stay pending a competency determination. Carter, an Ohio death row inmate, initiated federal habeas proceedings but later moved for a competency determination and stay. The district court granted the motion, found Carter incompetent, dismissed his petition without prejudice, and prospectively tolled the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit identified a right to competence in 18 U. S. C. 4241 and ordered indefinite stay with respect to claims requiring assistance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 3599 does not provide a state prisoner a right to suspension of federal habeas proceedings when he is adjudged incompetent and that Section 4241 does not provide a right to competence during federal habeas proceedings. Review of record-based claims, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), is limited to the record before the state court that heard the case on the merits and extra-record evidence concerning such claims is inadmissible. View "Ryan v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

In each of two underlying cases, a 14-year-old was convicted of murder and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The highest courts of Alabama and Arkansas upheld the sentences. The Supreme Court reversed. The Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. Children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes. Their lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility lead to recklessness, impulsiveness, and heedless risk-taking. They are more vulnerable to negative influences and lack ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. A child’s actions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity. The mandatory penalty schemes at issue prevent the sentencing court from considering youth and from assessing whether the harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. Life-without-parole sentences share characteristics with death sentences, demanding individualized sentencing. The Court rejected the states’ argument that courts and prosecutors sufficiently consider a juvenile defendant’s age, background and the circumstances of his crime, when deciding whether to try him as an adult. The argument ignores that many states use mandatory transfer systems or lodge the decision in the hands of the prosecutors, rather than courts.