Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jonathan Joshua Munafo pleaded guilty to two charges related to his involvement in the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. The district court accepted his plea and sentenced him to 33 months in prison, within the agreed U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of 30-37 months. Munafo appealed, arguing that the government breached his plea agreement by not dismissing a pending misdemeanor assault charge in D.C. Superior Court and by referring to his past statements and affiliations during sentencing.The district court for the District of Columbia had accepted Munafo's guilty plea and sentenced him based on the agreed guidelines. Munafo did not raise the issue of the pending misdemeanor charge until after his sentencing, and the court did not rule on it, suggesting instead that Munafo's counsel discuss it with the U.S. Attorney's Office. Munafo also objected to the government's sentencing presentation, claiming it breached the plea agreement by including information beyond the agreed-upon Statement of Offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Munafo forfeited his objection regarding the dismissal of the misdemeanor charge by not pressing it before the district court. Additionally, the court found that the plea agreement did not support Munafo's interpretation that the government was required to dismiss the pending charge. The court also held that the government's references during sentencing did not breach the plea agreement, as the agreement allowed both parties to describe fully the nature and seriousness of Munafo's misconduct.Munafo's claim that his sentence appeared to be based on his constitutionally protected political speech and affiliations was also rejected. The court noted that Munafo had waived his right to appeal his sentence unless it exceeded the statutory maximum or guidelines range, and he did not make a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice. The court affirmed Munafo's sentence. View "USA v. Munafo" on Justia Law

On January 6, 2021, Darrell Neely, a radio host, entered the U.S. Capitol building during the riot that disrupted the certification of the 2020 presidential election. Neely spent over an hour inside the Capitol, during which he stole items belonging to the U.S. Capitol Police. He was later indicted and convicted of five misdemeanor offenses, resulting in a 28-month prison sentence. Neely appealed, challenging the denial of three pretrial motions on statutory and constitutional grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Neely's motions to dismiss certain charges, transfer venue, and suppress a confession. Neely argued that the statute under which he was charged did not apply to his conduct, that he could not receive a fair trial in the District of Columbia, and that his confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The District Court rejected these arguments, leading to Neely's conviction and sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Neely's appeal. The court held that the statute in question did apply to Neely's conduct, as it did not specify that only the Secret Service could restrict the relevant areas. The court also found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Regarding the motion to suppress, the court determined that Neely's Miranda rights were not violated, as there was no evidence of a deliberate two-step interrogation strategy by the FBI. Finally, the court upheld the denial of the motion to transfer venue, finding no presumption of jury prejudice. Consequently, the court affirmed Neely's convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Neely" on Justia Law

James Little participated in the January 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol, where he roamed the Senate Gallery, took photographs, and sent messages to his family and friends. He pleaded guilty to one count of Parading, Demonstrating, or Picketing in a Capitol Building, a violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G), which carries a maximum punishment of six months in prison or five years of probation. The district court initially sentenced him to 60 days in prison followed by three years of probation.Little appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred by imposing both imprisonment and probation for a single violation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court resentenced Little to 150 days in prison, giving him credit for the 60 days already served and an additional 30 days for the time spent on probation.Little appealed again, claiming that his new sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with Little's arguments. The court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the imposition of additional punishment because the time Little served on the original sentence was credited against his new sentence. The court also found that Little had no legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence because he had appealed it. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Little's new sentence of 150 days in prison. View "USA v. Little" on Justia Law

Bryan Burwell and Aaron Perkins were involved in a series of bank robberies and were convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, including mandatory minimum sentences for firearms-related convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which mandates enhanced penalties for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Burwell and Perkins argued that their convictions under § 924(c) were erroneous because federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is not categorically a crime of violence.The District Court denied their post-conviction motions, which challenged the application of § 924(c) based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, which invalidated the residual clause of § 924(c) as unconstitutionally vague. Burwell and Perkins appealed, arguing that bank robbery by extortion does not involve the use or threat of force and thus cannot be considered a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is indivisible regarding the means of committing bank robbery—by force and violence, intimidation, or extortion. The court concluded that extortion, as a means of committing bank robbery, does not necessarily involve the use or threat of force. Therefore, bank robbery under § 2113(a) does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c). Consequently, the court vacated Burwell's and Perkins's § 924(c) convictions and remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether to release them immediately. View "United States v. Burwell" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who entered the U.S. Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021, during the certification of the Electoral College votes. The grounds were restricted to protect Vice President Pence, who was present. The defendant, along with others, breached the security perimeter and remained in the restricted area for about two hours. He was charged with knowingly entering and remaining in a restricted area without lawful authority, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a bench trial and found the defendant guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1). The court held that the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew the specific reason for the restriction, only that he knew the area was restricted. The court sentenced the defendant to fourteen days of incarceration and one year of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the statute requires only that the defendant knowingly entered or remained in a restricted area, not that he knew the specific reason for the restriction. The court emphasized that requiring proof of knowledge of the specific reason would undermine the statute's purpose of protecting Secret Service protectees. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant knew the area was restricted when he entered and remained there. View "USA v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Michael Riley, a former Capitol Police officer, was convicted of obstructing a federal grand jury investigation into the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. The day after the attack, Riley advised a rioter, Jacob Hiles, to delete a Facebook post admitting he had been inside the Capitol. When Riley learned that his communications with Hiles might be investigated, he deleted their direct messages and call logs. A jury convicted Riley of one count of obstruction of an official proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) for these deletions but could not reach a verdict on another count related to his advice to Hiles.The District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced Riley to probation and a fine. Riley appealed, arguing that the government failed to prove that a grand jury proceeding was foreseeable or that he intended to obstruct such a proceeding. He also claimed various trial errors.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the indictment sufficiently alleged that Riley intended to obstruct a foreseeable grand jury proceeding. The evidence showed that Riley, an experienced officer, knew that felony charges were likely for those involved in the Capitol breach and that a grand jury would be convened. The court also held that Riley's deletion of messages had a clear nexus to the foreseeable grand jury investigation.Riley's claims of constructive amendment and prejudicial variance were rejected, as the evidence at trial matched the indictment's allegations. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's partial denial of Riley's discovery requests and rejected his claim of judicial bias.The D.C. Circuit affirmed Riley's conviction, holding that the government had sufficiently proven that Riley intended to obstruct a foreseeable grand jury proceeding by deleting his communications with Hiles. View "USA v. Riley" on Justia Law

Terrell Armstead was convicted of sex trafficking through coercion. During jury deliberations, a juror was dismissed for failing to disclose her father's criminal history during voir dire. The district court then instructed the jury to return any partial verdicts due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which made future deliberations impossible. Armstead argued that the juror's dismissal and the instruction to return a partial verdict were improper.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the juror for lack of candor during voir dire, noting multiple instances where she failed to disclose her father's convictions. The court found this misconduct sufficient to justify her removal, independent of her views on the evidence. The jury, after the dismissal, returned a guilty verdict on one count and no verdict on the remaining counts. Armstead was sentenced to 276 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the juror, as her lack of candor during voir dire constituted good cause under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(3). The appellate court also found that the instruction to return a partial verdict was not coercive and did not violate the Sixth Amendment. The instruction was neutral and did not pressure the jury to reach a verdict. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. Armstead" on Justia Law

Five police officers from the Crime Suppression Team were patrolling Southeast Washington, D.C., when they encountered Antonio Malachi Bryant. Upon searching him, they found a firearm. Bryant, a previously convicted felon, was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the gun, arguing it was obtained through an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Bryant’s motion to suppress. The court found that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to seize Bryant when they observed a bulge in his waistband, which they believed to be a weapon. The court concluded that the seizure was constitutional and did not need to determine the exact moment the encounter turned into a seizure, as the reasonable suspicion was established by the time the bulge was observed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain and search Bryant when they saw the bulge in his waistband. The court found that Bryant was not seized until after the officers observed the bulge, and thus the seizure was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The court also noted that the officers’ approach and initial questioning did not constitute a seizure, as police officers are permitted to approach individuals in public places without it being considered a seizure. The court concluded that the District Court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "USA v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Naquel Henderson pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(1) and (b)(1). After his plea but before sentencing, the Supreme Court in Rehaif v. United States held that the government must prove a defendant knew they possessed a firearm and belonged to a prohibited category. Henderson did not appeal directly but later moved to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowing and voluntary.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Henderson's motion, finding he failed to show cause for procedural default, actual prejudice, or actual innocence. The court noted that Henderson knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm, as evidenced by his prior conviction and interactions with the judicial system.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Henderson did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial if informed of the Rehaif decision. The court found substantial evidence that Henderson knew of his felon status, including his prior guilty plea to attempted robbery and subsequent charges for firearm possession. Consequently, Henderson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing plea failed, as he could not show actual prejudice or actual innocence. The court affirmed the denial of Henderson's motion to vacate his conviction. View "USA v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Joseph Smith was convicted of child sexual abuse and related offenses after sexually abusing his stepdaughter, A.S., starting when she was twelve years old. Smith forced A.S. to engage in sexual acts, sent her explicit messages, and coerced her into sending him nude photos. The abuse was reported to the police in April 2017, leading to a search of Smith’s residence, where incriminating evidence was found on a personal computer and two cell phones.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Smith’s pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged underrepresentation of Black residents in the jury pool, a motion to suppress evidence found on the seized devices, and motions related to the government’s case agent’s presence and testimony. Smith was convicted on multiple counts, including child sexual abuse, production and possession of child pornography, and enticement of a minor, and was sentenced to two concurrent life terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Smith’s appeal and rejected all four of his challenges. The court held that Smith failed to demonstrate systematic exclusion of Black residents in the jury-selection process, as required by the Sixth Amendment. The court also found that the search warrant for Smith’s residence was sufficiently particular and that the good-faith exception precluded suppression of the evidence. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court did not plainly err in allowing the case agent to remain in the courtroom and testify based on her knowledge of Cellebrite, as any error did not affect the trial’s outcome given the overwhelming evidence against Smith. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed Smith’s convictions. View "U.S. v. Smith" on Justia Law