Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Four years after his release from prison, and after completing three years of supervised release, plaintiff was told he would have to serve another 27 months in jail based on an erroneous release from prison because he had a consecutive misdemeanor to serve. Plaintiff filed a writ of habeas corpus and the district court ruled that he must serve the remainder of his sentence. Plaintiff appealed, but the district court failed to act on the appeal until December 2013, at which point it dismissed the petition as moot because plaintiff had been released from jail upon completion of his sentence.Plaintiff then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that his spontaneous incarceration deprived him of due process under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case based on claim preclusion in light of plaintiff's prior unsuccessful habeas corpus action. The DC Circuit reversed and, on remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the District.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that plaintiff failed to establish a pattern of constitutional violations or to demonstrate deliberate indifference. The court explained that plaintiff's evidence fails to show either that the District had a relevant custom of unconstitutional actions or that the District acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court vacated the entry of summary judgment for the District on the claim of unconstitutional policy because the nature and contours of the alleged policy present a number of disputed issues of material fact. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hurd v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly transporting an individual to engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2421(a), the district court sentenced him to 22 months in prison and six years of supervised release.The DC Circuit vacated the supervised release portion of defendant's sentence, agreeing with defendant that his attorney provided ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to object when the district court relied on the wrong provision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In this case, USSG 5D1.2(c) was the incorrect provision to apply, and the proper Guidelines provision was USSG 5D1.2(c). The court explained that the record of defendant's sentencing shows a reasonable probability that the district court would have chosen a five-year sentence but for his counsel's failure to object to the incorrect Guidelines provision. Therefore, defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Parks" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea on the understanding that the government would not argue that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction because of his alleged supervisory or managerial role in a drug-smuggling conspiracy. Doing so would eliminate a statutory barrier to defendant seeking relief under the Safety Valve provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(4), from his mandatory minimum sentence. However, the government understood its promise differently, arguing that it retained the ability to oppose any Safety Valve relief and characterizing the relevant language in the plea agreement as inelegant and unnecessary.The DC Circuit held that the plea agreement is ambiguous as to the government's ability to oppose Safety Valve relief on the ground that defendant was a supervisor or manager in a drug conspiracy. The court explained that controlling precedent requires that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding, untainted and uninfluenced by the government's breach of the plea agreement and the evidence it introduced in the process. View "United States v. Moreno-Membache" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts related to his involvement in a Mexican cartel called the Los Zetas. The first count involved a racketeer influenced and corrupt organization (RICO) conspiracy to import controlled substances into the United States, and the second and third counts related to being an accessory after the fact to the murder and attempted murder in Mexico of two U.S. Special Agents.The DC Circuit concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error in determining the drug quantity for which defendant was responsible; the district court did not commit reversible error in applying the two-point supervisory role enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(c); and the district court did not commit reversible error in imposing a two-point enhancement for the use of threats and violence under USSG 2D1.1(b)(2) and a two-point enhancement for the use of physical restraints under USSG 3A1.3. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's calculation of defendant's sentence for the RICO conspiracy. However, the court vacated defendant's convictions under 18 U.S.C. 1114 for accessory after the fact to the murder and attempted murder of U.S. officials. The court concluded that the district court committed plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights by convicting and sentencing defendant under section 1114 because the underlying conduct occurred in Mexico. The court remanded for a limited resentencing. View "United States v. Carbajal Flores" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit considered an appeal of a pretrial detention order issued after a magistrate judge had previously ordered the two appellants released pursuant to a lengthy set of stringent conditions. After appellants, Eric Munchel and his mother, Lisa Eisenhart, participated in the January 6, 2021 incident at the Capitol, a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging Munchel and Eisenhart with obstruction of an official proceeding; Munchel with unlawful entry while armed with a dangerous weapon, and violent entry while armed with a dangerous weapon; and Eisenhart with aiding and abetting unlawful entry while armed with a dangerous weapon, and aiding and abetting violent entry while armed with a dangerous weapon.The court need not reach appellants' contention that the district court erred in not deferring to the magistrate judge's factual findings as to their dangerousness where the situation here was more akin to a new hearing in light of the substantial additional evidence the government submitted to the district judge that had not been presented to the magistrate judge. The court rejected the argument that the district court inappropriately relied on a finding that appellants were unlikely to abide by release conditions to detain them, because that factor is applicable only to revocation of pretrial release. The court also rejected the argument that the charged offenses do not authorize detention.However, the court concluded that the district court did not demonstrate that it adequately considered, in light of all the record evidence, whether Munchel and Eisenhart present an identified and articulable threat to the community. In this case, the district court did not adequately demonstrate that it considered whether Munchel and Eisenhart posed an articulable threat to the community in view of their conduct on January 6, and the particular circumstances of January 6, and failed to demonstrate that it considered the specific circumstances that made it possible, on January 6, for Munchel and Eisenhart to threaten the peaceful transfer of power. Accordingly, the court remanded for further factfinding.Finally, the court rejected appellants' contention that the government's proffer of dangerousness should be weighed against the fact that the government did not seek detention of other defendants where these facts and circumstances are best evaluated by the district court in the first instance. View "United States v. Munchel" on Justia Law

Drill riser buoyancy modules (DRBMs) are the high-tech equivalent of water wings for the miles of steel pipe that extend from drillships to the ocean floor and carry oil from natural deposits tens of thousands of feet below the surface. In 2012, only four major companies in the world produced DRBMs. CBMF was sponsored by China to develop DRBM technology. CBMF partnered with Shi, a Ph.D. with 25 years of experience in offshore structural design. Shi visited factories where DRBM was being produced; the manufacturers took precautions to protect their information. Shi hired former employees of those companies, making clear that they were to provide their former employers’ nonpublic information. CBMF was successful in duplicating the technology. At a pitch meeting by Shi to representatives of a company Shi believed to be Lockheed Martin, FBI agents arrested Shi.Three coconspirators pled guilty to conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. 1832; one absconded, and a CBMF employee remained in China. CBMF never appeared, leaving Shi as the only defendant at trial. The D.C. Circuit affirmed Shi's conviction as supported by substantial evidence. The information at issue was not publicly available; it came from a competitor. Shi joined an agreement to acquire and use trade secret information and believed the documents he received contained trade secrets. View "United States v. Shi" on Justia Law

In an action challenging the voluntary and intelligent nature of appellant's plea as to certain drug and drug-related offenses, the DC Circuit concluded that the appointment of counsel was not in the interest of justice under the Criminal Justice Act given her unwaived and material conflict of interest.The court explained that, under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the only legally viable avenue for challenging the plea apparent on the record would have been for counsel to argue that her own and/or her husband's representation of appellant in the decision to plead guilty was constitutionally ineffective. In this case, the fact that counsel chose to pursue a challenge to appellant's guilty plea that was plainly foreclosed by precedent rather than the only potentially viable legal avenue recognized by case law—an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against herself and her spouse—presents an untenable direct and plain conflict of interest between attorney and client. Furthermore, counsel, when she re-inserted herself into appellant's case to file this Section 2255 motion, did not obtain any waiver of the conflict—even assuming a conflict like this is waivable at all. The court explained that counsel never advised appellant that, to be legally viable, a challenge to the voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea based on the suppression of the other wiretaps would require him to level an ineffective assistance of counsel claim aimed at her and/or her husband. Therefore, the court concluded that the conflict of interest persisted throughout and permeated counsel's representation of petitioner in these Section 2255 proceedings. The court reversed and remanded for the appointment of conflict-free counsel to assist with appellant's Section 2255 petition. View "United States v. Scurry" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and one count of simple possession of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 844(a). Appellant conditionally pleaded guilty to the firearms charges and preserved his ability to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that appellant's motion to suppress was properly denied where the vehicles' in-tandem driving to and from the scene of a shooting is suggestive of a conspiracy to perpetrate the shooting, in a way that mere presence as a passenger during what might have been an outwardly lawful transaction is not. Furthermore, despite the passage of time, the evidence gathered by the police was sufficient to establish probable cause to search one of the vehicles when it was seized. Finally, the court held that, while it would have been better if the district court had expressly omitted the disputed sentencing points from its calculation of the criminal history score, the record is sufficiently clear that the points did not affect the sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

ESPN published an article about Driscoll, the former president of a nonprofit organization, indicating that a former employee planned to file an IRS whistleblower complaint that might lead to charges of embezzlement and fraud against Driscoll. The following month, Driscoll participated in a child custody hearing against her ex-husband. Valdini, an IRS criminal investigator, watched testimony by a cousin of Driscoll’s ex-husband who was also the IRS whistleblower, and from Driscoll, telling Driscoll that he was a member of the public. Valdini had lunch with Driscoll’s ex-husband, who offered to aid in the criminal investigation.Driscoll was indicted for fraud and tax evasion. Defense counsel asked the court to authorize discovery on whether the government had used a civil “audit” process to gather information for Driscoll’s criminal case. In reply to the government's opposition, Driscoll raised the custody hearing for the first time. The court denied her motion. At trial, Valdini’s conduct at the child-custody hearing was revealed. Government counsel, previously unaware of Valdini’s lunch outing, disclosed Valdini’s actions to the court, which held an evidentiary hearing. Driscoll unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial or dismissal, arguing that Valdini’s presence at the child-custody hearing violated her right against self-incrimination and that the government violated Brady by failing to disclose Valdini’s conduct.The D.C. Circuit vacated Driscoll’s convictions, finding that the court’s anti-deadlock jury instructions likely coerced a unanimous verdict. The court found no prejudice on the Brady claim and did not address Driscoll’s pretrial discovery or Fifth Amendment arguments. View "United States v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit reversed the district court's denial of appellants' motions for reduced sentences under section 404 of the First Step Act. The court held that the district court erred in determining that if a defendant was convicted of a "covered offense" and is thus eligible for relief under section 404, "the final issues to address are whether relief is available and, if so, to what extent a sentence reduction is warranted as a matter of discretion." Rather, the court explained that there is no additional "availability" requirement in section 404 beyond the covered offense requirement in section 404(a) and the limitations set forth in section 404(c).The court also held that the district court, in reaching its alternative judgment, was unclear as to whether it properly weighed the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Furthermore, there is nothing indicating that the district court weighed the mitigating factors raised by appellants, including post-sentencing conduct. Finally, the district court relied on inaccurate information in weighing the claims raised by Appellant Hicks. Accordingly, the court remanded so that the district court may exercise its discretion under section 404. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law