Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant applied for a visa to enter the United States. But the Government denied his application, fearing that he was part of a criminal organization. Appellant and his wife (collectively “Appellants”) — who is an American citizen — filed this suit to challenge that decision. But their suit faced an uphill struggle: With narrow exceptions, a court may not review the government’s decision to deny a visa. To show that their suit fits within an exception, Appellants pointed to a rule allowing American citizens to challenge visa denials that burden their constitutional rights. Appellant’s wife argued that the rule applies because denying her husband a visa interfered with her constitutional right to marriage. The district court rejected that argument and dismissed it.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that though marriage is a fundamental right, it does not include the right to live in America with one’s spouse. So the right is not burdened when the government denies a spouse’s visa application. Further, the court wrote that even if the exception applied, allowing us to review the Government’s visa denial, Appellant’s wife’s challenge would fail on the merits. To survive judicial review, the Government need only cite a statute listing a factual basis for denying a visa. It did that here. View "Kristen Colindres v. DOS" on Justia Law

In 2005, after a jury convicted Appellant of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)), the district court, relying on the Armed Career Criminal Act, sentenced Appellant to 18 years imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. The Supreme Court’s Johnson decision came down in 2015. Within a year Appellant brought a Section 2255 habeas petition, seeking to have his sentence vacated or corrected. The district court used the preponderance of evidence standard in determining that Appellant failed to show that it was more likely than not that his sentence relied on the residual clause.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that nothing in the record indicates whether Appellant’s sentence rested on the residual clause, or on the elements clause, or both. The government’s sentencing memorandum, the presentence report, and the court’s statements indicate only that Appellant’s prior convictions were violent felonies and therefore subjected him to the sentencing enhancement. Further, Appellant contended that after his sentencing, there were cases suggesting that a crime with a mens rea of recklessness would not qualify as a violent felony. The aggravated assault statutes punish attempts to cause or causing “bodily injury purposely” or with “extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such” injury. The New Jersey statutes thus required not mere reckless conduct but extreme recklessness. The circuit courts considering “extreme” or “depraved heart” recklessness, as in the New Jersey statutes, have concluded that elevated recklessness satisfied the elements clause. View "USA v. Matthew West" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his criminal convictions for forty-two counts of prescribing a controlled substance without a legitimate medical purpose under 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a) and two counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957. Appellant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him. He contends that each of his actual patients included in the indictment, despite the fact that they were ultimately pill-seekers addicted to oxycodone, had real ailments to which he properly responded in good faith, and the government did not prove otherwise. He also argues that the two undercover DEA agents presented real MRIs with real injuries, leading Appellant to believe he was treating them appropriately.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentencing. The court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to convict Appellant, and the court affirmed the district court on its Napue and expert testimony rulings. However, the court reversed the district court on its Brady decision and remand this case for a new trial due to the government’s suppression of the favorable and material Pryor Reports and CCN Report. The court explained that although the Brady error is dispositive of this appeal, the remand will open the possibility of a new trial, and Appellant’s remaining arguments as to the evidentiary questions in the case are likely to arise again on retrial. View "USA v. Ivan Robinson" on Justia Law

A grand jury charged Appellee with wire fraud and obstructing an official proceeding. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense. The district court granted the motion, and the Government appealed to contest the dismissal of the section 1343 (wire fraud) count. Before the District Court, Appellee moved to suppress certain evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued in this case and requested a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).  The Government does not appeal the dismissal of the section 1512(c)(2) (obstructing an official proceeding) count.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. The court dismissed Appellee’s cross-appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and request for a Franks hearing. The court explained that regardless of whether Appellee lied to “obtain” future salary or “maintain” his existing salary, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal because the indictment fails to allege that the State Department was deprived of something more than Appellee’s honesty. The court wrote that the wire fraud statute, as interpreted through the lens of Supreme Court precedent, does not support an indictment on the facts proffered by the Government in this case. Moreover, the court explained that Appellee is the prevailing party in this case. As such, he has no right to seek review of the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and request for a Franks hearing. View "USA v. Paul Guertin" on Justia Law

The Government removed Appellant from the United States. Back in his home country, Appellant filed a habeas petition, arguing that his removal was unlawful. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. It concluded that habeas proceedings are available only to those in government custody. Because Appellant did not file his petition until he was back home and out of custody, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. Appellant appealed to the DC Circuit.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an alien may seek judicial review of an expedited removal order in “habeas corpus proceedings.” And habeas corpus proceedings are available only to those in custody. Here, Appellant was not in custody. So the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his habeas petition. Further, the court noted that it cannot adopt an extreme-circumstances exception because it has no statutory basis. The court wrote that creating exceptions to jurisdictional rules is a job for Congress, not the courts. View "I.M. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a former Guantanamo Bay detainee. He asked the DC Circuit to vacate his convictions for war crimes—including providing material support to terrorism and murder of a United States soldier in violation of the law of war—based on the alleged constitutional and statutory infirmities of those convictions.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition because Petitioner waived his right to appellate review by the DC Circuit. The court explained that a defendant cannot challenge a plea based on an alleged error of law that was raised, rejected and then waived pursuant to the plea. Here, Petitioner, aware that the military judge had rejected his theories, nonetheless chose to plead guilty and expressly waive his right to appeal those erroneous (in his view) rulings. He cannot now have the merits of his waived claims reviewed on appeal by arguing his waiver was invalid because those claims were wrongly decided. Indeed, the basic principle behind an appeal waiver is that the defendant gives up his right to have an appellate court review the merits of his arguments in exchange for valuable consideration. View "Omar Khadr v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged the basis of his detention at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay. Detained in 2004, Mr. al-Hela filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2005 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2241. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. On appeal, he argued that the length of his detention without trial violated the Due Process Clause. He also argued that the District Court’s procedural decisions and evidentiary rulings deprived him of his right under the Suspension Clause to meaningful review of, and a meaningful opportunity to challenge, the basis for his detention, as well as his rights under the Due Process Clause.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it rejects Appellant’s claim that his procedural due process rights were violated. The court held that it need not decide whether due process protections apply to Guantanamo detainees because even assuming the Due Process Clause applies, the court found that the procedures employed by the district court to adjudicate Appellant’s habeas petition satisfy procedural due process. The court further rejected Appellant’s claims that his detention violates substantive due process because there is insufficient evidence that he was an enemy combatant or solely because of the lengthy duration of the military conflict. The court concluded that even assuming the Due Process Clause applies to Appellant, these claims fail on the merits. The court remanded as to Appellant’s claim that his continued detention violates substantive due process because he no longer poses a significant threat to the United States. View "Abdulsalam Ali Al-Hela v. Joseph Biden (REISSUED)" on Justia Law

After a jury convicted Defendant of drug trafficking and unlawful firearm possession, the district court sentenced him to 420 months imprisonment. Defendant challenged that sentence, arguing that the district court procedurally erred by miscalculating his Sentencing Guidelines range in three ways: overestimating the quantity of phencyclidine (“PCP”) he possessed, finding that he made credible threats of violence, and determining that he acted as a manager or supervisor.   The DC Circuit affirmed on the first two points, reversed the role enhancement, and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that the district court found that Defendant’s offense involved 3 to 10 kilograms of PCP, which amounts to a base offense level of 32. This finding was not clearly erroneous. Record evidence demonstrates that Defendant bought a 1-gallon shipment from the West Coast and sold another 24 fluid ounces to the buyer. Together, these amounts surpass the 3-kilogram threshold. Further, the court found that the district court committed no error by finding that Defendant made a credible threat.   In imposing the role enhancement, the district court also referenced another dealer and a would-be buyer, but nothing in the record demonstrates Defendant’s control over either. Defendant preferred not to interact with the other dealer, and his only known contact with the potential buyer was to warn him against texting in uncoded language. The court explained that here, the facts simply do not support the district court’s conclusion. View "USA v. Lamont Johnson" on Justia Law

Several defendants were charged by indictment in separate cases with various offenses arising from their alleged participation in the Capitol riot on January 6, 2021. Among other charges, the government also charged each Defendant with one count of Obstruction of an Official Proceeding under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The district court granted each Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The government filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. At issue on consolidated appeal is whether individuals who allegedly assaulted law enforcement officers while participating in the Capitol riot can be charged with corruptly obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The DC Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the counts under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The court wrote that Defendants’ alleged conduct falls comfortably within the plain meaning of “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] [an] official proceeding, or attempt[ing] to do so.” The alternative interpretations of Section 1512(c)(2) proffered by the district court and Defendants failed to convince the court to depart from the natural reading of the statute’s unambiguous text. View "USA v. Joseph Fischer" on Justia Law

Defendant opened bank accounts for fictitious companies, deposited stolen checks into the accounts, and then withdrew the cash from the accounts. After he was arrested, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of bank fraud, one count of aggravated identity theft, and two counts of conspiracy to launder money. The district court sentenced Defendant to 90 months in prison. However, prior to pleading guilty, Defendant met with prosecutors to discuss the crimes in hopes of obtaining a favorable plea agreement.Defendant and his attorney reviewed the Debriefing Agreement, which stated the prosecution could make derivative use of and may pursue any investigative leads, in this or any other investigation, suggested by any statements made by, or other information provided by Defendant. The agreement specifically stated that Defendant would not enjoy the protections outlined by the Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).On appeal, Defendant claimed that the government violated the Debriefing Agreement when it used the cell phone password he provided during discussions with prosecutors to obtain additional evidence against him, resulting in additional charges being brought through a superseding indictment.The D.C. Circuit disagreed, affirming Defendant's conviction. The court explained that Kastigar did not apply because the government did not compel him to provide any incriminating information; he did so voluntarily pursuant to the Debriefing Agreement. View "USA v. Kelvin Otunyo" on Justia Law