Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jackson pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base, entered a plea agreement, and was sentenced to 48 months of imprisonment to run consecutively to an anticipated, not-yet-imposed, prison sentence in another district court. While imprisoned, Jackson filed two unsuccessful motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A).The D.C. Circuit affirmed his sentence and the denial of the motions. While the judge accepting Jackson’s guilty plea did not fully comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(N), as he did not go over the appeal rights that Jackson was waiving, Jackson still knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to appeal. Jackson confirmed to the judge at his plea hearing that he had read the plea agreement carefully, that he understood it, and had sufficient time to discuss the plea agreement with his counsel The language of Jackson’s plea agreement is unambiguous, making any error in the plea colloquy harmless. Jackson’s obesity and sleep apnea did not constitute extraordinary circumstances and, in evaluating the section 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court did not err in evaluating his continuing dangerousness by considering his dangerousness at the time of his earlier criminal history. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two criminal counts, remanding for resentencing. Both defendant and the government agree that a court may deviate from the Sentencing Guidelines, including by imposing consecutive sentences that exceed the total recommended punishment, after considering the Guidelines range and the other statutory sentencing factors.The court explained that, consistent with the Sentencing Commission's statutory mandate to promote fairness and uniformity in sentencing, the Guidelines provide recommended sentencing ranges based on two factors: a defendant's culpable conduct and criminal history. Chapter 7 of the Guidelines sets out recommended terms of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release. Finding consensus among Chapter 7's text, context, and purpose, the court held that the sentencing ranges in Chapter 7's Revocation Table represent the Guidelines' total recommended punishment for supervised release violations. Those recommendations do not depend on the number of counts for which a defendant is serving supervised release. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed defendant's 57 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two violations of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which prohibits certain felons from possessing firearms. Defendant argues that his attorney was ineffective at his sentencing hearing, depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). However, the court concluded that the record from the hearing made clear that irrespective of any alleged deficiencies in representation, the district court would have imposed the same sentence. Accordingly, defendant has not demonstrated prejudice and thus his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. View "United States v. Orange" on Justia Law

Brevard left a halfway house, where he was serving a sentence for unlawful firearm possession, and did not return. Weeks later, he was apprehended and charged with escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). The U.S. Attorney’s Office calculated a Guidelines range of 15–21 months, and recommended 15 months, noting Brevard suffered from mental health issues and had accepted responsibility. Based on a “threats” incident that occurred during his escape, Brevard had been charged under the D.C. Criminal Code; those charges had been dismissed when the complainant did not appear for trial. The district court sentenced Brevard to 30 months’ imprisonment, departing upward, under Sentencing Guidelines 5K2.21, based on that uncharged conduct. Alternatively, the court found, under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), that the same upward variance was appropriate, given Brevard’s criminal history.The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Although the departure was procedurally erroneous, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Because the uncharged D.C. Code offenses could not have been properly joined with Brevard’s federal escape charge, the "threats" conduct did not “underl[ie] a potential charge” that could have been “pursued in the case,” U.S.S.G. 5K2.21. The court could properly rely on factors in Brevard’s criminal history, without regard to the uncharged threats conduct, to conclude that the top of the Sentencing Guidelines range did not “fully account for” the seriousness of Brevard’s repeated failure to conform his conduct to the law. View "United States v. Brevard" on Justia Law

Hillie was convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(e), possession of images of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), and various counts relating to sexual abuse of children and minors, under D.C. law. A search of his electronic devices had revealed videos, recorded by cameras hidden in the bedroom and bathroom, of minors in the nude. Hillie had also touched the girls in a sexual manner. He was sentenced to 354 months’ imprisonment.The D.C. Circuit vacated in part, agreeing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions of sexual exploitation of a minor, attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, and possession of images of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. No rational trier of fact could find the girl’s conduct depicted in the videos to be a “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person,” under section 2256(2)(A) nor that Hillie intended to use the girl to display her anus, genitalia, or pubic area in a lustful manner that connotes the commission of sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, or sadistic or masochistic abuse, and took a substantial step toward doing so. The court rejected arguments that the court erroneously instructed the jury, erroneously admitted certain testimony, and erroneously denied a motion to sever the federal counts from the remaining counts. View "United States v. Hillie" on Justia Law

Six defendants were indicted in 2018 following an ATF investigation of drug activity at a D.C. barbershop. During a 2017 traffic stop, officers had found what appeared to be a drug ledger, approximately $9,000, and drug paraphernalia in Fields’s vehicle. The ATF executed a search warrant on the barbershop three months later. In a suite above the barbershop, agents found cash, firearms, more drug paraphernalia, and large quantities of heroin mixed with fentanyl, PCP, Suboxone, and synthetic marijuana. They also found a document listing a medical appointment for Fields and a receipt for a purchase made with his credit card. A search of Fields’s home led to more drug ledgers, two of which listed “Foots” (Samuels). During subsequent searches of Samuels’s home, ATF agents found a shotgun, drug paraphernalia, crack cocaine, marijuana, and synthetic marijuana. Samuels admitted that he kept a gun under his bed for protection.Fields, Samuels, and Tucker were convicted on several drug- and firearm-related offenses. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the convictions, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and Samuels’s 84-month sentence, rejecting challenges to the 2017 traffic stop, evidentiary rulings, and the denial of Fields’s request to represent himself, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court cured any potential prejudice to Samuels and Tucker with limiting instructions and did not abuse its discretion in denying their motions to sever. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Gaskins served almost eight years of a 22-year sentence on a narcotics conspiracy charge before the D.C. Circuit reversed his conviction for insufficient evidence in 2012. At his trial, Gaskins had invoked his constitutional right not to testify. After the reversal of his conviction, he sought limited discovery and a chance to testify in support of his motion for a certificate of innocence under 28 U.S.C. 2513, a prerequisite to a claim against the government for compensation for wrongful imprisonment. The district court denied the certificate of innocence without acting on Gaskins’ motion for discovery.The D.C. Circuit vacated. A failure to prove criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt requires acquittal but does not necessarily establish innocence. On a motion for a certificate of innocence, the burden is on the claimant to prove his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court erred by denying Gaskins’ motion for a certificate of innocence without addressing his procedural motion. The key issue bearing on whether Gaskins is entitled to the certificate concerns his state of mind--whether he agreed to work with co-conspirators with the specific intent to distribute drugs. His actions, as established by the trial evidence, do not add up to the charged offenses unless he agreed to join the conspiracy. The court declined to reassign the case. View "United States v. Gaskins" on Justia Law

In 2014, ATF agents executing a search warrant at Johnson’s home recovered explosive powder, items associated with the production of explosive devices, and boxes containing .37-millimeter ammunition shells with caps and primers on them. One shell had been assembled as an improvised explosive device (IED) using explosive powder, a fuse, and a primer. Agent Campbell looked through the boxes and disassembled and examined the IED. In 2017, while reviewing photos, Campbell noticed items that he had not examined, discovered that one of the shell casings “appeared to be loaded,” and concluded it had been converted into a second IED. The 2018 indictment charged: Unlawful Receipt or Possession of an Unregistered Firearm and Destructive Device; Unlawful Making of a Firearm; Possession of a Weapon of Mass Destruction (D.C. Code); Unlawful Receipt or Possession of an Unregistered Firearm and Destructive Device; Unlawful Making of a Firearm; Possession of a Weapon of Mass Destruction; and Conspiracy to Smuggle Goods. There was a federal possession, federal manufacture, and D.C. possession charge for each IED. The court permitted the defense to argue that the evidence had been mishandled by the government and that Campbell was not a credible witness. The D.C. Circuit remanded Johnson's convictions. The federal firearm possession convictions are “multiplicitous” of the federal firearm manufacturing convictions, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause; the D.C. law convictions are multiplicitous of each other. The court also remanded a claim that Johnson received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in rejecting a plea agreement. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2000, Arrington was convicted of assaulting a federal officer with a dangerous weapon and of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The judge calculated a mandatory 210-240-month sentencing range and sentenced Arrington to 240 months. Arrington’s sentencing range involved a higher base offense level for the unlawful possession of a firearm because he “had at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2); he also received an enhancement as “a career offender” because he had “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The judge applied the “residual clause” in the Guidelines' definition of "crime of violence." In 2003, Arrington was denied post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255.The Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory while Arrington’s first petition was pending. In 2015, the Court held (Johnson) that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “residual clause” was unconstitutionally vague. In 2016, the Supreme Court held that “Johnson announced a substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.” Within a year of Johnson, Arrington sought leave to file a successive section 2255 motion challenging his sentence in light of Johnson. The district court denied his motion as untimely. The D.C. Circuit reversed. The Johnson decision recognized a person’s right not to have his sentence dictated by the unconstitutionally vague language contained in a mandatory residual clause identical to that in the Guidelines. View "United States v. Arrington" on Justia Law

In 2018, Jabr drove from California to the District of Columbia planning to meet then-President Trump in person. She believed herself to be a victim of a conspiracy between law enforcement and various casinos she visited on her trip, and she felt compelled to inform the President. When her car’s GPS device marked her arrival at the White House, she parked the car, exited it, scaled two fences, ran across a courtyard, and sprinted up the stairs of the building towards the entrance, where Secret Service officers intercepted her. Jabr, in reality, had dashed up the stairs of the wrong building--the U.S. Treasury Building, which sits immediately adjacent to the White House. The government charged Jabr under a statute that bars entering the “White House or its grounds” without lawful authority. The Treasury Building lies outside the “White House grounds” for purposes of that statute.The district court acquitted Jabr of committing the charged offense but found her guilty of attempting to commit the charged crime, explaining that the statute prohibits attempted entries. The D.C. Circuit affirmed but vacated an erroneous restitution order. The court rejected Jabr’s contention that the flaw in the charge against her left the district court without jurisdiction. View "United States v. Jabr" on Justia Law