Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner shot and killed her husband when she found him cheating. She pled guilty to second-degree murder in Indian country. She also pled guilty to discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. A year later, Petitioner moved to vacate her Section 924(c) conviction, believing that intervening Supreme Court cases rendered it unlawful. Specifically, she argued that federal second-degree murder could not be considered a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c)(3)(A). The district court dismissed her motion. She appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that federal l murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an “unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” The statute lists the killings that qualify as first-degree murder.3 “Any other murder is murder in the second degree.” Second-degree murder thus has two elements: (1) unlawful killing of a human being; with (2) malice aforethought. Petitioner argued that killing a person “with malice aforethought” can be done without “using force against the person or property of another.” The court reasoned that the history and definition of “malice aforethought” demonstrate that federal second-degree murder satisfies Section 924(c)’s force clause. The phrase “malice aforethought” necessarily denotes the oppositional conduct that the force clause requires. Second-degree murder is thus a crime of violence. View "Tiffany Janis v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 142 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. As two of the conditions of supervised release, the district court prohibited Defendant from possessing or using a “computer,” as the term is defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 1030(e)(1), and from possessing or viewing visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct. On appeal, Defendant challenged both special conditions.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the special condition on computers and affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that the district court discussed how, in its experience, people who have Defendant’s addiction initially search for adult pornography, which eventually “leads back to” searching for child pornography. Defendant’s internet search history; and the connection between using the Internet and accessing pornography. In addition, the presentence report detailed how some videos tied to Defendant depicted adult pornography. Under these circumstances, we conclude the district court did not plainly err. However, the court concluded that the district court’s findings do not adequately tie the special condition on computers to statutory purposes. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion, and therefore the court vacated the special condition discussing computers. View "United States v. Joshua Powell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of ammunition as a felon. The district court sentenced him to 296 months and one day of imprisonment.  Defendant argued that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury forbids the district court to determine whether he committed three prior felonies on different occasion   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that the district court sufficiently considered the statutory factors and made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. In varying upward, the district court considered Defendant’s extensive criminal history and concluded that his criminal history category understated the likelihood of recidivism and the seriousness of his criminal history. Defendant’s criminal history scored 24 points under the guidelines, well above the 13 points required for placement in the highest criminal history category. Giving deference to the district court as required by Gall, the court concluded that the one-level variance and the overall sentence is not unreasonable in light of Section 3553(a). View "United States v. Deonte Ellison" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of distributing a controlled substance, resulting in the death of R.L. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) the district court erred in allowing the government to introduce evidence of Defendant’s prior drug arrests and convictions pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (3) the district court’s use of Defendant’s prior drug possession conviction to enhance his sentence is unconstitutional because it punishes Defendant more harshly than a drug distributor.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and drawing all reasonable inference in its favor, it held that the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant distributed the drugs to R.L. Further, the court concluded that the record includes sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that fentanyl was the but-for cause of R.L.’s death. Finally, the court held that the First Step Act did modify Section 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B). But it did not alter the language of Section 841(b)(1)(C), the crime under which Defendant was convicted. View "United States v. Gerald Cardwell, Jr." on Justia Law

While in prison for dealing drugs, Defendant continued to run his operation from behind bars. At one point, he arranged for a shipment of marijuana to a relative. But when black-tar heroin arrived instead, a co-conspirator, C.H. sold it on his behalf. To protect his family, Defendant pointed the finger at C.H. and passed along his address to their suppliers. C.H. continued to sell drugs, including what he received through Defendant. He eventually sold those drugs in controlled buys, which led to federal drug charges. Defendant, for his part, pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court gave him a two-level enhancement for “making a credible threat to use violence or directing the use of violence.” Defendant challenged the enhancement on appeal. At issue on appeal is whether providing a co-conspirator’s address to dangerous people “directs the use of violence” or itself conveys “a credible threat to use violence.”The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that once danger came knocking on his family’s door, Defendant redirected the suppliers’ anger toward the person who refused to pay. It was “reasonably foreseeable” that this simple act, given how dangerous they were, could have led to the use of violence against C.H. Accordingly, the court held that the record supports a two-level enhancement for “directing the use of violence.” View "United States v. Luis Hernandez-Barajas" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on four drug-related charges stemming from his involvement in a narcotics-distribution ring in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, which culminated in the overdose deaths of two individuals. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin and two counts of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death. The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute heroin and 420 months imprisonment on each count of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death, with all terms to run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) that the district court erroneously admitted text messages between one of the victims and himself and (2) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him on any of the three counts of conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the night before her overdose, the victim texted Defendant—her primary if not only supplier of narcotics—at 6:58 p.m. “presumably to make arrangements to purchase heroin.” Per their typical arrangement, the victim then withdrew the necessary funds from an ATM and drove to Defendant’s house, texting him at 7:48 p.m. that she was in his backyard. Her subsequent text messages to family members reveal that she then went home. The victim’s body was found the next day. Under these facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant distributed the fentanyl that resulted in the victim’s death. View "United States v. Jeffery Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of a six-count federal indictment -- carjacking resulting in death (Count 1); discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j) (Count 2); and two counts of witness tampering (Counts 5 and 6). The government agreed to drop Counts 3 and 4. The parties agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of 360 months imprisonment. Defendant timely objected to a statement in his presentence investigation report (PSR) that the sentence imposed for Count 2 must be consecutive to the other counts under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Defendant argued that violations of Section 924(c) and § 924(j) are separate offenses and that Section 924(j) does not require consecutive sentencing. The district court overruled the objection, accepted the guilty plea but not the 360-month recommendation, and imposed a within-range sentence of 540 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing the court procedurally erred in imposing a mandatory consecutive sentence for Count 2 and that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. Defendant’s disagreement with how the district court weighed the relevant sentencing factors does not justify reversal. Accordingly, the court held that, in light of the seriousness of Defendant’s crimes and lengthy criminal history, the district court was well within its substantial discretion in sentencing Defendant to a within-guidelines-range term of imprisonment. View "United States v. Anthony Jones, Jr." on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of three counts of wire fraud, one count of theft of government money, and two counts of Social Security fraud. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had had the requisite criminal intent to commit the offenses. He also appealed the district court’s order for restitution in the amount of $168,456.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion, vacated the restitution and forfeiture orders, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that a jury could reasonably disregard Defendant’s asserted reason for these inconsistencies—that he did not believe that he had to report “work” below a certain income threshold—and find that he acted with the intent to defraud the SSA by receiving benefits for which he was not eligible. Further, the court reasoned that reliance on the SSA’s determination alone does not allow the court to meaningfully review the calculation of the amount of loss when, as here, that amount is challenged by the defendant. The government was thus required to present evidence to show that Defendant engaged in substantial gainful activity in November 2009. The court held that the district court erred in accepting the statement of loss in the absence of evidence establishing the date that Defendant became ineligible for benefits. View "United States v. James Workman" on Justia Law

After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. Prior to trial, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress twelve ounces of cocaine that investigators found in a warrantless search of the rental car Johnson was driving as he arrived at the Omaha home of local distributor A.M. Prior to sentencing, the government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Section 851 seeking a statutory enhancement based on Defendant’s prior Texas state court conviction for a “serious drug felony.” Overruling Defendant’s written objection, the district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Defendant to a mandatory minimum 120 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing the court erred by denying his motion to suppress and by applying the sentencing enhancement and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he conspired to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we must, there was more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Defendant was a key part of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and that it was reasonably foreseeable to Johnson the conspiracy distributed 500 grams or more of cocaine. Moreover, the court held that Defendant makes no attempt on appeal to show good cause for his failure to raise an Oliver objection to the district court. View "United States v. Isaac Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. In the district court, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop of a vehicle that she was driving. The district court denied the motion, and Defendant reserved the right to appeal that ruling.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that there was no error in denying the motion to suppress. The court explained that the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant as she drove away from the residence on August 24. Officers had abundant reason to believe, based on informant reports and surveillance, that the owners were distributing methamphetamine from their residence. Police seized drugs from four short-term visitors who were stopped shortly after leaving the residence in June. As of August 24, investigators had reliable information that the owners were distributing a shipment of methamphetamine that arrived two days earlier, including a quantity that was seized from a downstream customer that very morning. A detective saw Defendant enter the residence at 10:00 p.m. and depart six minutes later. Although Defendant was previously unknown to investigators, her short-term visit to the suspected drug house conformed to the pattern of the drug trade and gave police reasonable suspicion to believe that she was carrying drugs as she departed. Accordingly, the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was involved in criminal activity as she departed the residence, so the traffic stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Elizabeth Pounds" on Justia Law