Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Defendant for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). Arrested on November 17, she was detained for 37 days before appearing before a magistrate judge on December 23. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress her statements from a post-arrest interview. The district court denied both motions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the 37-day delay between Jones’s arrest and her initial appearance before a magistrate judge violated Rule 5(a). However, to determine whether a delay in presentment violates substantive due process, this court determines whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, the government’s conduct “offends the standards of substantive due process” and “shocks the conscience.” Defendant asserted that law enforcement officers in South Dakota have a “pattern” of delaying defendants’ initial appearances, citing two cases where defendants moved to dismiss indictments based on delays in their initial appearance. However, the court held two mistakes do not establish a pattern of outrageousness sufficient to show deliberate indifference and support a due process violation.   Further, Defendant argued that her Miranda waiver was involuntary because the agent’s pre-warning statements were an unlawful two-step interrogation under Missouri v. Seibert and that her confession was involuntary under United States v. Aguilar. The court held the district court properly concluded that these brief, narrow-scope pre-warning statements were not a two-step interrogation in violation of Seibert and that Defendant’s statements were voluntary. View "United States v. Tracy Jones" on Justia Law

At sentencing, the district court, varying upward from the advisory guidelines sentencing range, imposed a sentence of 120 months imprisonment plus four years of supervised release upon Defendant. Defendant appealed. He argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conspiracy conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and remanded for resentencing. The court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The court agreed with Defendant that the district court committed procedural sentencing error when it adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and, without adequate notice varied upward for reasons that contradicted the PSR’s factual findings. However, the court found that the jury was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Thus, the court did not disturb the jury’s credibility findings on appeal. Similarly, the court concluded that there is sufficient evidence to uphold Defendant’s conspiracy conviction. Finally, the court wrote that it cannot conclude that the inconsistencies between the PSR findings and the findings on which the district court based its upward variance, combined with the lack of prior notice, resulted in procedural sentencing error that was harmless. View "United States v. Deshonte Dickson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted co-defendants K.S and T.H of conspiracy to distribute and distribution of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Both challenged several district court rulings, and T.H. appealed his conviction. 
 The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that K.S. argued that, instead of co-Defendant’s testimony, the court should have admitted co-Defendant’s letter under the residual hearsay exception. The court explained the residual exception is to “be used very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.” To fall within the exception, the statement must be “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.” The district court concluded that the letter was not trustworthy. Although the court did not explain how it reached its conclusion, its “discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence is particularly broad in a conspiracy trial.”   T.H. argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. The evidence established that the middleman bought methamphetamine from K.H. and sold it to the CI. The CI testified to arranging the buy, and the middleman’s phone records showed calls with T.H. on the day of the purchase. After the middleman bought methamphetamine from someone in the white S.U.V., officers identified T.H. as the driver. The plastic bag the middleman later sold the CI had fingerprints from all three men. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from K.T. and D.S. that T.H. sold drugs in the same car and the same location as the controlled buy. This evidence was sufficient to sustain his conspiracy conviction. View "United States v. Kieffer Simmons" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 84 months imprisonment. Harrison appealed, challenging the admission of evidence of his prior firearm conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant’s knowledge is at issue here because he did not plead guilty. Thus, Defendant’s prior conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was relevant to prove knowledge. Further, Defendant’s conviction was not too remote in time. Although it occurred 8 years before his arrest in this case, he was incarcerated for more than 3 of those years. Therefore, based on its compliance with the requirements of Oaks, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior firearm conviction. View "United States v. Robert Harrison" on Justia Law

I.M. and J.R. (collectively, “Appellants”) were convicted by a jury of charges alleged in a ten-count superseding indictment for offenses committed as part of a large drug conspiracy. The district court sentenced them to 360 and 336 months in prison, respectively. On appeal, I.M. challenged both the denial of his motion for severance and his sentence; J.R. challenged the denial of his motion for recusal, the denial of his motions to suppress wiretap and video surveillance recordings and his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained I.M. has given the court no reason to conclude that this was not an adequate safeguard in his case or that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to sever. Thus, the denial of I.M.’s severance motion was not an abuse of discretion. Further, the district court’s statement that I.M.’s “criminal history consists of violent acts and possession of firearms” did not mischaracterize his criminal history. Thus, the district court did not commit procedural error.   Moreover, the court held J.R. has failed to point to any facts establishing that the district judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The district judge’s issuance of some of the warrants, in this case, does not, of itself, require recusal. Any other challenges to the wiretap recordings are also waived because J.R. has failed to meaningfully explain why his motion to suppress should have been granted. View "United States v. Isaac May" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a sentence of ninety-six months’ imprisonment imposed by the district court after Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error by miscalculating his base offense level under the sentencing guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it has held that second-degree robbery under this Missouri statute is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the offense requires “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Because Defendant’s prior conviction for second-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1), the district court did not err in determining a base offense level of 20 under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the court held that there was no procedural error. View "United States v. George Gordon" on Justia Law

Claimant claimed $34,918 found in his car during a traffic stop. When he failed to fully respond to the government’s special interrogatories, the district court sanctioned him by striking his claim and entering a default judgment forfeiting the money to the government. Claimant appealed, arguing that the district court relied on an incorrect interpretation of Rule G(8).   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that an individual cannot “fail to comply” with an unknowable obligation. A party fails to comply with discovery obligations after a court order defines those obligations. Thus, Rule G(8) authorizes striking a claim for “failing to comply with” Rule G(6) only if the claimant has reason to know of and violates Rule G(6) special interrogatory obligations. The court wrote that it cannot conclude that Claimant knew or should have known that Rule G(6) obligated him to provide more information than he had provided. Claimant articulated a facially reasonable belief that the bank records and check receipts he supplied “firmly established” his relationship to the cash by “showing where the money comes from, [and] where the money was transferred and sent.” He claimed that additional documents requested by the government exceeded the scope of Rule G(6). Nothing in the record indicates that Hester had actual or constructive knowledge of additional obligations—the district court neither found that he should have known he was violating the Rule nor issued an order compelling him to respond to interrogatories. View "United States v. Christopher Hester" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison. Defendant appealed, challenging: (1) the admission of evidence (field tests and a photograph); (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) the sentence (an adjustment and an enhancement).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence was not inadmissible simply because it was prejudicial. Further, the court explained that the jury saw the pistol and photographs of it. An ATF agent, testifying as an expert, testified that it met the federal definition of a firearm. The pistol and the testimony are sufficient to prove that the pistol was a firearm. Accordingly, the court held that the evidence sufficiently proved that Defendant’s .45-caliber pistol was a firearm under 18 U.S.C. Sections 921(a)(3) and 922(g). Finally, the district court found that Defendant was a drug dealer—not merely a drug user—due to the packaging of the drugs, the evidence found in the search and police investigations, and his own testimony that he intended to distribute drugs. As such, the district court did not err in applying the sentencing enhancement. View "United States v. Gregory McCoy" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. He argued that evidence should have been excluded from trial due to an unlawful search and seizure, that he had a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm as a convicted felon, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that none of the contentions has merit and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court found that the officer’s action was permissible under the Fourth Amendment on at least two bases: as an investigative search based on reasonable suspicion of crime and danger and as a search for evidence-based on probable cause under exigent circumstances. Further, the court held that the longstanding prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons is constitutional, and the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss. Moreover, the court wrote that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. Finally, the court explained that a rational jury could have found that the firearm was placed strategically in a location where it was hidden from view but readily accessible to one who was seated in a wheelchair and carrying drugs in his undergarment. View "United States v. Sylvester Cunningham" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of distributing a controlled substance near a protected location, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Defendant to 380 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury and challenges the reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant specifically requested separating the protected location element—Proposed Instruction No. 15—from the remainder of the elements of Count 1—Proposed Instruction No. 12. Defendant then filed objections to certain instructions but failed to object to either Instruction No. 12 or 15 prior to trial. He further failed to do so at trial or in his post-trial motion. Defendant “cannot complain that the district court gave him exactly what his lawyer asked.” Further, the court wrote that Evans controls here. Henderson’s interpretation of the career offender enhancement was “neither unexpected nor indefensible” and “had a rational basis.” The district court did not err in applying this enhancement. The court also explained that “when a district court varies downward and sentences below a presumptively reasonable Guidelines range, it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still further.” Here, Defendant offered no convincing reasoning to rebut this presumption. View "United States v. Patrick Webb, Jr." on Justia Law