Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and the district court imposed a sentence of 71 months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting that the government violated the terms of the plea agreement, rendering her appeal waiver invalid and that the district court procedurally erred when determining her advisory Guidelines range. Defendant suggests that the United States impermissibly objected to her receiving an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment “based on” her “pre-plea conduct.”   The Eighth Circuit enforced the waiver and dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court explained that it is true that the government cannot object to an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment based on a defendant’s pre-plea conduct if it initially agreed at the time the plea was entered that the defendant “qualified for” that adjustment. But here, the government took no position in the plea agreement on whether an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment was warranted. And in any event, the government’s objection at sentencing was based on Defendant’s post-plea conduct, not any conduct that pre-dated the plea agreement. In the waiver, Defendant expressly gave up “any and all rights to appeal . . . [her] sentence,” which includes her appeal of the district court’s denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. And she does not contend that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary or that enforcing it “would result in a miscarriage of justice.” View "United States v. Lacee Tuttle" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence of 1,680 months imprisonment for seven counts of child-exploitation and child pornography offenses. Specifically, he challenged the jury selection, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the reasonableness of the district court’s sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained here the magistrate judge conducted extensive voir dire, and the parties had ample opportunity to examine the jurors. Throughout the process, the magistrate judge took care to rehabilitate wavering jurors by focusing them on what they were being asked to do as jurors—listen to the evidence and fairly and impartially judge the facts. Ultimately, the magistrate judge accepted Juror 3’s responses as indicating that he would be able to put aside his visceral reactions and impartially consider the evidence. On this record, that finding was not a “manifest error,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove Juror 3.   Further, the court explained that the district court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors and sentenced Defendant within the guidelines range, the calculation of which Defendant does not challenge. The district court noted Defendant’s “extremely dangerous” conduct in pulling a loaded handgun from his waistband and pointing it at a law-enforcement officer’s head when he was arrested. The court then emphasized that Defendant’s offense conduct was “particularly disturbing.” It also found by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had sexually abused his ex-girlfriend’s daughter. It did not err in considering this conduct, even though Nosley was acquitted of it in state court. View "United States v. Nathan Nosley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 75 months imprisonment. The government appealed the district court’s decision not to enhance Defendant’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(1). The government argues on appeal that the definition of MDMA at Minnesota Rules, part 6800.4210, is identical to the federal definition of MDMA. They argue that the district court should have deferred to the expert agency’s interpretation of the term “isomers,” which is contained in the Rule, rather than allowing the statute to expand the definition.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that the version of the Minnesota statute applicable to Defendant’s 2011 felony drug convictions prohibiting isomers of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) was overbroad. The court explained for the enhancement to apply, the court would have to read “isomers” in Minnesota Rules, part 6800.4210, item C, as excluding certain isomers, namely, those excluded in the federal regulations. However, if the court read “isomers” as being limited to optical, positional, and geometric isomers, it would render superfluous the language of Minn. R. 6800.4210, “whether optical, positional, or geometric.” A common sense reading of the statute suggests that Minn. R. 6800.4210 limits some isomers, while Minn. Stat. Section 152.02, subd. 2(3) (2009) limits all isomers. Therefore, Defendant does not have the requisite three ACCA convictions for enhanced sentencing. View "United States v. Lorenzo Heard, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pled guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. The district court sentenced Defendant to 48 months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The parties agree there are two issues on appeal, whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to (1) conduct a Terry stop on Defendant and (2) command Defendant to stand for a frisk.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that because Defendant only challenged the district court’s legal conclusions, there is no basis to disturb the district court’s findings of fact. The court further reasoned that Defendant’s answers to the officer’s questions about why he was at the salvage lot at 3:00 a.m. were odd because he was waiting at the salvage lot in the middle of the night so he could inquire about a stolen car in the morning and Defendant had not reported it stolen. Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, these facts were sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.   Further, while Defendant argued the bulge in his pockets was insufficient to justify the frisk, under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer to fear for his safety. Therefore, the court concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the attempted frisk. View "United States v. Victor Stokes" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of offenses involving interstate transportation of stolen property and witness tampering. The district court sentenced him to a total of 108 months imprisonment, along with a term of supervised release and restitution. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions and that the district court erred when imposing the sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s co-conspirator gave detailed testimony about the scheme that was neither incredible nor insubstantial on its face. His testimony was corroborated by other evidence, including security camera videos, GPS data, and seized evidence of burglaries. The court, therefore, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions for conspiracy and for aiding and abetting the interstate transportation of stolen property. Further, the court found that Defendant’s criminal history and offense conduct, including his commission of witness tampering while on pretrial release, adequately justified the sentence imposed. View "United States v. Bryan Kirkendoll, II" on Justia Law

A grand jury charged the five appellants with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Each appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the conspiracy involved the importation of methamphetamine from Mexico. Because the offense involved large quantities of methamphetamine with a high level of purity, the court reasonably inferred that the drugs were coming directly from a “super lab” that produces methamphetamine. Further, the increase applies whether or not a defendant knew that the offense involved the importation of methamphetamine. For this reason, the district court correctly applied the increase to all four defendants, and it is unnecessary to consider whether the evidence supported a finding that three of them knew about the importation of drugs. View "United States v. Travis Werkmeister" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, one count of health care fraud, and one count of obtaining controlled substances by fraud. Defendant caused multiple persons, including her daughter and significant other, to inflict serious bodily injury on themselves. In some instances, she inflicted the injuries herself by using a rock to smash their hands. Defendant secured their injuries to enable them to obtain pain medication for her use. Their injuries and the lack of prompt, proper treatment ultimately resulted in amputated fingers.   The district court sentenced Defendant to 144 months in prison, a 36-month upward variance. She appeals, challenging the substantive reasonableness of her sentence. She argues that it resulted from “an unreasonable weighing decision in that it was unjustified by the record and explanation.” Defendant also argued that the district court’s articulated reasons did not warrant an upward variance because the calculated Guidelines range sufficiently accounted for them.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that despite One Defendant’s assertions to the contrary, the district court expressly accounted for her upbringing, prior abuse, and addiction. It stated, “we can’t overlook the reality that she’s had a very difficult journey in life herself, and then struggling with the addiction issues,” but that “it’s not offered as an excuse for the behavior.” The district court also noted that the seriousness of the crime warranted commensurate consequences, “especially when there’s physical injury to five different victims in the setting of these facts.” View "United States v. Frenchone One Horn" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the charge that he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm. He was charged with this offense on December 15, 2020, and arrested on December 17. A warrant search of his residence on December 20 found marijuana, cannabis flowers, cocaine, digital scales, drug packaging, stockpiles of magazines and ammunition, and a handgun. Defendant pleaded guilty to the Section 922(g)(3) offense in October 2021. The government agreed not to file charges related to the December arrest and warrant search (the “December 2020 search”), and to request a within-guidelines-range sentence. In calculating the advisory guidelines range, the PSR increased the offense level because Defendant used drugs and the Glock handgun in connection with his Section 922(g) offense. The district court overruled Defendant’s objections to the enhancements, adopted the PSR in full, and imposed a 72-month sentence. Defendant appealed the sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that even without evidence of Defendant’s activities at the residence in the intervening period, during which he was tried and convicted of state drug offenses, the court concluded this evidence is consistent with the findings of relevant conduct in Anderson (“a career of drug dealing”), and in Lawrence (“continuous pattern of drug activity”). Thus, the district court did not commit error, much less “clear or obvious” plain error, when it failed to find that Defendant’s conduct revealed by the December 2020 arrest and search, as set forth in the PSR and in Special Agent’s testimony, was not relevant conduct under Section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines. View "United States v. Gregorio Soto, Jr." on Justia Law

After a three-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm and, in a separate count, of being a felon in possession of ammunition, following a shooting in north Minneapolis. The district court imposed concurrent 115-month sentences on each count. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of the interstate commerce element of the firearm offense, insufficient evidence of possession of ammunition and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The government’s appeal brief noted that the two counts are multiplicitous and should have been merged for sentencing purposes.   The Eighth Circuit agreed the firearm and ammunition convictions are multiplicitous as submitted to the jury. Therefore, one must be vacated to eliminate plain error prejudice, the two $100 special assessments. The court otherwise affirmed. The court reasoned in these circumstances, it was plain error not to merge the two counts for sentencing purposes, and the appropriate remedy is to remand with directions to vacate one of the multiplicitous convictions. The court left to the district court which of the two counts to vacate. The court wrote it does not require full resentencing or a new trial. View "United States v. Johnnie Haynes" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s1 denial of his pro se motion to terminate supervision or modify conditions of supervised release. Defendant argued that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 and his Fifth Amendment due process rights when it denied Defendant’s motion in a sealed document without the procedural protections of appointed counsel, a hearing, and the opportunity to review and challenge the U.S. Probation Office’s recommendation. Additionally, he challenged the terms of his supervised release as overbroad and unconstitutional.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not violate Rule 32.1(c)(1) by failing to provide Defendant with counsel and a hearing before it denied his motion to terminate supervision or modify the conditions of his supervised release. By its plain language, Rule 32.1(c)(1) applies only if a district court “modif[ies] the conditions of . . . supervised release.” Here, the district court refused to modify Defendant’s conditions of supervised release. Under Rule 32.1’s plain language, neither a hearing nor counsel was required before the court denied Defendant’s motion. Further, because Defendant suffered no prejudice from the information contained in the Supervision Summary, no due-process violation occurred. View "United States v. James Norris, Jr." on Justia Law