Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and his request for a Franks hearing. The court explained that because Defendant was not unlawfully questioned, his contention that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights because of the allegedly unlawful questioning necessarily fails. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and his request for a Franks hearing. Defendant asserted that the district court correctly held that “law enforcement’s two warrantless K9 sniffs of the curtilage of his home were violations of the Fourth Amendment.” Defendant also argued that the district court erred, however, in ultimately denying his motion to suppress based on its application of the Leon good faith exception.    The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the two dog sniffs occurred in September 2019; at that time, we “had neither expressly overruled Scott nor explained how Jardines applies to apartment doors in a common hallway.” The applicable standard is an objective—not subjective—one. Applying this standard, the district court correctly denied Defendant’s suppression motion. The court agreed with the government that Defendant’s challenges to the search warrant affidavit’s omission of certain details about the two dog sniff amount to “an attempt to relitigate the merits of the curtilage issue.”   Further, the court held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements given while he was in custody. As the district court correctly explained, “Police asked Defendant a series of simple questions to confirm his identity and ensure officer safety. They were not seeking to elicit incriminating responses from Defendant. He was read his Miranda rights prior to his further questioning in the bathroom and upon the continued questioning at the police station.” His contention that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights because of the allegedly unlawful questioning necessarily fails. View "United States v. Donell Hines" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. The district court sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing the court erred in applying a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement and that his sentence is unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court described specific portions of the testimony that either Defendant “struggled to explain” or were simply “fanciful” and noted that Defendant’s testimony under oath directly contradicted his earlier statements to law enforcement made immediately after his arrest. The court wrote that the district court properly addressed each element of perjury, and the court’s findings are sufficient to support an obstruction-of-justice enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence.   Further, the court wrote that the district court may “assign relatively greater weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense than to the mitigating personal characteristics of the defendant,” and the record demonstrates that the court properly considered Section 3553(a) factors. Under these circumstances, Defendant’s sentence was not unreasonable. View "United States v. Joel Garcia" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two child pornography-related offenses. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s admission of social media evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the court’s application of a 5-level enhancement at sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed his convictions but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that taken together, this circumstantial evidence provided a sufficient basis for the district court to permit the jury to decide whether the MeWe account belonged to Defendant. Further Defendant asserted that the district court erred in applying an enhancement under USSG Section 4B1.5(b)(1) because he was not convicted of a “covered sex crime.” With the 5-level enhancement, Defendant’s advisory Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment; without it, the range would be 180 to 188 months. Under these circumstances, Defendant has shown “a reasonable probability that but for the error he would have received a more favorable sentence.” View "United States v. Vincent Perez" on Justia Law

D.B., a juvenile and an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree burglary pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court sentenced him to 12 months of official detention followed by a three-year term of juvenile delinquent supervision. D.B. appeals, arguing that his federal juvenile delinquency proceedings should have been dismissed because he was not afforded a speedy trial as required by the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), and that his sentence is unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained it need not resolve whether D.B.’s speedy trial rights under the FJDA were violated because D.B. waived his right to appeal that issue as part of his plea agreement. Further, D.B. does not assert that his sentence is unlawful or that his counsel was ineffective. His sentence likewise did not violate the terms of his plea agreement. Although the district court declined to adopt the parties’ joint recommendation for a sentence of probation, the agreement cautioned that this recommendation was not binding on the district court. And that warning was expressly reiterated to D.B. during his change-of-plea hearing. Accordingly, the court concluded that the sentence imposed by the district court here was not plainly unreasonable. View "United States v. D. B." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of interference with commerce by robbery, possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court sentenced him to 274 months in prison. He appeals his conviction. Defendant claims the district court erred by allowing the forensic examiner to testify as an expert on firearm and bullet identification.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the examiner’s degrees and training gave her competence for the subject area of her testimony. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing her to testify as an expert. Further Defendant challenged element 1, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove he robbed the Select Mart and the VP Racing Station because no one identified him as the robber. But “courtroom identification is not necessary when the evidence is sufficient to permit the inference that the defendant on trial is the person who committed the acts charged. However, the court explained that the court reverses a conviction, including one based on circumstantial evidence, “only if no construction of the evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict.” Here, the evidence included video footage and still photos from Select Mart’s security camera and a detailed account of how investigators found Defendant’s fingerprints on the store’s door handle. View "United States v. Lonnie Perry" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and possession of a firearm. He reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress drugs and a gun seized from his rental vehicle after a traffic stop and incriminating statements he made later that day. On appeal, Defendant argued the district court erred because police officers did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe he committed a traffic violation and then unconstitutionally expanded the stop while a drug dog sniffed the exterior of the vehicle.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, given the undisputed facts regarding the length of the stop, particularly its short duration, and the reasons given for the time it took to almost complete the purpose of the stop before the narcotics dog alerted to the rear of the driver’s side, the district court did not err in concluding that the Sergeant did not unlawfully prolong the stop before the dog alert gave the officers probable cause to arrest Defendant and search the vehicle. Further, the court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation before Defendant made incriminating statements after being given Miranda warnings. Thus, the district court properly rejected his argument that the statements should be suppressed as fruit of a poisonous tree. View "United States v. James Rutledge" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse of one child and abusive sexual contact and aggravated sexual abuse (two counts) of another child. The district court sentenced him to 32 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing the court erred in admitting expert testimony about statistical studies of victims of child sexual abuse. Defendant argued the expert’s testimony improperly bolstered and vouched for the victims, rendering the trial fundamentally unfair   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the expert did not offer any information or opinion specific to this case. She repeatedly acknowledged she was not testifying whether sexual abuse occurred or whether the two victims were telling the truth. She testified only generally about child sexual abuse and victim statistics, based on her general knowledge of studies and her experience with hundreds of children she had interviewed. Further, the jury was specifically instructed that it must decide the case based on the evidence presented. The jury is presumed to follow all instructions. Thus, the district court did not commit error that was plain by allowing the expert’s testimony. View "United States v. Bennett Belt" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two counts of felon-in-possession and one count of possessing an unregistered firearm. Defendant brought three challenges. First, he argues that Standing Order 19-03 and Standing Order 16-043 denied him his constitutional right to prepare for trial. Second, he claims the district court erred in declining to give his requested jury instruction on duress and coercion. Finally, he challenges the evidentiary sufficiency of his conviction.   The Eighth Circuit. The court held that because Defendant did not show the absence of legal alternatives to firearm possession, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on coercion/duress. Further, the court reasoned that Defendant’s own statements support the verdict. Although he was one of many passengers in the car that held the gun, he told officers that he “wouldn’t charge the other passengers with the gun” and joked that he might have held the other passengers hostage with a “12-gauge.” Officers testified that Defendant had never been told that a gun was found in the car, much less that it was a 12-guage. Police found the sawed-off shotgun under the passenger seat where Defendant sat. The gun’s stock was positioned toward him, bullets at his feet. Defendant’s knowledge that the car held a 12-gauge shotgun, the gun’s position, and his proximity to it support an inference that he knowingly possessed the gun. View "United States v. Eric Ladeaux" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine with two prior serious drug felonies. The district court sentenced him to 324 months in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) testimony from a man who was not involved in the charged conspiracy but began selling meth with Defendant three months after the conspiracy ended.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the government failed to give the notice required under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3). But under a plain error standard of review, the error did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The evidence of his participation in the conspiracy was robust. And, as he concedes, many witnesses had already testified about his drug connections to California.   Further, Defendant argued the testimony, particularly about him exchanging guns for drugs, was unduly prejudicial because it “changed a non-violent, alleged conspiracy into a hyper-violent one.” However, the court held that the evidence, particularly with the court’s limiting instruction, was not unduly prejudicial. Moreover, four cooperating witnesses and co-conspirators testified that Defendant brought and shipped meth into Nebraska for redistribution. Their testimony was further corroborated by a package (intercepted by law enforcement) with about five pounds of meth; Postal Service records of packages sent; records of wire transfers sent to California; phone records; and records of drug sales kept by a cooperating witness. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. View "United States v. Enrique Abarca" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine or 5 grams or more of actual, pure methamphetamine, two counts of distribution of heroin, and one count of distribution of heroin and methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on the introduction of a stipulation as to his codefendant’s prior conviction, its refusal to give his requested jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence on the conspiracy count. He also challenged the district court’s calculation of his advisory sentencing guidelines range.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the stipulation to be introduced or in rejecting Defendant’s proposed jury instructions, and there was sufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy to distribute. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Further, the court wrote that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the drug quantity involved in Defendant’s offense. The district court’s quantity determination was largely based on a customer’s and a confidential informant’s testimony. The district court found these witnesses to be credible, and the court found no reason to overturn that finding. View "United States v. Charleton Maxwell" on Justia Law