Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity after Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. He filed a motion in limine asking the district court to instruct the jury that Section 2423(a) required the Government to prove that (1) he knew R.M. was underage and (2) he intended the unlawful nature of the sexual activity. The district court denied the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial. The court explained that Section 2423(a) “does not signal an exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse.” Therefore, a Section 2423(a) conviction predicated on intent to engage in unlawful sexual activity does not require proof of the defendant’s intent or knowledge that such activity is unlawful. Thus, the court held that the district court correctly held that the Government did not need to prove that Defendant specifically intended R.M. to engage in sexual activity that was unlawful as such. It was required to prove only (1) that he intended R.M. to engage in sexual activity and (2) that the sexual activity was unlawful. View "United States v. Luis Moreira Bravo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the supervised release revocation sentence the district court imposed when it found, after a hearing, that he had committed three Grade C violations -- a new law violation, failure to comply with a search condition, and marijuana use.  On appeal, Defendant argued that, because he tested positive on April 1, it was a “near certainty” that he would test positive again on April 4. Therefore, for the district court to order eight months imprisonment on May 4 after ordering residential reentry on April 1 is “simply unreasonable.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it has repeatedly upheld revocation sentences that varied upward from the advisory guidelines range because the defendant was a “recidivist violator of supervised release conditions.” Here, the district court imposed a within-range sentence of eight months, a sentence that is accorded a presumption of substantive reasonableness. Thus, on the record, the district court did not abuse its substantial revocation sentencing discretion. View "United States v. Johnny Harris" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders directing state officials to transport or facilitate testing for purposes of Petitioner’s clemency case. Because argument would not be helpful or assist us in analyzing this issue of statutory interpretation, the court denied Petitioner’s request for oral argument. Petitioner was sentenced to death in 2001 for killing two Sheriff’s Deputies. Petitione, relying on the same authority, filed an ex parte sealed motion in preparation for his clemency case—this time requesting that the court authorize a doctor to conduct bone-lead level testing on Petitioner, either in a private room in the prison or at another secure location of the prison’s choosing. The next day the district court granted the ex parte motion for bone-lead level testing. The district court entered an ex parte sealed order directing the Warden and Missouri Department of Corrections to transport Petitioner to the hospital on October 24, 2022, at 6:00 a.m. for medical testing. The State moved the district court to vacate and stay its orders, but before the district court ruled on the motions.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders directing state officials to transport or facilitate testing for purposes of Petitioner’s clemency case. The court held that because argument would not be helpful or assist us in analyzing this issue of statutory interpretation, Petitioner’s request for oral argument is denied. The court explained that Section 3599’s authorization for funding neither confers nor implies an additional grant of jurisdiction to order state officials to act to facilitate an inmate’s clemency application. View "Michael Tisius v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of his peers for possession of child pornography. Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and admission of certain evidence. Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the warrant was not sufficiently particular and lacked the requisite nexus.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained In this case, multiple child pornography images were flagged by a search engine, those images were affiliated with four IP addresses, and those IP addresses were registered to the address that was searched. In addition, the state court was aware that Defendant had a previous conviction for possession of child pornography and lived at the address flagged for child pornography. Considering these circumstances, the court concluded there was a sufficient nexus between the evidence to be seized and the place to be searched. Further, the court agreed with the district court that Defendant’s prior conviction for possession of child pornography has probative value because of its similarity to the charged offense.   Finally, the court explained that the non-Rule 414 evidence connecting Defendant to the child pornography on his tablet was overwhelming. And the government’s case was only marginally strengthened by the excess propensity evidence. Accordingly, the court held any error in admitting evidence under Rule 414 was harmless. View "United States v. Gene Schave" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted and convicted on two counts of production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). The indictment focuses on two secretly recorded videos of M.B., Defendant’s then approximately fifteen-year-old cousin, before and after she took a shower in Defendant’s master bathroom. The district court sentenced Defendant to 210 months of imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient. The court explained that the statute underlying the indictment prohibits a person from using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct. Congress, in turn, defined sexually explicit conduct as the lascivious exhibition of genitals—not mere nudity. Applying this statute to the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded no reasonable jury could have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Matthew McCoy" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant on three counts in connection with his involvement in a methamphetamine and heroin conspiracy. The district court sentenced Defendant to 149 months imprisonment, followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion in limine and admitting certain testimony of a confidential informant (CI).   On appeal, Defendant raised the same arguments as he did before the district court: (1) that the CI’s testimony regarding the 2017 events is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and constitutes a prior bad act, rendering the testimony inadmissible under Rules 402, 403, and 404(b), respectively, and (2) that the CI’s testimony identifying Defendant is inadmissible under Rule 403, given that he was unaware that the CI could identify him.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, as the district court noted, the Government did not introduce the evidence to establish that Defendant was acting in accordance with his character but rather offered it as direct evidence establishing Defendant’s participation in the instant conspiracy. Moreover, the evidence was offered to lay the foundation for how the CI knew Defendant and was able to identify him at the 2019 drug transaction. Accordingly, the court wrote that because substantial evidence other than the CI’s testimony supports the jury’s verdict, any error in admitting the CI’s testimony regarding the 2017 events was harmless and does not warrant reversal. View "United States v. Armondo Heredia, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm but preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant appealed and asked the court to reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in addition to crediting law enforcement’s testimony, the magistrate judge discredited witness testimony to the extent it varied from the officers’ description of events. The magistrate judge noted that the witness originally told the Sheriff there were only two people in the house when there were actually three. The magistrate judge also noted that the witness appeared to admit he lied when he “dropped his head” after the Sergeant confronted him about the discrepancy. Defendant insists the magistrate judge “infers too much.” But, again, the magistrate judge’s credibility determination after personally hearing and observing the witness’s testimony is virtually unassailable on appeal. And the Sergeants’ testimony was not inconsistent or implausible. View "United States v. Michael Mitchell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court1 determined that Defendant qualified for the enhanced statutory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Defendant appealed the district court’s application of the ACCA enhancement.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the ACCA, a felon who possesses a firearm is subject to a minimum sentence of fifteen years if he has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses “committed on occasions different from one another.” Here, The PSR notes that Defendant “admitted to selling drugs to an undercover officer on three separate occasions.” Although Defendant objected to his sentence enhancement, Defendant never objected to this separate-occasions statement in the PSR, so the district court properly accepted it as true. The court also disagreed with Defendant that the rule of lenity requires the court to construe the ACCA’s occasions clause in his favor. The rule of lenity states that ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant. However, the court considers the rule of lenity only when, after employing all other tools of construction, “a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute” remains. Here, Defendant committed at least three (if not four) qualifying offenses occurring on separate occasions, so there is no ambiguity in the statute as applied to Defendant. View "United States v. Damon Buford" on Justia Law

After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Defendant’s conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court sentenced Defendant to 126 months imprisonment, varying upward six months from the mandatory minimum of 120 months, his advisory guidelines range. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, raising three Fourth Amendment issues emanating from a postal inspector’s warrantless seizure of an undeliverable Express Mail package sent to “Defendant Rm 512” at a hotel in Des Moines, Iowa. He also appealed his sentence, arguing it is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately justify the upward variance.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Here, the district court carefully explained why it imposed a six-month upward variance, stating that a mandatory minimum sentence would “ignore” Defendant’s “ridiculously problematic” and “offensive” behavior during his pre-sentence detention for this offense. The court did not abuse its discretion by varying upward to account for dozens of serious security and disciplinary violations. View "United States v. Manuel Flores" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. Defendant reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and subsequently appealed. Defendant argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because he was unlawfully arrested in his home, and the attenuation doctrine does not apply to render the evidence that was seized during a subsequent search admissible against him.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that under the circumstances, it cannot say the district court committed a clear error in finding that Defendant’s consent to search was voluntary. The court expressly considered the relevant factors for assessing voluntariness before reaching its conclusion, including those weighing against a finding of voluntary consent. Further, the court wrote that weighing the appropriate factors, it concluded that Defendant’s voluntary consent to the search of his residence was sufficient to purge the taint of the officers’ initial unlawful conduct. The district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the December 14, 2019, search. View "United States v. Gary Harris" on Justia Law