Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found Defendant guilty of sex trafficking of a minor. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation by denying his requests to proceed pro se. Second, he contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Third, he argues that the district court admitted unfairly prejudicial evidence. Finally, he submits that two of the special conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court are impermissibly vague and overbroad.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed but remand for clarification of the two special conditions. In regards to the special conditions the court explained that although a sentencing judge has “broad discretion” when imposing terms of supervised release, we have said that a special condition of supervised release is unconstitutionally vague when it “fails to convey sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct . . . when measured by common understanding and practices.” The court held that Defendant is correct that the two special conditions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, respectively. The court remanded for the narrow purpose of amending the written judgment as it relates to Special Conditions 2 and 3. View "United States v. Anthony Atkins" on Justia Law

Defendant began supervision in November 2020. He struggled reacclimating to society. Although he started a business and, for a time, underwent substance-abuse and mental-health treatment, he never stopped using meth. In ten months, he violated his probation no less than 15 times, never lasting more than a month without testing positive for meth. He was arrested on October 13, 2021 for driving without a license. While in custody, he threatened to kill two United States Marshals if they did not release him to care for his sick mother. The district court revoked his probation on January 20, 2022.   The government urged a top-of-the-guidelines sentence. The court imposed a bottom-of-the-guidelines 21-month sentence. Defendant appealed, claiming the court both committed procedural error by failing to consider the letter he sent before his original sentencing and also imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the revocation court did not commit plain error by failing to read Defendant’s letter. Defendant did not ask the revocation court to consider it. He did not provide the information contained in the letter. He did not even mention its existence. He now argues that the district court erred by not learning of and hunting down the letter sua sponte. This court disagrees. The district court did not plainly err by failing to discover and consider the letter. Further, here, the district court did not fail to consider a relevant factor. Moreover, the court’s within-guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable. View "United States v. Jeffrey Dixon" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant n of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The district court sentenced him to a term of 300 months in prison. Defendant appealed his conviction. Defendant challenged the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the evidence presented by the government was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Defendant guilty on both counts. Overall, the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the conclusion that Defendant had a role in the drug conspiracy and possessed methamphetamine with the intent to distribute.   Defendant also argued the district court erred in allowing a witness to read a text message from his phone while on the stand when that message had not been disclosed to the defense ahead of trial. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the witness to read the undisclosed text message on the stand. The court allowed Defendant’s counsel to review the text message over lunch. And Defendant’s counsel did not ask for more time to view the message, ask for a continuance, or even renew his objection following that review. While this process is not what Rule 16 envisions or requires, the defense did have an opportunity to examine the text message and cross-examine the witness about it at trial. View "United States v. Marcus Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant previously pleaded guilty to selling cocaine in Minnesota on two separate occasions. The district court held that these two convictions were not "serious drug offense[s]" under the Armed Career Criminal Act because Minnesota law defines "cocaine" more broadly than federal law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that "a drug statute that criminalizes even one additional isomer does not qualify as a 'serious drug felony.'” Here, Minnesota law prohibits all isomers of cocaine, while federal law prohibits only optical and geometric isomers. Thus, because Minnesota law sweeps more broadly than federal law in this regard, Defendant's cocaine convictions do not count as "serious drug offense[s]" under the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Maurice Owen" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in 2021 to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Applying circuit precedent, the district court1 determined that Larry’s Missouri offense constituted a “crime of violence” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, see United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2009), and therefore increased his base offense level. Larry appeals, arguing that Pulliam is no longer good law in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), and that the district court thus committed procedural error in determining his Guidelines sentencing range. Defendant argued that Borden requires that the offender’s force be targeted at another person.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote, that when the plurality and concurring opinions are read together, then, Borden holds only that the force clause categorically excludes offenses that can be committed recklessly. Pulliam thus remains binding precedent. View "United States v. Keith Larry" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and the district court sentenced her to 42 months in prison. She maintained that her sentence is unreasonably high.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the record reflects that additional considerations drove the district court's sentence. For example, the court was concerned that the calculated Guidelines range didn't adequately account for the severity of Defendant’s offense conduct, which it characterized as a "series of serious criminal conduct . . . including the sexual abuse of a minor" that the court found "very troubling." The court also expressed concern about Defendant’s behavior during pretrial detention, where she incurred 25 separate violations of jail rules, including her possession of sharpened objects and drugs as well as a false allegation of rape against jail staff.  Thus, the court discerned no abuse of discretion in the court's treatment of the relevant sentencing criteria, and "reversal is not appropriate simply because the district court did not weigh" these considerations as Defendant prefers.   Further, the court wrote that though the court did not apply a sentencing enhancement based on this finding, it nevertheless took it into account in selecting a sentence. Finally, it is true that at one point during the sentencing hearing the district court remarked that Defendant could "get some treatment that she may need" while in prison. But the record as a whole demonstrates that the sentence was driven by her offense conduct, her criminal history, and the court's desire to protect the public. View "United States v. Keasia Morrow" on Justia Law

The district court convicted Defendant of two controlled substance offenses, and of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The issue on appeal is the third element of this offense, whether the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly possessed ammunition. Defendant argued on appeal, as he did in the district court, that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the ammunition in question, which was found in a locked safe in a closet of what Defendant described as “my bedroom” in a Davenport, Iowa home where he was not then living.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there were gaps and inconsistencies between what Defendant told the officers and what officers found when they searched the safes in the bedroom closet at 1025 West Locust. But resolving fact discrepancies and drawing reasonable inferences are tasks reserved for the fact finder at trial, here, the district court. The errors in Defendant’s testimony can be reasonably attributed to his age, his decades of heroin and cocaine abuse, and the likely passage of time since he had accessed the safes in the bedroom closet. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s verdict the court concluded that Defendant’s statements to officers, when combined with the other evidence are sufficient for a rational factfinder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant constructively possessed the ammunition found in the second safe. View "United States v. Donnie Spencer" on Justia Law

During proceedings to determine whether Defendant had violated the conditions of his supervised release, Defendant asked the district court to allow him to appear without a lawyer. The court granted his request and, after a hearing, revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to thirteen months' imprisonment. Defendant maintains on appeal that the court erred in granting his request.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant has not demonstrated reversible error but merely buyer's remorse for his decision to proceed pro se. The court wrote that the record shows that the court did not deny Defendant his right to proceed with appointed counsel; if anything, it shows that the court encouraged Defendant to proceed with his prior attorney as counsel. The court explained that a "district court does not violate the right to counsel when it gives a defendant the choice between adequate representation and self-representation," see Ivers, 44 F.4th at 756, and Defendant does not allege that his previous counsel was inadequate. In addition, Defendant has no right to standby counsel, as that option is available at the district court's discretion. View "United States v. Orlando Preston" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating the Travel Act by facilitating prostitution, served her fifteen-month prison sentence, and began a three-year period of supervised release in July 2020. In the following eighteen months, she violated supervised release conditions at least twenty-four times. The district court revoked supervised release and imposed an 18-month sentence, with 18 months of supervised release to follow. Defendant appealed, arguing that varying upward to a sentence greater than the 6-12 month advisory guidelines range is substantively unreasonable because a lesser sentence would have been sufficient.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that on the sentencing record, the contention the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the Section 3553(a) factors by imposing a sentence outside the advisory guidelines range is without merit. The court wrote it has repeatedly held that it is not unreasonable for a sentencing court to demonstrate with an upward variance that contemptuous disregard for our laws can have serious consequences.   Further, here, the district court explained it was varying upward to promote Defendant’s respect for the law and to protect the public from further crimes, not to enable treatment or promote rehabilitation. View "United States v. Paisley Michels" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The presentence investigation report recommended an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 57 to 71 months imprisonment, based on Defendant’s prior conviction for a crime of violence (second-degree robbery) plus enhancements for possessing a stolen firearm and possession in connection with another felony offense. The district court adopted the PSR’s recommended guidelines range, and sentenced Defendant to 71 months imprisonment, the top of that range. Defendant appealed, arguing the sentence is substantively unreasonable.   Reviewing the sentence under the governing deferential abuse-of-discretion standard the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. The court wrote that after careful review, the court concludes this is not the “unusual case” where it should reverse a sentencing decision as substantively unreasonable. Properly applying the Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement did not result in a “disproportionately” unreasonable advisory guidelines range. Moreover, as the district court noted, there were other aggravating factors warranting a sentence at the top of the advisory range. District courts have “wide latitude” in weighing the relevant Section 3553 factors. This is not the rare case where a presumptively reasonable guidelines range sentence is substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. James Jones" on Justia Law