Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, as well as his request for leave to file a second suppression motion out of time. He also argued that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the relevant search was legal, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s leave to file a second, untimely suppression motion. The court explained that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous, and he never exceeded the lawful scope of his Terry frisk of Defendant’s truck. Accordingly, the district court was correct to deny Defendant’s first suppression motion.   Further, even if the district court had erred, any error would have been harmless. The evidence from Defendant’s second traffic stop related to Counts 3–5 of the second superseding indictment—counts that were dropped as part of Defendant’s plea deal. So the evidence didn’t affect Defendant’s conviction. And since the exclusionary rule doesn’t apply at sentencing, United States v. Tauil-Hernandez, 88 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 1996), the district court was free to consider this evidence when imposing Defendant’s 360-month sentence. View "United States v. Randy Dabney" on Justia Law

The district court had strong views about what charges fit Defendant’s crimes. It rejected both her plea agreement and a motion by the government to dismiss four of the five counts in the indictment. The Eighth Circuit held that the latter ruling went too far, and reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the government’s motion.   The court explained that here, the district court merely “disagreed with the prosecutor’s assessment of what penalty the defendant ought to face.” Rather than addressing whether the prosecutor acted in bad faith, the court just listed the reasons it thought Defendant was getting off too easy: she was “very dangerous” and “by far the most culpable”; the victim suffered life-threatening injuries; and a “conviction for robbery alone strip[ped] the [c]ourt of any ability to sentence [her] to a just punishment.” These may be important factors to consider at sentencing, but they are not reasons to interfere with the government’s charging decisions, no matter how much the court may disagree with them. View "United States v. Tiffany Bernard" on Justia Law

After a jury trial before the district court, Defendant was convicted of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he knowingly possessed a firearm.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm in question. The court explained the government presented security camera footage showing a man retrieving a firearm from Apartment H6, running down the exterior staircase of the H building with the firearm and taking a firing stance, returning to Apartment H6 and depositing the firearm, and running to Apartment P4. Security camera footage showed that Defendant was the only person, besides the resident of the apartment, who entered Apartment P4 between the time of the shooting and the time officers were posted outside of the apartment, and it is inconsequential whether Defendant left Apartment P4 before the shooting. Thus, based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm found in Apartment H6 on August 30th. View "United States v. Earl McKee" on Justia Law

Defendant drove drunk through the White Earth Indian Reservation. Local residents tried to stop him, but he struck and pinned one of them, N.V., under his car. A jury convicted Defendant of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The district court varied upward from the Guidelines and sentenced Defendant to 80 months on each count, to run consecutively.   Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) he was too drunk to have the specific intent to assault N.V.; (2) he ran over N.V. in self-defense; (3) his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy clause; and (4) his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Because those arguments are meritless.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there was enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Defendant intended to assault N.V. The jury’s verdict was supported by evidence that: Defendant aimed his car at local residents; he attempted to jump the curb three times; he stomped on N.V.’s head after hitting him with his car, and police described his responses afterward as logical. Further, the court wrote that the jury had significant evidence that Defedenadnt was not acting in self-defense. Moreover, the court explained that Defendant’s Double Jeopardy clause argument is foreclosed by both Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent. Finally, the court saw no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentence. View "United States v. Kevin Doerr" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, asserting that his 2000 Illinois state conviction could not qualify as a prior felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. Section 851. The district court denied Appellant the requested post-conviction relief because of his untimely filing, but it granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Appellant’s Section 2255 motion is time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding that Appellant failed to demonstrate the diligence required for equitable tolling. The court concluded that Appellant’s Section 2255 motion is time-barred and equitable tolling is not appropriate because Appellant failed to allege facts showing that circumstances beyond his control at the prison prevented him from timely seeking relief. The court explained it need not address whether the motion is procedurally defaulted. The court also rejected Appellant’s argument that finding his motion time-barred under Section 2255(f) poses a problem under the Suspension Clause. View "Clifton Odie v. United States" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections  841(a)(1) and 846. He appealed the district court’s denials of his motion to suppress evidence, his motion to strike a juror for cause, and his motion to admit a portion of a video recording.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions. Defendant argued that the seizure and detention of the lockboxes was unreasonable under United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). But “Place had nothing to do with the automobile exception and is inapposite.” See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 578 (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently “explained that automobile searches differ from other searches” and has denied the applicability of cases that “do not concern automobiles or the automobile exception” to cases involving the automobile exception). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Further, the court wrote there was no abuse of discretion because the juror stated that she could remain fair and would listen to the detective’s testimony before deciding if she believed it. Finally, Defendant claimed that the “partial recording and the Government’s characterization of it . . . gave a misleading and unfair understanding of the meaning of Defendant’s statement to the jury.” But he offers no explanation of how the recording was misleading. View "United States v. Shaun Farrington" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in 2006. While on bail awaiting sentencing, Defendant and his brother were involved in a bar fight, during which Defendant shot and killed one man and assaulted another. Defendant was charged with murder, assault, and armed criminal action in state court.The following year Defendant was sentenced on the federal drug charges. The district court calculated a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category II, resulting in a Sentencing Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. The government moved for an upward departure under USSG Secs. 4A1.3 and 5K2.0(a)(2). The district court heard evidence about the bar fight, including a video of the altercation and testimony from a police detective, and granted the motion. The court sentenced Defendant to 480 months of imprisonment, the then-applicable statutory maximum. Defendant was subsequently acquitted of the charges related to the bar fight.In 2013, Defendant moved for a sentencing reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 3582(c). The district court granted the motion, but only reduced Defendant's sentence to 240 months. The court denied Defendant's subsequent sentencing reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act. Defendant appealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's s motion, finding that the district court conducted a complete review of Defendant's motion and provided a reasonable basis for its decision. View "United States v. Anthony Sisco" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to the charge of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and was sentenced to 80 months imprisonment plus 4 years supervised release. The government dropped the charges related to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.The district court calculated Defendant's total offense level as 34 with a criminal history category of II, resulting in a Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months. The district court varied downward, sentencing Defendant to 80 months imprisonment to be followed by a term of 4 years supervised release.Defendant appealed, claiming that the district court erred in using the methamphetamine to calculate her guideline sentence. The district court did not err in determining that quantities of methamphetamine were attributable to Defendant based on its credibility findings and the district court's credibility findings are virtually unassailable on appeal and were not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Jennifer Buford" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with firearm and drug charges after an officer claimed to see a bag of drugs in Defendant's car that was in plain view. In a motion to suppress, the officer testified inconsistently with the radio call. However, the district court found the officer credible and denied Defendant's motion. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the district court should not have credited the officer's testimony.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the district court was entitled to credit the police officer's testimony over Defendant's. In finding that the drugs were in plain view, the district court implicitly credited the officer's testimony over his radio call. While the two statements were at odds, the court’s credibility determination did not amount to clear error. View "United States v. Lamont White" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual assault in Arkansas state court in February 2003, an offense requiring him to register under the Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997. One of Defendant's registration requirements was that he notify his probation officer of intended international travel 21 days in advance. However, after registering in 2020, Defendant left the country without informing his probation officer. Upon his return, Defendant was charged with knowingly failing to provide information and then engaging in intended travel in foreign commerce.Defendant's guidelines were 18 to 24 months, but the government successfully sought an upward variance, resulting in a sentence of 36 months of imprisonment. The court also imposed a term of 15 years of supervised release with up to 36 months of home detention as a special condition of supervised release. Defendant appealed his sentence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding that any error by the district court did not affect Defendant's substantial rights because the court indicated it would have imposed the same term as an upward variance. View "United States v. Brian Floss" on Justia Law