Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The district court sentenced Defendant to 264 months’ imprisonment for drug trafficking conspiracy. Defendant asserted on appeal that the district court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial and that the court imposed an unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no reversible error, and therefore affirmed the judgment. Defendant first challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. He sought to exclude a statement about employment that he made to a detective during the search of his residence in 2019. The court wrote that employment is a standard element of a booking inquiry because a judicial officer is required by statute to consider “employment” in deciding whether to release or detain a defendant pending trial. Employment status is not so central to a drug investigation that it must be excised from the routine biographical information that is collected in the course of arrest and booking.   Further, Defendant claimed that the disputed evidence concerned “other acts” of the defendant and should have been excluded as inadmissible character evidence. The court concluded that the district court properly deemed the evidence probative of the charged conspiracy. The evidence tended to show that Defendant and the co-conspirator acted to protect the “turf” of their drug trafficking organization and to “warn” potential competitors. That sort of activity is relevant to the crime charged.   Finally, in sentencing Defendant, the district court varied downward by eight years from the bottom of the advisory range, and the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vary downward even further. View "United States v. Terrell Jason Armstrong" on Justia Law

After the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, Redman pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Defendant appealed, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him and that evidence recovered after the seizure should have been suppressed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The court explained, during a Terry stop, an officer may “take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop,” including frisking a person for weapons if the officer has “articulable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.”   Here, the parties agree that Defendant was not seized until the officer physically grabbed his jacket. The court concluded that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Defendant at that time. The officer was investigating an early-morning report of shots fired near 1:00 a.m. in a high-crime area. That he had been told that the call may have pertained to fireworks did not alone end his investigation, however. The officer knew that, among other facts, Defendant was one of only two people present in the dark parking lot that was the alleged location of the shots fired. Given these circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that Defendant may have been involved in a shots fired incident, which justified his decision to seize Defendant and to perform a limited search to determine if Defendant was armed. View "United States v. Anthony Redman" on Justia Law

Defendant is an inmate serving a sentence in federal custody after he was convicted in 2007 for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. After a hearing, the district court ordered Defendant committed to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment of a mental disease or defect at the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on his own without counsel, and the clerk of this court appointed the federal public defender to represent Defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representing Defendant and a separate motion to file counsel’s motion to withdraw under seal.   The Eighth Circuit denied the motion to file under seal as overbroad. The court explained that a proper motion to seal should be narrowly drawn and accompanied by a proposed redacted filing for the public docket. Here, counsel’s present motion seeks to seal the entire motion to withdraw without any proffered justification. Further, counsel failed to state any cited authority or developed an argument as to why a court’s decision to commit a person against his will for mental health treatment should be made and reviewed in secret.   However, the court granted the the motion to withdraw and will not require a brief of the sort described in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The court wrote that on review of the motion and the record, the court is satisfied that counsel’s ethical obligation to refrain from prosecuting a frivolous appeal justifies his motion to withdraw. View "United States v. David Garner" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distributing at least fifty grams of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. Section 841. At sentencing, the district court denied Defendant’s request to be sentenced according to the sentencing guidelines without regard to the statutory minimum penalty of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b). Defendant relied on 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(f), which allows a court to sentence offenders who meet certain criteria below the otherwise applicable statutory minimum term of imprisonment. Defendant disputed the district court’s ruling, but the Eighth Circuit concluded that he does not qualify for sentencing under Section 3553(f), and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court.   The court considered whether Congress meant to introduce a new concept of a “prior offense” that accrues criminal history point. The statute requires an evaluation of whether a defendant has a particular prior offense “as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” The court wrote there is no separate determination under the guidelines that would assign criminal history points to a defendant’s prior offense.   Here, it is undisputed that Defendant has a criminal history that meets the criteria in subsections (A) and (B). He has more than four criminal history points and a prior three-point offense. Those circumstances make him ineligible for sentencing under Section 3553(f). That Defendant does not also have a prior two-point violent offense that would meet the condition in subsection (C) is immaterial. View "United States v. Mark Pulsifer" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to enticing a minor and was sentenced to 288 months imprisonment followed by 10 years of supervised release. In fashioning Defendant's sentence, the district court applied United States Sentencing Guidelines Sec. 2G1.3(c)(1), which applies where the defendant caused the minor victim to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct.On appeal, Defendant argued that it was procedural error for the district court to apply Sec. 2G1.3(c)(1) because the government had not proved that he acted with the purpose of “producing a visual depiction” of his sexual conduct. However, the district court determined Defendant's claim that he did not cause the victim to perform oral sex for the purposes of creating a video was not credible. The Eighth Circuit found that the district court's resolution of the issue was not in error. Further, the court held that, even if the district court committed procedural error, it was harmless.The Eighth Circuit also found that Defendant's below-guidelines sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Abraham Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted persuasion, inducement, or enticement of a minor for sexual activity, in violation of 18. U.S.C. Sec. 2422(b), after a jury found him guilty and the district court sentenced him to 150 months imprisonment followed by five years supervised release. On appeal, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him. He also raised several alleged jury instruction errors and challenged the district court's denial of a downward departure.The Eighth Circuit rejected each of Defendant's appellate issues, affirming his conviction and sentence. View "United States v. James Joiner" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempting to persuade, induce, and entice an individual who had not yet attained the age of 18 years old to engage in sexual activity. The district court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. Sec 2422(b). Defendant challenged the district court's imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court explained that the facts of the case show defendant intentionally engaged in dangerous conduct that was exploitive of children, which is exactly the type of conduct contemplated and targeted by the statute. Under these facts, the court determined that there was no inference of gross disproportionality. View "United States v. Raul Rivas" on Justia Law

Appellant petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus in part on the basis that an off-the-record jury selection procedure violated his constitutional rights. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to whether the district court prematurely dismissed Appellant’s claims that the pretrial jury selection procedure violated his right to be present, right to a public trial and right to an appeal and that his trial counsel was ineffective for participating in the procedure.The Eighth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Appellant has not shown that “fundamental unfairness” resulted from his trial counsel’s participation in the pretrial jury selection procedure. Appellant alleged that his was fundamentally unfair because he was unaware of the pretrial jury selection procedure and any discriminatory strikes made during this procedure.  However, the court wrote, that Appellant’s trial counsel agreed to and participated in the procedure, which effectively gave both parties an additional 15 peremptory strikes; a record was, in fact, made of these strikes, and maintained by and available for review at the Washington County Circuit Court Clerk’s Office; the written submission of strikes that occurred as part of the pretrial jury selection procedure was only a portion of voir dire; and the remainder of voir dire, along with the evidentiary and sentencing phases of the trial, remained open to the public. Thus, Appellant’s trial counsel’s participation in the pretrial jury selection procedure did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. View "Zachariah Marcyniuk v. Dexter Payne" on Justia Law

Cruz repeatedly brought methamphetamine from Texas to North Dakota for sale. South Dakota officers stopped and searched Cruz’s vehicle, finding drugs and cash. Cruz posted bond, returned to North Dakota, and continued using methamphetamine and selling drugs. Grafton Officers Jones and Campoverde surveilled his residence. When Cruz exited, they approached. Cruz shot Campoverde, who was wearing a marked police ballistic vest. The bullet entered Campoverde’s arm, caused nerve damage, and collapsed his lung. Jones shot Cruz before apprehending him. Where Cruz fell, officers found his gun, methamphetamine, and marijuana. A search of the residence produced additional drugs and ammunition.Cruz pleaded guilty to five counts; two carried potential life sentences, and one carried a minimum sentence of a mandatory consecutive 120 months, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government agreed to limit its sentencing recommendation to 360 months. The PSR recommended an advisory range of 235–293 months with a mandatory consecutive sentence of 120 months, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government did not pursue the application of a six-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(c)(1) for assaulting an officer during flight, so the resulting advisory Guidelines range was 130–162 months plus the consecutive 120 months. Cruz described his criminal history as old and as largely the product of his addiction to methamphetamine. The Eighth Circuit affirmed a 420-month sentence as not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Minneapolis police investigated Randle for selling crack cocaine while he was on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After conducting a controlled buy, Officer Hamilton applied for a warrant to search a Brooklyn Park, Minnesota home that Randle listed as his supervised release address. The warrant was executed that day. Randle arrived during the search. Police seized 308 grams of crack cocaine and related evidence from the home and from bags carried by Randle.The district court denied a motion to suppress, applying the good-faith exception while concluding the affidavit did not create a “fair probability that evidence of Randle’s alleged drug trafficking activities would be found at the Residence” because it did not include Hamilton’s statement that in his professional judgment drug traffickers typically keep narcotics in their home and did not state that Hamilton followed Randle to the residence directly after the controlled buy and failed to specify when the officers started following Randle. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence is admissible because “it was objectively reasonable for the officer executing [the] search warrant to have relied in good faith on the [issuing] judge’s determination that there was probable cause to issue the warrant.” The court also upheld the denial of a “Franks” hearing; Randle failed to make the necessary “substantial preliminary showing” of “deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth.” View "United States v. Randle" on Justia Law