Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Following a series of trial delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a jury convicted Defendant of two counts of interstate communication of a threat, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c). The district court sentenced him to a term of 60 months in prison.   Defendant appealed arguing that the government did not have sufficient evidence to prove he made “true threats” because his statements were ambiguous and/or political hyperbole. Further, he argued that; the jury instructions were erroneous; the indictment failed to state an essential element of his offense; and he was denied a right to a speedy trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court first held that a jury could have reasonably concluded that his messages constituted a true threat of present or future violence and that he intended to communicate a threat. Thus, because the statements were objectively threatening, and neither ambiguous nor political hyperbole. The evidence is sufficient to satisfy the elements required for convictions under Section 875(c).  Further, there was no reversible error, because when taken as a whole, the instructions sufficiently articulated the elements for the charges and the matters were fairly and adequately submitted to the jury.   Next, Defendant has not shown prejudice caused by the delay. While he points to a longer period of detention, repossession of his vehicle, increased pretrial anxiety, and an in-custody assault, none of these circumstances demonstrate he was deprived of an opportunity to properly defend himself at trial. Finally, Defendant’s constitutional claim fails because he has not shown that a nine-month delay was presumptively prejudicial. View "United States v. Cody Leveke" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud, and four counts of aggravated identity theft. He entered into a non-binding Plea Agreement in which he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count and two counts of aggravated identity theft. A magistrate judge found that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The district court adopted those findings, accepted the guilty plea, and sentenced him to 71 months imprisonment on the conspiracy count and 24 months imprisonment on each aggravated identity theft count, with the three sentences to be served consecutively, for a total of 119 months imprisonment.   Defendant appealed, challenging (i) the court’s compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and (ii) the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that a defendant who fails to object to the Rule 11 colloquy in the trial court “has the burden to satisfy the plain-error rule and [the] reviewing court may consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error on substantial rights.” Here, the court held that Defendant failed to meet his burden.   Further, Defendant argued the district court gave inadequate weight to mitigating factors and did not adequately explain why it imposed a sentence that was twice the parties’ joint recommendation. However, the court explained that a district court has “wide latitude” to weigh the relevant sentencing criteria, and has no obligation to accept the recommendation of the parties in a non-binding plea agreement. View "United States v. Gregory Harrison" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. Defendant appealed, asserting four claims of error: (1) the district court abused its discretion when it made certain evidentiary rulings; (2) he was deprived of a fair trial due to behavior by members of the gallery; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction; and (4) the district court improperly considered prior act evidence for purposes of sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court took steps to ensure the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial by considering the cumulative effect and denying the proffered testimonies of two additional women. While some amount of prejudice is to be expected when evidence is admitted under Rule 414, it did not rise to the level of unfair prejudice in this case.   Next, during cross-examination of Defendant, a member of the gallery caught the district court’s attention. The district court addressed the behavior swiftly and succinctly. Defense counsel raised no questions or objections during trial and Defendant’s testimony continued without incident. The weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and there is no indication that any further problems or concerns occurred. No jurors complained or had questions about the incident. Without some indication that Defendant’s substantial rights were affected, the jury was influenced by the behavior, Defendant has failed to show plain error. Further, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the district court to find that Defendant committed a prior act of molestation. Thus, the district court did not err in applying the enhancement. View "United States v. Robert Dowty, Sr." on Justia Law

After Petitioner pled guilty to one count of receipt or possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sections 5841 and 5861(c)-(d), the district court sentenced him to 100 months imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in calculating his base offense level under United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) Section 2K2.1(a)(3) and in applying a two-level enhancement under USSG Section 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) for an offense involving a destructive device.   The Eighth Circuit agreed with Defendant’s second point of error and remanded for resentencing without application of the destructive-device enhancement. The court explained that it is undisputed that the shotgun involved in the offense of conviction was a .410 caliber weapon, meaning that its bore diameter was less than one-half inch, and the government concedes error, suggesting that this Court remand for resentencing. The court agreed with Defendant and the government that the application of this enhancement when the weapon involved in the offense of conviction does not meet the definition of “destructive device” was plain error that affects Defendant’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Demetrius Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. In calculating an advisory guideline range at sentencing, the district court found based on the evidence of drug trafficking that Defendant possessed the firearm “cited in the offense of conviction in connection with the commission . . . of another offense.” USSG Section 2K2.1(c)(1). Therefore, the court applied a cross-reference under Section 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) and applied Section 2X1.1 in respect to the offense of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. As a result, the base offense level under Section 2X1.1(a) was 32 based on USSG Section 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(5), and (b)(1), and Defendant’s guideline sentence was the statutory maximum term of 120 months’ imprisonment.   Defendant argues that the district court erred by applying the cross-reference and that the error increased his advisory guideline sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Defendant’s sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The court held that the district court properly applied the cross-reference under Section 2K2.1(c)(1). The court explained that by its plain terms the guideline extends beyond “use” to “possession,” as long as the possession is “in connection with the commission” of another offense. The guideline commentary specifies that the cross-reference applies “in the case of a drug trafficking offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia.” USSG Section  2K2.1, comment. (n.14(B)). According to the plain meaning of Section 2K2.1(c), as explained more specifically by the commentary. View "United States v. Gregory Sewalson" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant, an officer, guilty of willfully depriving a man of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable force, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 242, and the district court sentenced Defendant to 72 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court committed both procedural and substantive errors.   On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain the sentence imposed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding that the district court’s explanation of Defendant’s sentence was adequate. “In determining whether a district court has adequately explained its reasons for imposing a particular sentence, the context for the appellate court’s review is the entire sentencing record, not merely the district court’s statements at the hearing.”   Next, Defendant contended that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Upon careful review of the record, the court concluded that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence, as it properly considered both the mitigating and aggravating factors listed in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553.   Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not give significant weight to any improper or irrelevant factor in fashioning Defendant’s sentence. The district court properly considered the victim's innocence and injuries. View "United States v. Brett Palkowitsch" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of civil disorder. The parties agreed that U.S.S.G. Section  2B1.1(a)(2), which deals with property damage or destruction, applied. The Presentence Report, however, recommended applying the higher base level in U.S.S.G. Section 2A2.4(a) for obstructing or impeding officers. Over objections from Defendant and the Government, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Section 2A2.4(a) was the most analogous guideline to Defendant’s conduct.   Defendant appealed arguing that the court incorrectly calculated his Guidelines range by applying U.S.S.G. Section 2A2.4(a), obstructing or impeding officers.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the shared prohibition on obstructing, impeding, or interfering with law enforcement establishes that Section 2A2.4(a) is sufficiently analogous to 18 U.S.C. Section.  231(a)(3). View "United States v. Jonathan Montanez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five offenses related to trafficking methamphetamine. He filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial, alleging a violation of the court’s trial procedure order and a Brady violation. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to 295 months in prison. He appealed, challenging the denial of his motion and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is nothing in the record reflecting what one of the government’s witnesses learned or whether it affected his testimony, another witness’s testimony, or Defendant’s rights. As a result, Defendant’s argument that he was prejudiced by the still-undefined discussion is baseless, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial.   Next, Defendant argued that the DEA affidavit is favorable evidence because it provides a basis for impeaching Defendant’s cellmate and because it suggests that someone else, was responsible for trafficking drugs. The court held that because the evidence is immaterial to the outcome of the case, the Government’s failure to disclose the DEA affidavit was not a Brady violation. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial.   The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s request for a downward variance. The court addressed Defendant’s arguments, considered all relevant factors, and concluded that a downward variance was not justified. View "United States v. Jason Corey" on Justia Law

Co-Defendants each pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. On appeal, both claimed the district court erred at their respective sentencings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in both cases.   Defendant 1 disputed the quantity and type of methamphetamine attributed to him in the calculation of his base offense level. He argued that he should only be held. He also objected to his classification as a career offender. He contended his Iowa convictions for delivery of a controlled substance under Iowa Code Section 124.401(1) do not count as predicate convictions for the career offender enhancement because Section 124.401(1) is overbroad. Here, the methamphetamine seized from the controlled buy was tested and shown to be ice, and the dealers and users in this case, including Defendant 1 referred to the drugs being sold as “ice.” This evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s conclusion that the methamphetamine Defendant 1 distributed was ice.   Defendant 2 sought to renew his argument that his 2011 cocaine conviction should have been classified as relevant conduct and therefore excluded from his criminal history calculation. However, where a defendant abandons and withdraws an objection to the PSR at the time of sentencing in exchange for a benefit, he has waived the objection and is not entitled to appellate review of that issue. By asserting this objection and then affirmatively withdrawing it as part of his deal with the government, Defendant 2 “demonstrated the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of his right to argue the point,” and the court may not consider it in on review. View "United States v. Lavelle Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress items found during a warrantless search of the apartment he shared with his girlfriend. The district court granted the motion as to the narcotics found in a black bag, concluding the search that led to the discovery of the narcotics exceeded the scope of his girlfriend’s consent to search the apartment. As to the other evidence, the court denied the motion.   The government filed an interlocutory appeal, asserting the district court erred when it focused on ownership of the bag rather than his girlfriend’s authority to give consent for the search and the Eighth Circuit reversed.   The question before the court was whether Defendant’s girlfriend had apparent authority to consent to the search of the bag. The court held that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement, which may be given by a third party with common authority or apparent authority over the premises or effects. Here, at the time of consent, law enforcement officers knew: (1) Defendant had directed his girlfriend to move the gun owned by and registered to her to a specific place within the apartment; (2) she voluntarily led the officers to the location of the gun; and (3) she had access to the bag and never indicated it was Defendant’s bag or that her ability to use or access the bag was limited. As the sole lessee, Defendant had actual and common authority over the apartment and consented to the search of the entire apartment for Fourth Amendment purposes. View "United States v. Mosley Williams" on Justia Law