Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder money for a drug trafficking ring, and the district court, in calculating Defendant’s recommended sentencing range, found that Defendant was responsible for more than five hundred grams of drugs. On appeal, Defendant challenged that determination and argued that his recommended sentencing range was too high as a result of the court's error. Defendant objected to the presentence report (“PSR”) calculation. He claimed that "the facts contained in the PSR are insufficient to demonstrate that the amount alleged even existed” let alone that he engaged in any actions related to the amount. He also challenged the price of methamphetamine that the PSR recommended.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and found that the court erred in calculating Defendant’s sentencing range. The court left it to the district court to decide whether resentencing should take place on the existing record and to resolve Defendant’s objection concerning the price of methamphetamine.   The court found that the timing of events supports the conclusion that some of the drugs may have been counted twice. Therefore, Defendant’s sentence cannot stand on this record because it was the government’s burden to demonstrate drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, the court held that it does not believe that Defendant forfeited his double-counting argument by raising it for the first time at the sentencing hearing. View "United States v. Dakota Siller" on Justia Law

Defendant, while working as a priest, stole from the cash-offering collections of several parishes. After a jury trial, he was convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, transporting stolen money, and making and subscribing false tax returns. The district court sentenced him to 93 months’ imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit reversed three of Defendant’s convictions and affirmed his remaining convictions, the forfeiture order, and the restitution award. The court also affirmed his sentence, except it directed the district court to vacate the $100 special assessments associated with Counts 39, 41, and 44.   The court held that the district court did not plainly err in failing to disturb the jury’s finding that Defendant’s cash deposits furthered his fraudulent scheme. Assuming the deposited money comprised stolen cash, a reasonable jury could believe that the cash deposits, were designed to “postpone inquiries,” and to keep the scheme from coming under scrutiny.   However, the court held that the district court did plainly err in upholding the wire fraud convictions which involved transfers of funds rather than cash deposits. The court reasoned that no reasonable jury could find that these actions furthered a fraudulent scheme. Once the cash was securely in the credit union account, the danger that it would expose Defendant’s scheme to fellow priests was eliminated. Finally, although the court reversed Defendant’s convictions for Counts 39, 41, and 44, it did not remand for resentencing because the sentences for those counts ran concurrently with the sentences for the first sixty counts. View "United States v. Marcin Garbacz" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm as a prohibited person, and the district court sentenced him to 71 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, an evidentiary ruling at trial, and the four-level increase at sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction finding that the record contains ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant constructively possessed the firearm. Further, the record supports that Defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm. The court reasoned that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Defendant possessed methamphetamine at the time of his arrest, and was an unlawful user of a controlled substance. Moreover, there is no plain error warranting relief, because the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Defendant knew of his status as a convicted felon.   Next, in regards to Defendant’s challenge of the admission of the Facebook photograph that shows him pointing a gun at the camera, the court held that the absence of conclusive evidence that the items were real did not create a risk of unfair prejudice. The court also noted the photograph was relevant.   Finally, although the four-level increase sentencing guideline does not allow an automatic increase simply because a defendant possesses drugs and a gun in the same proximity, the court did not err because it properly applied the “facilitate” standard. View "United States v. Darrell Two Hearts" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. Defendant argued that the district court erred in overruling his Batson objection, abused its discretion in admitting parts of the government’s expert witness’s testimony, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction. Defendant’s failure to lodge an objection at trial resulted in the waiver of his Batson claim. Regarding the government’s witness, the court held that any error in admitting the testimony was harmless. Finally, the court found that the government’s evidence against Defendant was sufficient to support his convictions. View "United States v. Robert Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals the district court’s imposition of a 66-month sentence for illegal possession of a firearm. On appeal, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he knew he was a prohibited person under any category; the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial by misstating the presumption of innocence, and his sentence was improperly enhanced because the Iowa assault conviction is not a “crime of violence.”The Eighth Circuit found that there is sufficient evidence of an intimate partnership, including evidence of the no-contact order itself, with the state judge’s finding that Defendant and the victim met the federal definition of intimate partners. Next, the court found that the no-contact order here was issued as part of the judgment agreed to by Defendant, who was represented by counsel, in his guilty plea. Third, the court held that Iowa presumes that a no-contact order “has force and effect until it is modified or terminated by subsequent court action.” In Iowa, the absence of a record can prove the nonoccurrence of an act or event, here the nonoccurrence of any modification or termination of the no-contact order. Thus, the court held the evidence was sufficient to find that Defendant possessed a firearm with knowledge that he was subject to a no-contact order involving an intimate partner. Further, Defendant has not shown that the improper remarks prejudiced his right in obtaining a fair trial. Finally, increase to Defendant’s base offense level under Sec. 2K2.1(a), if error at all, was harmless. View "United States v. Junior Roldan Marin" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of sexual abuse of an incapacitated victim. On appeal, Defendant challenges one pretrial evidentiary ruling by the district court and one of its directives at trial.Defendant argued that the district court erred in allowing the government to elicit testimony from the victim and her mother regarding the victim’s suicide attempt. Defendant’s primary argument was that the testimony lacked sufficient probative value to overcome its potential prejudicial effect on the jury as it determined whether the victim was sexually assaulted. The court found that the district court adequately addressed Defendant’s concern, noting that “the testimony is unlikely to be so provocative as to divert the jury’s attention from the central sexual abuse allegation.” The court found that due to the temporal and causal proximity of the victim’s suicide attempt in relation to Defendant’s conduct, the evidence was probative and not unfairly prejudicial.Next, Defendant claimed that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the district court impermissibly restricted his cross-examination of both the victim and her mother. However, ultimately, the jury acquitted Defendant of aggravated sexual abuse, but it found him guilty of abuse of an incapacitated victim. That the jury convicted him of only one count but not the other indicates that it was able to make an appropriate determination based on the evidence. Thus, the court affirmed the district court ruling. View "United States v. Paul Cavanaugh" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told police that Defendant was importing heroin from Chicago and selling it at an apartment. A detective applied for a search warrant for Defendant’s apartment to seize evidence of drug distribution. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the warrant application incorrectly stated he was listed on the utility bills—one of the seven facts the detective used in his affidavit for a search warrant.Defendant argues that the good-faith exception does not apply because the affidavit in support of the warrant was so lacking in “indicia of probable cause to search for evidence of drug trafficking” at Defendant’s apartment that the existence of probable cause was entirely unreasonable. The court disagreed, reasoning that the detective had had an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause, and the affidavit contained sufficient indicia of probable cause, thus the good-faith exception applies. There is no evidence the detective acted in bad faith, and the issuing judge found that the affidavit provided a substantial basis to find probable cause to search for evidence. Further, information known to the detective reinforces the objective reasonableness of his belief in probable cause.Defendant counters that there was not a sufficient nexus between his drug trafficking and this apartment. However, the good-faith exception applies even if there is no direct nexus between a defendant’s continuous course of drug trafficking and his residence. As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "United States v. Roy Norey" on Justia Law

Defendant was found incompetent to stand trial for the criminal charges against him. Defendant filed seventeen pro se motions seeking either release, a competency evaluation, or an order compelling his counsel to file a Sec. 4247(h) motion for a hearing to determine discharge. The court addressed whether the court had jurisdiction over Defendant’s direct appeal from a magistrate judge’s order. The parties argue the magistrate judge’s order was a “final order” authorized by the district court’s order of reference and Western District of Missouri Local Rule 72.1(c).The court reasoned that it has jurisdiction over “final decisions of the district courts of the United States”, thus without a “decision of a district court” it lacks jurisdiction to proceed any further. Defendant argues the parties implicitly consented to have the magistrate judge decide the motions at hand. But the parties’ consent does not save the appeal. Parties may consent to have a magistrate judge conduct any civil proceeding when the magistrate judge is “specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court”. Here, the district court did not specially designate the magistrate judge to exercise such jurisdiction. Thus, the court dismissed the Defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Timothy O'Laughlin" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after police stopped Defendant upon suspicion of criminal activity. He later pled guilty and appealed the district court’s denial of his first motion to suppress, arguing that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a Terry stop without reasonable suspicion and by arresting him without probable cause.The court found that the officer and a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Defendant of wrongdoing, which provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. The court reasoned that the officer stopped Defendant at the direction of a detective who was investigating Defendant for drug-related crimes and as a person of interest in a homicide investigation. Defendant argues his past convictions and his involvement in a suspected drug deal two months earlier were “stale” and thus could not provide reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. However, the court found that the argument is unpersuasive because it fails to take into consideration the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the district court correctly held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant.Defendant further argues that the Terry stop became an arrest when the officers drew their weapons and handcuffed Defendant. Defendant claims this purported arrest was unlawful because the officers lacked probable cause. The court found that the officers’ protective actions here did not turn the stop into an arrest. View "United States v. Andre Johnson" on Justia Law

Prison corrections officers suspected that Defendant’s family had given him contraband. A strip search did not reveal contraband, but surveillance footage showed Defendant taking bundles out of his shoes and giving them to another inmate. Defendant was charged with three counts of possessing a prohibited object in prison.Defendant claims that excluding his sole witness, a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) employee, violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to put on a complete defense. Defendant argues that the witness would testify as to his decision not to discipline Defendant. The court held that under Rule 403, the testimony is inadmissible. Whatever probative value the testimony might have is substantially outweighed by the danger that the testimony would be unfairly prejudicial.Defendant argues that the government did not lay the necessary foundation because there was no testimony that the shoes presented at trial were in the same condition as the day of the offense. The court found Defendant didn’t present evidence to rebut the presumption that evidence is presumed unchanged unless there is “a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.”The court found that the jury instruction was proper because an inmate need not know specifically what prohibited item he has, so long as he knows that he possesses a prohibited object. Finally, Defendant’s evidentiary insufficiency argument fails because a reasonable jury could weigh this evidence and infer that he knew the items were prohibited. Thus, the court affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Isiah Dozier" on Justia Law