Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Elvis Eghosa Ogiekpolor, who was convicted of conspiring to commit money laundering and 15 counts of money laundering. The charges stemmed from business email compromise schemes and online romance scams, where victims were defrauded into sending money. Ogiekpolor and his co-conspirators registered sham corporations, opened bank accounts in their names, and deposited the fraudulently obtained money into these accounts. They then laundered approximately six million dollars through these accounts.In the lower court, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia handled the case. Ogiekpolor was initially charged via a criminal complaint in August 2020 and was detained pending trial. The government filed an information in November 2020, and Ogiekpolor waived indictment. However, after he denied committing the fraud at a change of plea hearing, the court did not proceed with the plea. A grand jury returned an indictment in January 2021, and a superseding indictment in February 2022 added more charges. Ogiekpolor filed multiple motions to dismiss based on Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment violations, which the district court denied. The trial began in May 2022, and the jury convicted him on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Ogiekpolor appealed his convictions, arguing violations of the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the delays in the case did not violate the Sixth Amendment or the Speedy Trial Act. The court found that the delays were justified due to the complexity of the case, the need for adequate preparation, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also concluded that Ogiekpolor did not suffer actual prejudice from the delays. View "USA v. Ogiekpolor" on Justia Law

John Armstrong, Jr. was indicted on multiple charges, including Hobbs Act robbery, bank robbery, attempted bank robbery, aiding and abetting bank robbery, and using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during these crimes. He pled guilty to several counts, and the government dismissed others. Armstrong was sentenced to 420 months in prison, including mandatory consecutive sentences for the firearm charges.Armstrong appealed, arguing that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were invalid because the predicate offenses (bank robbery) could be committed without violence, making the "crime of violence" definition unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected this argument, relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent that bank robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit initially affirmed Armstrong's convictions. However, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Taylor, which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), prompted the Supreme Court to vacate the Eleventh Circuit's decision and remand the case for reconsideration.Upon reconsideration, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed Armstrong's convictions. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a divisible statute, criminalizing both bank robbery and bank extortion as separate offenses. Armstrong's convictions for bank robbery by intimidation were upheld as crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court also affirmed that aiding and abetting bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. Additionally, the court concluded that attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a) is a crime of violence because it requires an element of force, violence, or intimidation.The Eleventh Circuit thus affirmed Armstrong's convictions for Counts 4, 10, and 12. View "United States v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

C.H., an eleven-year-old, was sexually exploited by a stranger on Omegle.com, an online platform that connects users in video chatrooms. The stranger, referred to as John Doe, threatened C.H. into creating child pornography. C.H.'s parents sued Omegle.com LLC, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (Masha’s Law) for knowingly possessing child pornography and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act for knowingly benefiting from a sex trafficking venture.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the claims, citing section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which protects providers of interactive computer services from being treated as the publisher or speaker of user-provided information. The court also found that the sex trafficking claim did not meet the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) exception to section 230 because C.H.'s parents did not allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge of benefiting from sex trafficking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that C.H.'s parents did not state a claim under Masha’s Law because they failed to allege that Omegle.com knowingly possessed or accessed child pornography. The court also held that the FOSTA exception to section 230 requires actual knowledge of sex trafficking, not just constructive knowledge. Since C.H.'s parents did not plausibly allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge of the sex trafficking incident involving C.H., the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims. View "M.H., et al. v. Omegle.com LLC" on Justia Law

One night, Officer Devosie Jones of the City of Remerton Police Department attempted to stop a black Cadillac with one headlight. The car did not stop, leading to a high-speed chase that ended when the Cadillac crashed into a tree. Quinton Simmons was found trying to exit the car and was arrested. Officers found narcotics and a firearm in the vehicle. Simmons was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He pleaded not guilty, claiming he was kidnapped and framed by a gang member who fled the scene.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia denied Simmons's Batson challenge, accepting the government's race-neutral reasons for striking three black jurors. During the trial, the court allowed the government to play a brief segment of a body camera video but denied Simmons's request to play additional clips during closing arguments, as they had not been shown during the evidence phase. The jury found Simmons guilty on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of closing arguments, as Simmons had the opportunity to present the video clips during the trial but chose not to. The court also found no error in the district court's denial of the Batson challenge, as Simmons failed to make a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and the government's race-neutral explanations were credible. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

The case involves Reginald Graham, Antonio Glass, Jerimaine Bryant, Mario Rodriguez, Torivis Reginald Ingram, Michael Walker, Levi Bryant, Curtis Bryant, Daniel Jones, and Samuel Hayes, who were convicted of various crimes related to their involvement in the Dub Street Blood Family (DSBF), a Miami-based gang. The gang engaged in drug trafficking, armed robberies, and murders over nearly two decades. The FBI, ATF, and local police departments conducted extensive investigations, leading to a broad indictment and subsequent trial.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the defendants were charged with multiple offenses, including racketeering conspiracy and narcotics conspiracy. After a 38-day trial, the jury found the defendants guilty on several counts, resulting in sentences ranging from 168 months to life imprisonment. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences, raising numerous issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the Count 1 RICO conspiracy convictions due to the district court's erroneous exclusion of the defendants' gang expert and the government's failure to address harmless error. The court also vacated Daniel Jones' sentence due to the improper application of a use-of-violence enhancement. In all other respects, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court addressed various challenges, including the sufficiency of the indictment, the denial of motions to suppress, the denial of a motion to sever, Batson challenges, and several evidentiary rulings. The court found no reversible error in the district court's handling of these issues, except for the exclusion of the defense expert and the sentencing error for Daniel Jones. View "United States v. Graham" on Justia Law

Rodolfo Maisonet was arrested for conspiring to distribute cocaine, a crime subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. He initially cooperated with the government, providing some information about the drug distribution scheme. However, he continued his criminal activities and was caught again. Before sentencing, Maisonet submitted an affidavit with additional information about the conspiracy, but the district court found that he had not fully disclosed all relevant information and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that Maisonet's lies and ongoing criminal activity made him ineligible for the safety valve provision, which allows for sentencing without regard to mandatory minimums if certain conditions are met. The court also indicated that his affidavit did not provide all necessary information about the drug distribution scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court disagreed with the district court's legal conclusion that Maisonet's continued criminal activity and lies automatically disqualified him from safety valve relief. The statute requires that a defendant provide all information by the time of sentencing, regardless of whether the government already knows the information or if the defendant's cooperation was prompted by a government investigation. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's factual finding that Maisonet's affidavit did not fully disclose all relevant information about the drug distribution scheme. This factual determination was not clearly erroneous, and thus, the district court's imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence was upheld. View "USA v. Maisonet" on Justia Law

Thomas Swinford was shot and killed by Athens-Clarke County police officers after he refused to drop a gun and instead raised and pointed it at the officers. His widow, Jayne Swinford, filed a lawsuit in Georgia state court alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia’s wrongful death statute against seven officers, the police chief, and the county government. The case was removed to federal court.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on qualified and official immunity grounds, relying on body camera footage showing the events leading up to the shooting. The district court considered the footage and granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the officers acted reasonably and did not violate Thomas’s constitutional rights. The court also denied Mrs. Swinford’s motion to amend her complaint and her motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the district court properly considered the body camera footage under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The footage showed that the officers had probable cause to believe Thomas posed a serious threat when he raised his gun at them, justifying their use of deadly force. The court found that the officers did not use excessive force and were entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, the supervisory liability claim against the police chief and the Monell claim against the county also failed.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders, including the denial of Mrs. Swinford’s motion to amend her complaint and her motion for reconsideration. View "Swinford v. Santos" on Justia Law

Jimmy Ray Lightsey was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. At sentencing, the district court determined that Lightsey was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and enhanced his sentence accordingly. Lightsey appealed his 240-month sentence, arguing that the district court erred in finding that his prior convictions qualified as predicate offenses under ACCA.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida initially reviewed the case. Lightsey was found guilty on all counts by a jury. At sentencing, the district court applied the ACCA enhancement based on Lightsey's prior convictions, including a 1997 conviction for attempted armed robbery and two drug-related convictions from 2000 and 2009. Lightsey objected to the ACCA enhancement, arguing that his prior convictions should not qualify as predicate offenses. The district court overruled his objections, noting that existing case law foreclosed his arguments, and sentenced him to 240 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Lightsey contended that his prior drug convictions did not qualify as "serious drug offenses" under ACCA because the definition of cocaine under Florida law was broader than the federal definition at the time of his federal offense. He also argued that his 1997 conviction for attempted armed robbery did not qualify as a "violent felony" under ACCA. The Eleventh Circuit held that Lightsey's drug convictions were properly considered "serious drug offenses" under ACCA, as both state and federal laws criminalized the conduct at the time of his convictions. The court also held that his attempted armed robbery conviction qualified as a "violent felony" under ACCA, following its precedent in United States v. Joyner. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Lightsey's sentence. View "USA v. Lightsey" on Justia Law

In this case, Jimmy Davis, Jr., an Alabama prisoner sentenced to death for the 1993 murder of Johnny Hazle during a gas station robbery, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas petition. Davis argued that his trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of childhood abuse and the circumstances of his prior conviction for third-degree robbery.The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Davis’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Davis then filed a state postconviction petition, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. The state court found that Davis’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently and that Davis was not prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of the postconviction petition, concluding that the investigation conducted by Davis’s attorneys was reasonable and that Davis failed to show prejudice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied Davis’s § 2254 petition, concluding that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.The Eleventh Circuit held that the state court’s conclusion that Davis was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged deficiencies was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court noted that the additional mitigating evidence presented during the postconviction proceedings, including evidence of childhood abuse and the non-violent nature of the prior robbery, did not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. The court emphasized that the state court’s decision was not so obviously wrong that it lay beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. View "Davis v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Two state prisoners, Theresa Batson and Michael Cassidy, filed federal petitions for writs of habeas corpus, arguing their petitions were timely due to amended state court judgments. Batson was convicted of conspiracy and solicitation to commit murder, receiving a 60-year sentence. After a successful post-conviction relief motion, her judgment was amended to vacate one count, but her sentences were marked nunc pro tunc to the original date. Cassidy was convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to 35 years. His judgment was amended to correct a clerical error and later to vacate one count due to ineffective counsel, but the amended judgment did not include a nunc pro tunc designation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed Batson’s petition as untimely, ruling that her amended sentences, designated nunc pro tunc, did not restart the statute of limitations. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Cassidy’s petition as untimely, concluding that his amended judgment was effectively nunc pro tunc, despite the absence of such a designation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed these consolidated appeals. The court affirmed the dismissal of Batson’s petition, holding that the nunc pro tunc designation on her amended sentences meant they related back to the original judgment, thus not restarting the statute of limitations. However, the court vacated the dismissal of Cassidy’s petition, determining that his amended judgment, which was not designated nunc pro tunc, constituted a new judgment that restarted the statute of limitations.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Batson’s petition and vacated and remanded the dismissal of Cassidy’s petition for further proceedings. View "Cassidy v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law