Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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The case involved an appeal by two brothers, Jonathan and Daniel Markovich, who were convicted for operating fraudulent drug rehabilitation clinics in Florida. They were found guilty of various charges, including health-care fraud, wire fraud, kickbacks, money laundering, and bank fraud, resulting in fraudulent claims of over $100 million.The brothers appealed their convictions on several grounds. They argued that the district court violated their constitutional rights by denying their motion to compel the prosecution to obtain and disclose confidential medical records possessed by third parties. They also claimed that the court violated Federal Rules of Evidence by admitting unreliable and confusing expert testimony about the clinics' medical and billing practices. Additionally, they argued that the court abused its discretion by admitting lay summary testimony about medical and billing records.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court ruled that the prosecution had no duty to seek out potentially exculpatory evidence not in its possession. It also determined that the expert testimony was clear and reliable, and the summary testimony was proper. The court found that any challenge to bank-fraud counts was forfeited due to a lack of explanation or supporting legal authority. Finally, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the brothers' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. View "United States v. Markovich" on Justia Law

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The case pertains to Thomas Ukoshovbera A. Gbenedio, a licensed pharmacist, who was charged with 72 counts of unlawful drug dispensing and one count of refusing an inspection of his pharmacy, essentially operating a "pill mill." The district court sentenced Gbenedio to 188 months of imprisonment and imposed a $200,000 fine.Gbenedio appealed, arguing that the lower court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment due to insufficient notice of the charges against him, and in making certain evidentiary rulings. He also contested the fine imposed, stating he was unable to pay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the indictment provided enough facts for Gbenedio to understand the charges against him. It also deemed the district court's evidentiary rulings as non-abusive and found that Gbenedio failed to prove his inability to pay the fine. View "USA v. Gbenedio" on Justia Law

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The case involves Andre Dubois, who was convicted on several federal firearm offenses. These offenses arose when Dubois attempted to ship a box containing firearms from Georgia to Dominica. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was asked to address five issues on appeal.Firstly, the court dismissed Dubois's argument that a recent Supreme Court case overturned the precedent upholding a ban on felons possessing firearms. The court held that the Supreme Court case did not abrogate the precedent, and therefore Dubois's argument failed.Secondly, the court affirmed that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Dubois knew he was in possession of a firearm.Thirdly, the court found that Dubois's prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana under Georgia law qualified as a "controlled substance offense" under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, triggering a higher base offense level.Fourthly, the court rejected Dubois's argument that the application of a sentencing enhancement for possession of a stolen gun violated his due process rights.Finally, the court held that the district court had not erred in imposing a $25,000 fine on Dubois, as there was sufficient evidence to suggest that he could afford to pay the fine.Therefore, Dubois's convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "USA v. Dubois" on Justia Law

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In 2002, Michael David Carruth was convicted and sentenced to death for four counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted murder, first-degree burglary, and first-degree robbery in Alabama. Carruth appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, which raised six main issues. These included allegations of ineffective trial counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his trial, and ineffective appellate counsel for failing to notify him of further available appellate proceedings and to argue that the prosecution engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. Carruth also argued that he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury and due process of law due to premature jury deliberations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined all the issues and affirmed the district court's denial of Carruth's habeas corpus petition. The circuit court determined that Carruth's claims did not survive deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, as the state court's adjudications were not contrary to federal law, nor did they involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also held that Carruth's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally barred because it was not properly raised and preserved at the state level. The circuit court concluded that the nature of the crimes and the strength of the evidence against Carruth outweighed any potential mitigating evidence that may have been presented. View "Michael David Carruth v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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In this case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Raquan Emahl Gray was convicted of conspiracy to commit a controlled-substances offense, after helping transport a car filled with drugs to a state prison. Gray appealed his conviction, arguing that the government failed to prove that he knowingly possessed a Schedule II controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, rather than a controlled substance generally. The appeals court affirmed Gray's conviction, holding that the government only needed to prove general knowledge to obtain a controlled-substances conviction, which it did. Gray also argued that the district court erred when it denied his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal due to his failure to timely renew the motion at the conclusion of the evidence. The appeals court acknowledged that Gray's renewed motion was timely, but deemed the district court's error as harmless because enough evidence supported Gray's conviction. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case of Everett Tripodis, who had appealed his sentence from the Northern District of Georgia. Tripodis was involved in a scheme of stealing and reselling luxury vehicles. After being indicted on multiple counts, he pleaded guilty to a conspiracy offense under a negotiated plea agreement. As per the agreement, the government was to recommend a 60-month prison sentence, but the agreement did not make explicit mention of supervised release. At sentencing, a three-year term of supervised release was imposed, and Tripodis appealed, arguing that this was not part of the plea agreement.The court, however, affirmed the sentence. It found that the plea agreement was unambiguous and only committed the government to recommend a 60-month custodial sentence. There was no mention of supervised release, and the agreement’s silence on this issue did not bind the government to any promise regarding it. The court also noted that during the plea hearing, Tripodis was informed that he could be subject to a term of supervised release and he affirmed his understanding of this. Therefore, the court concluded that the government did not breach the plea agreement by recommending supervised release, and the district court did not err in imposing it. The court did, however, advise the government to be clearer in future plea agreements about what it is promising and what it is not. View "USA v. Tripodis" on Justia Law

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This case relates to the admission of an investigator's testimony from a preliminary hearing in a subsequent trial. The appellant, Maurice Kent, was a member of a violent gang and was charged with RICO conspiracy and five other substantive crimes, including the attempted murder of Shadeed Muhammad. The government alleged that the gang murdered a former member, Qualeef Rhode, for cooperating with the police’s investigation into the attempted murder. The government introduced an investigator’s testimony from a preliminary hearing in a related case, which identified Rhode as cooperating with law enforcement to implicate Kent in the attempted murder. Kent argued that this testimony was hearsay and its admission violated his Confrontation Clause rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Kent's arguments and affirmed the decision of the district court. The court held that the investigator's testimony was not hearsay because it was offered for the effect it had on the listeners (other gang members) and not for the truth of the matter asserted. It was relevant because it influenced Kent and the other gang members who heard the testimony at the preliminary hearing, providing them with a motive to murder Rhode. The court also determined that the district court had sufficiently reduced the risk that the jury would improperly consider the out-of-court statement for the truth of the matter asserted by redacting the most prejudicial portions of the testimony and instructing the jury to consider the testimony only for its effect on the listeners. Therefore, the admission of the testimony did not violate Kent's rights under the Confrontation Clause. View "United States v. Kent" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Thanquarius R. Calhoun was appealing the denial of his federal habeas petition following his conviction for felony murder and other crimes in the state of Georgia. Calhoun had led police on a high-speed chase that resulted in a passenger's death after law enforcement used a Precision Immobilization Technique (PIT) maneuver to stop his vehicle.Calhoun's appeal argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel did not present a defense or request a jury instruction on the theory that the PIT maneuver, and not his own actions, was the proximate or intervening cause of the passenger's death.Under Georgia law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, a defendant's act is not the "legal cause" of an injury or damage if some other act "intervenes." However, if the intervening act "could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrong-doer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrong-doer is responsible for all of the consequences resulting from the intervening act." In other words, proximate cause is not affected by a reasonably foreseeable intervening cause.The Eleventh Circuit, giving deference to the Supreme Court of Georgia's interpretation of Georgia law, found that the PIT maneuver was reasonably foreseeable given Calhoun's reckless behavior during the police chase. As a result, the use of the maneuver did not break the causal chain linking Calhoun's actions to the passenger's death. Thus, Calhoun had not carried his burden to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if his counsel had argued that the PIT maneuver was an intervening cause. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Calhoun's habeas petition. View "Calhoun v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison" on Justia Law

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In a dispute that arose from a gang-related murder, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was called to examine whether the placement of two suspects (who were allegedly involved in the same crime) in a room together constituted an interrogation under Miranda rights. The case involved Jimmie Bowen, a member of the New Moneii gang, who was convicted for the murder of Pierre Roche and injuring two others. After his arrest, Bowen invoked his right to counsel, at which point the police ceased questioning him. However, they moved him to another room where Bernard Jones, another member of the gang and the alleged getaway driver, was present. The ensuing conversation between Bowen and Jones resulted in Bowen making incriminating statements, which were used in his trial. Bowen appealed, arguing that his placement in the room with Jones violated his Miranda rights. The district court agreed with Bowen, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision. The appeals court found that the Supreme Court's precedent was unclear on whether placing two suspects in a room together constitutes an interrogation under Miranda. The court held that because reasonable jurists could disagree about whether Bowen was "interrogated" in the interview room, federal courts lack the power to overturn his state criminal conviction. The appellate court further noted that the fact that Bowen incriminated himself does not necessarily mean it was "reasonably likely" that he would do so when Jones was placed in the room. The court concluded that the case fell into a gray area not clearly defined by Supreme Court precedent, and thus, Bowen's challenge did not warrant federal habeas relief. As such, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bowen v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed appeals from Eric Robert Rudolph, who had pled guilty to six federal arson charges and four counts of using a destructive device during a crime of violence in order to avoid the death penalty. As part of his plea deal, Rudolph had waived his rights to appeal his conviction and sentence, and to collaterally attack his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding. Despite this, Rudolph filed two petitions for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, seeking to vacate several of his sentences. He argued that his convictions for using an explosive during a crime of violence were unlawful in light of new Supreme Court precedent.The Eleventh Circuit found that Rudolph’s § 2255 motions were, in fact, collateral attacks on his sentences, which his plea agreements did not permit. The court held that § 2255 is a mechanism for attacking sentences, not convictions. The court also rejected Rudolph's argument that his appeal waivers were unenforceable because he hadn't known he was waiving the right to collaterally attack his convictions, pointing out that the waivers explicitly included motions under § 2255. The court further declined to adopt a so-called "miscarriage of justice" exception to the enforceability of appeal waivers, which some other courts have recognized. The court affirmed the district courts' decisions denying Rudolph’s § 2255 motions. View "Rudolph v. United States" on Justia Law