Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Following a guilty plea, Defendant objected to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) arguing that pursuant to Section 2M5.2(a)(2), his base offense level should have been 14 rather than 26 because the weapons parts that were seized could be converted to only two functional weapons.   Interpreting U.S.S.G. Section 2M5.2(a)(2), the Eleventh Circuit explained that the subsection sets a lower base offense level for defendants convicted of illegally exporting weapons if the offense involved only non-fully automatic small arms and there were no more than two weapons. The question here is whether a defendant who exports enough weapons parts for two operable firearms, along with additional parts to service additional firearms, can take advantage of the lower base offense level.   The court affirmed Defendant’s sentence, finding that the district court applied the correct base offense level because Defendant’s offense did not fit within the narrow carveout set forth in Section 2M5.2(a)(2)(A); and the court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s discretionary decision not to depart downward from the Guidelines. View "USA v. Christopher Daniel Stines" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 180-month sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At sentencing, the district court concluded that Defendant qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. Section  924(e), because he had at least three prior “serious drug offenses.” On appeal, Defendant argued the “maximum term of imprisonment” is not the “statutory maximum” penalty but instead the high end of the particular sentencing range calculated for his prior convictions under Alabama’s presumptive sentencing standards.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s ACCA-enhanced sentence. The court found that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant had at least three qualifying serious drug offenses under the ACCA and in imposing an enhanced 180-month sentence. The court explained that to count as a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA, the drug offenses must have a “maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more . . . prescribed by law.” See 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Alabama’s statutory maximum penalties for each of Defendant’s drug offenses was ten years or more. The court applied the categorical approach and looked to the maximum statutory sentence for Defendant’s drug offenses, not to the high end of his presumptive sentencing range. View "USA v. Quinton Deairre Gardner" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and indicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits an alien who "is illegally or unlawfully in the United States" from possessing a firearm. Defendant did not dispute that he possessed a firearm, but filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming Section 922(g)(5)(A) violated his Second Amendment rights. The district court denied Defendant's motion, ultimately convicting him after a bench trial.Defendant appealed, arguing that because he lived in the United State prior to his arrest, he was among "the people" protected by the Second Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit rejected Defendant's argument, holding that the Second Amendment does not apply to all citizens. Under District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Second Amendment confers the right to gun ownership to individuals, not collectively. Thus, certain groups of people are constitutionally deprived of the right to own or possess a gun. Based on the Eleventh Circuit's "'examination of a variety of legal and other sources' from the Founding era," aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States are among those who are constitutionally restricted from owning or possessing a firearm. View "USA v. Ignacio Jimenez-Shilon" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy and substantive health care fraud for fraudulently billing Medicare and Medicaid for millions of dollars for visits to nursing home patients that he never made. He challenged the convictions, sentence, restitution amount, and forfeiture amount on appeal. In an April 12, 2022 opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence.Following the court's initial opinion, Defendant filed a petition for rehearing en banc. The Eleventh Circuit considered Defendant's petition as a petition for a panel rehearing. The court granted Defendant's petition, vacated its previous opinion and issued a revised opinion that did not change the court's judgment or Defendant's sentence. Defendant was given 21 days to file a supplemental brief. View "USA v. Douglas Moss" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition. The Eleventh Circuit issued a certificate of appealability and concluded that the district court properly denied Section 2254 habeas petition. The court reviewed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland. To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, the petitioner must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.   The court held that counsel’s failure to assert the failure-to-inform theory as trial court error in briefing Petitioner’s appeal could not amount to ineffective assistance under Strickland. The fact that Petitioner was concerned about a joint trial, not joint representation, fully supports the Florida District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) rejection of this ineffective assistance claim. The court reasoned that the trial court appropriately responded to Petitioner’s concern by explaining why Petitioner would not be prejudiced by a joint trial: because the State had charged Petitioner as a principal in the armed robbery, all of the evidence that would be introduced in co-defendant’s trial would be introduced in his as well.   Further, the district court correctly concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that the DCA’s affirmance of this ineffective assistance claim constituted an adjudication that was “contrary to, or an incorrect application of,” the Supreme Court’s holdings in Strickland. View "Gregory Lamar Blackmon v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 168 months imprisonment followed by 30 years of supervised release, imposed pursuant to his guilty plea for child sex crimes. He challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence, arguing that the district court did not properly consider the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors. He also contested the imposition of a special condition of supervised release prohibiting him—absent probation office approval—from using or possessing a computer or a device capable of connecting to the internet and from possessing an “electronic data storage medium.”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the relevant factors or imposing a special condition of supervised release. The court reasoned that the district court did not commit any procedural errors. Here, the district court stated that it had considered the advisory guidelines and “all of the factors” set out in Section 3553(a)(1)– (7) and reliance on some Section 3553(a) factors over others does not necessarily render a sentence unreasonable.   Next, the court reasoned that the sentence was substantively reasonable because the district court imposed the lowest possible prison sentence within the range and it was within the district court’s discretion to weigh the factors as it did and arrive at this sentence. Finally, the court held that a district court has discretion to impose any condition of supervised release it deems appropriate so long as it comports with the factors enumerated in Section 3553(a). View "USA v. Blaine Joyner Coglianese" on Justia Law

Defendant played several distinct roles in a large-scale methamphetamine drug trafficking conspiracy operating out of the Tampa Bay, Florida area. On appeal, he disputed various building blocks of his 135-month prison sentence imposed by the district court. His primary challenge involved the trial court’s determination that he was responsible for distributing 200 kilograms of methamphetamine. He also made three other arguments on appeal -- concerning his sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm, the district court’s decision not to grant him a downward variance or downward departure, and the overall reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that the district court did not err in attributing 200 kilograms of methamphetamine to the drug trafficking organization as a whole. The court reasoned that under case law, the government meets its burden of establishing the relevant drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence by convincing the trier of fact that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence. The court concluded that there is no basis on the record for the court to find that the total quantity determination reflected any clear error. Further, Defendant’s involvement was not limited to a single discrete act or a single discrete phase of this elaborate conspiracy. Additionally, the district court was justified in enhancing Defendant’s sentence on the grounds that his co-conspirator had stored a firearm at the stash house. View "USA v. Edwar Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant, a physician who operates a medical clinic, was under investigation for healthcare fraud and related charges. During the investigation, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant permitting them to search the clinic. During the search, one officer found a bag of videotapes. The officer played the tapes, which led to Defendant being charged with several child pornography offenses. Defendant unsuccessfully sought suppression of the tapes at trial.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The search warrant application specifically mentioned "videotapes" among the items to be searched. Thus, the officer's search of the tapes was covered by the search warrant.The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Defendant's claim that his right to a public trial was violated when the district judge closed the courtroom during several witnesses' testimony. Defendant agreed to most of the closures and failed to object to any of the other closures. View "USA v. Ronald Tai Young Moon, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court’s denial of his timely 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate. In his motion, Petitioner challenged his felon-in-possession conviction, arguing that the district court erred when it instructed the jury on aiding and abetting even though the government failed to prove that Petitioner knew his co-defendant was a convicted felon.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s Section 2255 motion, vacated the felon-in-possession conviction, and remanded. The court held that Rehaif applies retroactively to Petitioner’s initial Section 2255 motion, that Petitioner’s Rehaif claim is neither procedurally barred nor defaulted, and that the district court’s error was not harmless. The court reasoned it is likely that the jury listened to the government’s guidance, asked a question about Petitioner's principal liability, received an answer suggesting Petitioner could not be convicted under that theory, opted for the aiding and abetting instruction, and convicted Petitioner based on that theory of liability. As a result, the court expressed grave doubts about whether the district court’s error substantially influenced the jury verdict, and thus it found that the error actually prejudiced Petitioner, and cannot be deemed harmless. View "Isaac Seabrooks v. USA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Florida pretrial defendant awaiting trial on state criminal charges, filed a petition in federal court alleging that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated as a result of temporary measures suspending criminal jury trials in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. He sought the dismissal of all of his criminal charges, traveling under the federal habeas provision found in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim, finding that Petitioner gave the court no basis for intervening in his state criminal prosecution. The court held that it cannot say that Petitioner’s speedy-trial filings, which expressly referenced only the Florida rule, fairly raised a federal constitutional speedy-trial claim. Further, there is not any indication that the state court somehow surmised that Petitioner had raised a federal constitutional claim-it never discussed the Sixth Amendment claim, even implicitly.   Further, the court held that Petitioner’s petition is barred under the application of the abstention doctrine under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The court reasoned that Younger established that, based on principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings where the state court conviction and/or sentence is not yet final. View "James Russell Johnson v. State of Florida" on Justia Law