Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, possessing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. On appeal, he raised five claims as to why he should either receive a new trial or, alternatively, be resentenced.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction holding that Defendant did not experience a cumulative error required to reverse a jury trial verdict. The court concluded that the only errors it identified were invited errors with respect to the jury instruction and potential harmless error with respect to the handling of the records of conviction.   The court reasoned that while the special agent’s misconduct in handling evidence in a previous case was egregious enough for him to be barred from bringing cases in at least one United States Attorney’s Office, it is not clear that the failure to disclose his prior mishandling of evidence would serve to render this trial unfair. Further, the court found that Defendant’s contentions sought to impermissibly heighten the probable cause standard to require officers to have perfect memory as to why they stopped an individual. Finally, the court held that Defendant cannot show that his trial outcome would have been different if all these supposed errors had not been made. View "USA v. Freddie Clark" on Justia Law

In 2018, Defendant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine and one kilogram or more of heroin. Defendant's role in the conspiracy was to deliver the narcotics to customers and by making narcotics sales at a stash house. At his arrest, Defendant had a key to the stash house in his possession.The pre-sentence report ("PSR") determined that the base offense level was 36. The PSR also suggested various enhancements, including a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G Sec. 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a house for the purposes of manufacturing or distributing narcotics. Applying the Sec. 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement, the district court sentenced Defendant to 120 months of incarceration.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding that the district court did not err in applying a two-level enhancement for maintaining a drug premises or by denying safety valve relief. When determining the applicability of a Sec. 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement, the court looks to whether a defendant had a possessory interest in the premises and the extent to which they controlled access to the premises. Here, although Defendant did not own or live at the stash house for the entire duration of the conspiracy, he lived at the house for at least some portion of the conspiracy. Additionally, although the district court erred in concluding the application of the 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement barred Defendant from safety valve relief, Defendant was not entitled to relief because he failed to cooperate against his codefendants. View "USA v. Trini Thomas, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g) and 924(a)(2). He argued that the district court did not elicit objections as required by United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1990).   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that under Jones, a district court must fully articulate objections to the court’s ultimate findings and conclusions of law following the imposition of a sentence. Here, the court found that the district court did not follow the procedures set forth in Jones. It explained that during the sentencing hearing, no one addressed the firearm being stolen from a police department. Rather, when read together, the allegations explained that the gun in question was reported stolen in the sheriff’s office county, not that it was stolen from the sheriff. Because the district court first announced this conclusion after the sentencing hearing when it issued the written document, the district court did not provide Defendant an opportunity to object to its finding as to the victim of the theft.   The court noted that in most cases a discrepancy between a court’s real-time pronouncement and later-filed form would not support a Jones claim. However, here, the district court failed to fully state its basis for departing during the sentencing hearing. Thus, in this situation, the post-sentencing form exposed an error. View "USA v. Karijmah Tremaine Mosely" on Justia Law

While investigating a suspected drug trafficking conspiracy, a Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent secured a wiretap authorization order from a state judge. The wiretap ultimately implicated nine people in the conspiracy. When federal authorities prosecuted them based on this state-gathered evidence, the defendants asked the district court to suppress it. The district court denied their motions, the defendants pleaded guilty to federal drug crimes, and each defendant expressly reserved his suppression arguments for appeal.The defendants argue that the recordings were never properly sealed both because the judge did not issue a separate, written sealing order after receiving the recordings and because the government “maintained access” to the original recordings after sealing. The court found that the state judge properly sealed the wiretap recordings, reasoning that the recordings were “made available to the [authorizing] judge” and “sealed under his directions.” No one accessed them after they were physically sealed.Further, Section 2518(8)(a) requires that the recordings be sealed “[i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the order or extensions thereof.” The statute states that a delay in sealing should be excused if the government provides a “satisfactory explanation” for the delay. Considering the absence of tampering, the government’s good faith, the short delay, the lack of tactical advantage to the government or prejudice to the defendants, and the objective reasonableness of the agents’ actions, the court found that the government provided a satisfactory explanation for any delay in sealing. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "USA v. Mario Demitric Stowers" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute and use a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime. The district court sentenced him to a term of 210 months of imprisonment on the narcotics offense and a consecutive term of 84 months of imprisonment on the firearm offense. Defendant wrote a letter to the district court asking whether he was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act and requesting the appointment of counsel to file a motion under the Act. Defendant appealed the district court's adverse decision.The court found that Defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. The court reasoned that under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, made retroactive by the First Step Act, a narcotics offense involving less than 28 grams of crack cocaine now carries a statutory penalty of up to 20 years with no mandatory minimum. Thus, because Defendant’s statutory penalty for his crack cocaine offense has been modified by the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act, his conviction is a “covered offense” under Sec. 404(a) of the First Step Act. The court further found that the district court erred when it issued its alternative ruling that Defendant did not merit a reduction of his sentence it did so without hearing from him. Thus, the court reversed the district court’s order denying the construed motion and remanded. View "USA v. Tydearain Smith" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of three misdemeanor counts of willful failure to file a federal income tax return. Defendant was represented by counsel at trial, but he lacked representation during the pretrial process. At his arraignment, Defendant expressed his desire to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself. The magistrate judge found that Defendant’s waiver was knowing, even after misinforming him that the maximum sentence he could receive if convicted was 12 months of imprisonmentThe court found the magistrate judge’s statements were materially incorrect. Instead of “unambiguously” informing Defendant of the penalties he faced, the magistrate judge incorrectly asserted that “we’re not talking about a felony involving imprisonment beyond one year”—when the true maximum sentence was three times longer. Thus, the court held that there was no knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Next, the court found that the deprivation of Defendant’s right to counsel at all pretrial stages of the proceedings against him was a structural error. As such, the court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "USA v. Saleem Hakim" on Justia Law

Several young girls were locked out of their social media accounts. Shortly after being locked out, Defendant would contact them, demanding pornographic images. Defendant threatened to release the images to the girls' social media followers if they did not follow his instructions. One of the girls called the police, which eventually led them to Defendant's residence. The officer told Defendant he was not under arrest but that he was investigating a crime. Defendant admitted to taking over about 20 girls' social media accounts and provided details about the involvement of several other men. The district denied Defendant's motion to suppress the statements he made to police. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment followed by a life term of supervised release.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding Defendant was not under arrest at the time he made the statements to the police. The court also affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding it was not procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "USA v. Joseph Isaiah Woodson, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy and substantive health care fraud for fraudulently billing Medicare and Medicaid for millions of dollars for visits to nursing home patients that he never made. He challenged the convictions, sentence, restitution amount, and forfeiture amount on appeal.The co-conspirator pleaded guilty to conspiracy and agreed to cooperate with the government. Part of his plea agreement addressed his compensation during the conspiracy. Defendant contends that the district court erred in quashing his subpoena of the co-conspirator’s attorney. The court ruled that any erroneous exclusion of the attorney’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because his testimony would not have impeached the co-conspirator. He further argues that the district court erred in limiting how many character witnesses he could present. The court found that the district court did not err because defendant overstates the importance of character witness testimony in this case. He was not on trial for being uncaring or uncompassionate but for lying and billing Medicare for services he did not provide.Additionally, defendant contends that the district court improperly limited part of his counsel’s closing argument when he was discussing whether defendant had made a profit. The court found that the government does not have to prove a defendant profited to establish the elements of fraud. The court also found that the district court did not err in calculating the loss amount used to determine defendant's sentence or the amount of restitution ordered. View "USA v. Douglas Moss" on Justia Law

In March 2017, a woman contacted police explaining that the defendant, her ex-boyfriend, was having sex with her 14-year-old sister. When the girl’s family confronted her, she acknowledged that she was communicating with the defendant over social media, had sent him nude pictures, and that they had sex. The defendant’s cell phone contained nude pictures of the girl. The defendant was charged with various sex offenses in a seven-count indictment. During his arrest, officers confiscated the defendant's second cell phone, which contained additional inculpatory evidence.The district court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in his home during a warrantless search, from one of his cellphones obtained from his work, and his statements to detectives. The defendant was ultimately convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a consecutive ten-year mandatory minimum sentence.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The officers had consent to enter the defendant’s home to obtain his cell phone. Once officers reviewed the phone, they then developed probable cause to search the defendant’s second cell phone. The court also rejected the defendant’s challenges to the computation of his sentence. View "USA v. Romeo Valentin Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, concluding that defendant has forfeited any argument under which the court may grant relief. In this case, defendant alleged that the district court improperly denied his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California. The court concluded that, despite the existence of a circuit split on whether a voluntary guilty plea waives the right to self-representation on appeal and the court's own order to defendant's appellate counsel instructing her to brief whether this court can review a denial of the right to self-representation following a guilty plea, appellate counsel failed to make any argument in the opening brief that even approached the applicable legal question. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law