Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for federal child sex crimes. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his long-term sexual abuse of two young girls. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant; the FBI's negligence does not justify excluding the New York or Kentucky evidence; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial. View "United States v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

In 2007, Moore was convicted of possession of several unregistered destructive devices and was sentenced to the statutory maximum for his offense—120 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months’ supervised release. He completed his term of imprisonment in 2016. His supervised release has been revoked three times. Upon the third revocation, Moore was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and an additional 18 months’ supervised release. During the revocation proceedings, he was also sentenced to a consecutive term of six months’ imprisonment for criminal contempt. Moore argued that 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), the statute under which he was sentenced upon revocation, was unconstitutional because it allowed the district court to extend Moore’s sentence beyond the authorized statutory maximum for his offense of conviction based solely on “judge-found facts” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. Although the district court plainly erred in imposing an additional term of supervised release because it failed to account for the terms of imprisonment that were imposed upon the prior revocations of his supervised release, section 3583(e) is not unconstitutional as applied to Moore; the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. The district court did not plainly err in convicting Moore of criminal contempt without giving him an opportunity to allocute. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Smith, a software engineer, obtained the coordinates of artificial fishing reefs in the Gulf of Mexico from a website owned by StrikeLines, a Florida business. Smith remained in Mobile, Alabama while posting information about the reef coordinates on Facebook. Smith initially agreed to remove the posts and to assist Strikelines with its security issues in exchange for additional coordinates but communications broke down. StrikeLines contacted law enforcement. Officers executed a search warrant and found StrikeLines’s coordinates and other customer and sales data on Smith’s devices. Smith was charged in the Northern District of Florida with violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C), (c)(2)(B)(iii), theft of trade secrets, and transmitting a threat through interstate commerce with intent to extort. Smith argued that venue was improper because all the prohibited conduct occurred in the Alabama and the data that was accessed and obtained was in the Middle District of Florida.Smith was convicted on the trade secrets and extortion counts in the Northern District of Florida. The Eleventh Circuit vacated Smith’s trade secrets conviction and related sentencing enhancements for lack of venue, affirmed the extortion conviction and related sentencing enhancements, and remanded. Smith never committed any essential conduct for the trade secrets conviction in the Northern District of Florida. Sufficient evidence supported the extortion conviction. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Booker is on Florida’s death row for first-degree murder. In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. In 2020, the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Public Defender (CHU) sought permission to represent Booker in state court to exhaust a “Brady” claim so that Booker could pursue the claim in a successive federal habeas petition. The Brady claim focused on the prosecution’s failure to disclose notes that allegedly could have been used to impeach an FBI hair expert. Booker said that he had learned through a FOIA request and a review by a qualified microscopist that there were inconsistencies between the expert’s trial testimony and his notes. The state objected to the appointment of CHU, noting that Booker had a state-law right to counsel through Florida’s Capital Collateral Regional Counsel North (CCRC-N); CCRC-N counsel was appointed to represent Booker in state court. Nonetheless, the district court appointed CHU under 18 U.S.C. 3599 to represent Booker in state courtThe Eleventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. Florida cannot establish standing based on a hypothetical conflict of interest that is not actual or imminent. State courts are empowered to reject appearances by CHU counsel, so the appointment cannot have inflicted an injury on Florida’s sovereignty. View "Booker v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated defendant's 110-month sentence for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The court held that the government did not waive its argument that defendant's conviction qualified as a predicate crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), where, as here, the argument was foreclosed by binding precedent at the time of sentencing and the change in law occurred within the time to file a notice of appeal. Therefore, the court need not determine whether a conviction for robbery under Georgia law is an ACCA predicate offense. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Sharp" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the conditions of petitioner's supervision program render her "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2241, such that the district court had jurisdiction to consider her habeas petition. The court also concluded that petitioner did not validly self-execute the 1995 deportation order when, shortly before it was entered, she voluntarily left the United States. Whether the court resolved 8 U.S.C. 1101(g)'s ambiguity through the principle of lenity or through Chevron deference, the court reached the same conclusion: Section 1101(g)'s two conditions operate successively. In this case, petitioner left the Untied States before she was ordered removed and thus she was not "deported or removed" within the meaning of Section 1101(g). Accordingly, the government may lawfully deport her under the still-operative 1995 order. View "Argueta Romero v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of one count of transmitting interstate threats, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 875(c) (Count 1), and three counts of cyberstalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2)(B) (Counts 2–4). Defendant's convictions stem from posts he made and messages he sent on Instagram, posing as various mass murderers including notorious serial killer Ted Bundy and Nikolas Cruz, the perpetrator of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting.The court held that 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2)(B) is both facially constitutional and constitutional as applied to defendant's conduct. Finding the First Circuit persuasive, the court declined to employ the "strong medicine" of overbreadth in defendant's constitutional challenge to strike down section 2261A(2)(B). In regard to defendant's as-applied challenge, the court found meritless defendant's contention that his speech was regarding a matter of public concern and that the statute impermissibly restricts the content of his speech. In this case, the messages defendant sent amount to true threats and are therefore not afforded First Amendment protection. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction; the district court did not plainly err in admitting the government's expert testimony; and the court rejected defendant's challenges to the jury instructions. View "United States v. Fleury" on Justia Law

Telcy, convicted of drug and firearms offenses, was sentenced to life imprisonment due to his armed career criminal enhancement. His 2010 section 2255 habeas petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, was rejected. In 2013 and 2016, Telcy unsuccessfully sought permission to file second or successive section 2255 habeas petitions. In 2019, under the First Step Act, the district court. reduced Telcy’s sentence to a term of 235 months without holding a hearing or revisiting its previous factual findings.Telcy again sought permission to file a second or successive 2255 habeas petition, arguing that, because his guideline range was based on the ACCA enhancement and the district court considered this guideline range when it imposed a reduced sentence, he would suffer adverse collateral consequences if he were not allowed to challenge the enhancement in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. For purposes of the bar on second or successive 2255 motions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a First Step Act sentence reduction is not a “new judgment” that resets the clock, allowing a defendant to file a new, “first” habeas petition. When a district judge reduces a sentence under the First Step Act, the court is not authorized to conduct a plenary, de novo resentencing; the sentence reduction does not affect the validity or lawfulness of the underlying sentence. View "Telcy v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for child pornography charges related to her two daughters. The court concluded that the district court did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a defense by excluding expert testimony related to her intellectual disability where the proffered testimony was not key to any legally acceptable defense theory. The court also concluded that defendant's below-Guidelines sentence of 30 years in prison was substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including the fact that defendant took about 500 images and videos of her two young children for her husband's sexual gratification. View "United States v. Litzky" on Justia Law

Defendants, members of the Plowshares Movement, appealed their convictions and sentences for conspiracy, destruction of property on a naval installation, depredation of government property, and trespass. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their actions illegally entering the Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in St. Marys, Georgia to engage in religious protest of nuclear weapons.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions and sentences, concluding that the district court did not err in denying defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA); the district court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in holding defendants jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution; any alleged error in failing to award Defendants Hennessy and Trotta reductions for acceptance of responsibility was harmless; the district court did not err in holding Hennessy accountable for the entire loss amount when imposing the USSG 2B1.1 enhancement; the district court did not err in failing to address Defendant Grady's RFRA-related sentencing argument; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give Grady's requested mistake-of-fact jury instruction. View "United States v. Grady" on Justia Law