Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal from the IJ's removal order. The court concluded that each of petitioner's two Georgia convictions for simple battery was a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year, within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Therefore, petitioner was convicted of two "aggravated felonies," as that term is defined in the Immigration and Naturalization Act, and is ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Talamantes-Enriquez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a criminal alien facing deportation to Somalia, petitions for review of the order of the BIA confirming his removability and denying his applications for withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and a refugee inadmissibility waiver. Petitioner also challenges the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that petitioner failed to preserve whether his defective notice to appear violated the agency's claim-processing rules; petitioner is removable for his controlled substance conviction; and, in the alternative, petitioner is removable for his second-degree assault conviction. The court also concluded that the Board denied the refugee inadmissibility waiver under the correct legal standard; the Board did not err in denying petitioner's applications for withholding of removal and for protection under the CAT; and petitioner's habeas petition is moot as to detention under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), and is not ripe as to detention under section 1231(a). Accordingly, the court dismissed in part, denied in part, dissolving the stay of removal and remanded with instructions to dismiss the habeas petition. The court denied the government's motion to dismiss the appeal. View "Farah v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Officer Sullivan pulled over Braddy on I-65 in Saraland, Alabama, after seeing Braddy react to the presence of his marked patrol vehicle and observing that Braddy’s vehicle’s license tag was obscured by bicycles. During the traffic stop, officers discovered cocaine in Braddy’s vehicle following two canine sniffs. Braddy was charged with possession with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846.The trial court denied his motion to suppress, rejecting an argument that the reason for pulling Braddy over, a violation of an Alabama law requiring motor vehicle operators to keep their license plates plainly visible, did not provide probable cause because the statute did not apply to Braddy as a nonresident of Alabama. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Any mistake of law by Sullivan was objectively reasonable and the traffic stop of Braddy’s vehicle was based on probable cause. Sullivan did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. There was probable cause to search Braddy’s vehicle based on the reliability of the drug detection dogs’ alerts. View "United States v. Braddy" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the GDC and ASMP officials. The district court found that plaintiff did not properly exhaust the available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The court rejected plaintiff's contention that there were no available administrative remedies under the GDC policy. Rather, the court concluded that the GDC's grievance policy is distinct from the policy at issue in Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856–57 (2016), and is not a "dead end." Furthermore, inmates need not wait for the Internal Investigations Unit investigation to conclude before filing a civil suit. The court explained that, under the GDC procedure, an inmate exhausts his administrative remedies once he properly submits a grievance alleging excessive force because that act automatically ends the grievance process. Finally, regardless of whether an inmate's mental illness may render an administrative remedy unavailable in some other case, it did not do so here. Because plaintiff did not file a timely grievance and because GDC did not waive the procedural defects in the untimely grievances that he did file, the court concluded that he failed to satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. View "Varner v. Shepard" on Justia Law

During a criminal investigation into money laundering and wire fraud, the FBI obtained a search warrant to be executed at the Miami offices of entities that comprise the Optima Companies, which were located in a business suite. The warrant identified the items to be seized, including records of and concerning two Ukrainian nationals and several American citizens who allegedly own, control, or manage more than 30 entities that fall under the name “Optima” and have offices in the Miami offices. Among the materials seized were items from the office of an in-house attorney. Optima and affiliated individuals asserting attorney-client and work-product privilege, moved under Rule 41(g), Fed. R. Crim. P., to prohibit the government’s filter team (attorneys and staff who were not involved in the criminal investigation) from reviewing any potentially privileged documents unless either they agreed or the court, after conducting its own privilege review, ordered disclosure.The district court imposed a modified filter protocol but denied the request to prohibit anyone from the government from reviewing potentially privileged documents without consent or court order. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that government filter teams per se violate privilege holders’ rights. The modified filter-team protocol allows the Optima parties to conduct the initial privilege review and requires their permission or court order for any purportedly privileged documents to be released. The filter team cannot inadvertently provide the investigation team with any privileged materials. View "United States v. Korf" on Justia Law

Mitchell was a Duval County Jail pretrial detainee. Detective Simpson told a jail official to “obtain,” “seize,” and “confiscate and review” all of Mitchell’s incoming and outgoing mail. A mail clerk, Perkins, delivered a letter from Mitchell’s attorney marked “Legal Mail” that had already been opened. When Perkins later asked Mitchell specific questions about his case, Mitchell concluded that she had read at least part of the letter. During the next year, Mitchell continued to experience issues with his mail. Perkins switched an outgoing letter to Mitchell’s family with another inmate’s letter. Sergeant Clark, the mailroom supervisor, tried to “intimidate” Mitchell, intercepting his grievances and warning him to stop filing complaints.Mitchell filed a pro se complaint alleging that Simpson, Perkins, and Clark, violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that: A simple rule has governed prison mail procedures in our Circuit for nearly 50 years: a prison official may not open an inmate’s properly marked legal mail outside of his presence. The defendants’ conduct violated Mitchell’s First Amendment right to free speech; it was clearly established that the officials’ conduct was unlawful. View "Mitchell v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2002, Hayes, age 20, violently attacked his 60-year-old neighbor without provocation or apparent motive, causing her to lapse into a coma. Hayes was later seen burning items in his backyard. Clothing recovered from the burn pile contained the victim’s blood. Charged with attempted first-degree murder with a deadly weapon and armed trespassing, Hayes was found incompetent to proceed and transferred to a state mental health facility. After months of treatment, the psychology department and two court-appointed psychiatrists concluded that Hayes was competent to proceed Counsel filed a notice of intent to rely on an insanity defense and renewed his objection to the competence finding but never obtained an expert opinion regarding Hayes’ sanity at the time of the attack. On the first day of trial, defense counsel withdrew the insanity defense, allegedly at Hayes' request. Defense counsel did not call witnesses but attempted to present a misidentification defense through cross-examination. At sentencing, new defense counsel presented extensive evidence of Hayes’ mental illnesses. The court called Hayes “mentally disturbed” but sentenced him to life imprisonment.Hayes argued that trial counsel was ineffective for abandoning the insanity defense. The Eleventh Circuit reversed a grant of federal habeas relief. To establish prejudice, Hayes must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The district court instead relied on a prejudice test that was rejected by the Supreme Court. Under the clear and convincing standard required by Florida law, Hayes cannot show a reasonable probability that his insanity defense would have been successful if presented to the jury View "Hayes v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc and this is the decision of the en banc court vacating the panel opinion and remanding the case to the panel for further proceedings.The en banc court held that Supreme Court precedent requires the use of the preponderance standard of predictive proof in ultimate discovery exception cases. Even if the court were not to do so, the court held that the preponderance standard must be used because of the advantages it has over the reasonable probability standard when it comes to finding whether evidence ultimately would have been discovered through lawful means if the constitutional violation had not taken place. View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit joined the Fourth and Sixth Circuits in holding that a sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release qualifies for a reduction under section 404(b) of the First Step Act when the underlying crime is a covered offense under the Act.However, the court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a sentence reduction. In this case, the district court provided an alternative reason for the denial of a sentence reduction based on defendant's "unwillingness or inability to abide by the law" and his "continued lawless behavior"—as demonstrated by his prison disciplinary record and most recent drug and firearm offenses—and a concern about recidivism. The court concluded that the district court's reasons were clear, supported by the record, and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Coats, then a convicted felon, was arrested after making several (recorded) controlled drug sales to a confidential informant (CI). Coats was housed at the Wilkinson County jail, where the CI was also in custody. Coats gained access to the CI and punched him. That incident resulted in additional state charges for battery and influencing a witness, to which he pleaded guilty.Coats then pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Coats to serve 235 months' imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which applies when a defendant who is convicted under section 922(g) has three prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony.” Coats had a 2003 Georgia burglary conviction, which the court determined was a violent felony under ACCA. The court denied an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction to his sentencing range, citing his obstructive conduct preceding his guilty plea.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Any Rehaif error was nonprejudicial; Coats was not informed of section922(g)’s essential "knowledge" requirement, but he made no attempt to show that he would not have pled guilty but for that error. Of the 12 criminal convictions identified in his PSR, at least four were for felonies. Coats did not dispute the PSR’s description of his criminal history. The burglary conviction qualifies as an ACCA violent felony and the district court did not clearly err in refusing to award an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. View "United States v. Coats" on Justia Law