Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed her conviction for conspiring to distribute and distributing controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, 841, and conspiring to commit and committing health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349, 1347. Defendant's conviction stemmed from a large governmental investigation of a pill mill. The district court sentenced defendant to 120 months in prison for each count, to run concurrently.The Eleventh Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for health care fraud under Count 24 where the government concedes, and the court agrees, that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The court explained that Indian Nat Insurance—an entity not named in the indictment—was billed for the prescriptions pertaining to this count. The court affirmed the remainder of defendant's convictions and the district court's evidentiary rulings. Finally, in regards to the contested jury instruction, the court found no plain error affected defendant's substantial rights. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Akwuba" on Justia Law

To root out police corruption in Miami, the FBI created a reverse sting operation, having agents pose as would-be drug dealers. Officer Anderson became the subject of the investigation and eventually agreed to act as a cooperating witness, wearing a recording device. Anderson identified Officer Harris as having corruptly engaged in misconduct. At the FBI’s direction, Anderson set up the “protection” operation, during which officers Harris and Archibald protected “drug couriers” as they delivered containers purportedly filled with cocaine to hotels. Both were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support their convictions. With respect to an entrapment defense, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to take part in the charged crimes. Archibald was not entitled to a duress instruction. The court rejected claims of perjury and government misconduct with respect to grand jury proceedings. The defendants failed to establish that the prosecutor struck an African American juror because of race, in violation of “Batson.” The district court did not err by not providing the jury with a read-back of Archibald’s testimony. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to clarify, modify, and terminate early his term of supervised release. The court also affirmed a July 2017 sealed order, which required him to disclose details about work he performs as part of the security company he owns and operates and to inform prospective clients of his sex offender status. Defendant is serving his supervised release term of ten years as part of his sentence for accessing with intent to view child pornography.The court concluded that the district court did not add an occupational restriction or otherwise modify the conditions of defendant's supervised release when it entered the July 2017 sealed order, and therefore no evidentiary hearing was required and the district court was not required to address the U.S.S.G. 5F1.5 factors. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to modify the conditions of his supervised release which sought the elimination of the internet restriction. As with the motion to modify, the record establishes that the district court considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion in denying summarily the motion for early termination. View "United States v. Cordero" on Justia Law

A conviction under Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a)—which makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to "own or to have in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm, ammunition, or electric weapon or device, or to carry a concealed weapon, including a tear gas gun or chemical weapon or device"—does not constitute a "firearm offense" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C), and its cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3).The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's final order of removal and vacated the BIA's decision deeming petitioner removable under section 1227(a)(2)(C) of the INA, based on his conviction for a violation of Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a). Applying the categorical approach, the court explained that the prohibited items for the possession and concealed carrying offenses in section 790.23(1)(a) are means of committing those crimes, and not elements of separate crimes. View "Simpson v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court in light of the Court's holding that 18 U.S.C. 1030 applies when a person "accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of that computer—such as files, folders, or databases—that are off limits to him," Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1652, 1662 (2021), the Eleventh Circuit vacated defendant's conviction for computer fraud under section 1030 and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, section 1030 does not cover those who, like defendant, have improper motives for obtaining information that is otherwise available to them. View "United States v. Van Buren" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on his previous drug-related convictions.The Eleventh Circuit explained that the Supreme Court recently clarified in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021), that the ACCA's elements clause does not include offenses that criminalize reckless conduct; it covers only offenses that require a mens rea of knowledge or intent. In this case, defendant was convicted of a version of Georgia aggravated assault that can be accomplished with a mens rea of recklessness -- aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. 16-5-21(a)(2) based on a simple assault under O.C.G.A. 16-5-20(a)(2). Therefore, defendant's aggravated assault conviction cannot support his classification as an armed career criminal. The court vacated the district court's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for sex trafficking three women, two of whom were minors when he recruited them. The district court sentenced defendant to more than five terms of life imprisonment and ordered that he pay restitution to his victims, returning the years of their prostitution earnings that he pocketed. The court concluded that defendant's convictions for his horrific crimes were supported by the evidence, the restitution was both correctly calculated and lawfully imposed, and the sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 brought by petitioner, alleging that the district court erred when it held that he was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to object to the introduction of hearsay evidence and it erred when it denied his Confrontation Clause claim.The court agreed with the district court that the conclusion of the Rule 3.850 state court that petitioner could not show prejudice under the Strickland standard was neither an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. Undertaking the section 2254(d)(2) inquiry first, and applying that deferential standard of review, the court cannot conclude that the Rule 3.850 court's statement that the witness identified petitioner as the perpetrator was an unreasonable determination of fact in light of the evidence presented in state court. In regard to the Confrontation Clause claim, the court could not conclude that petitioner has met his burden under Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 135 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011), to show that there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. Finally, the court rejected claims of cumulative error, because the court could not conclude that petitioner can satisfy his burden of avoiding the preemptive effect of the state court decisions and of establishing prejudice. View "Tarleton v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) sentencing enhancement to defendant's sentence after he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The court concluded that the district court did not err in considering the prosecutor's factual proffer from defendant's state plea colloquy concerning the dates of his prior offenses when conducting the ACCA's different-occasions inquiry because defendant implicitly confirmed the factual basis for his plea. In this case, the district court did not err in relying on the prosecutor's factual proffer in defendant's plea colloquy to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the three qualifying prior convictions for Alabama assault occurred on three separate, distinct occasions. The court also concluded that defendant is not entitled to relief on his Rehaif-based challenge where he cannot establish that the error affected his substantial rights for purposes of plain error review. View "United States v. Dudley" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's 60-month sentence for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Although the court agreed with defendant that the district court committed a Jones error, the court concluded that the record is sufficient to permit appellate review of the sentencing issue he raises.On the merits, the court acknowledged that there is daylight between the standards under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1) and USSG 5C1.2(a)(2), and that application of a firearm enhancement does not necessarily preclude safety-valve relief. However, the court affirmed the sentence because, on this record, the district court's factual findings under section 2D1.1(b)(1) foreclosed relief under section 5C1.2(a)(2). The court remanded for the sole purpose of correcting a clerical error. View "United States v. Sanchez Carrasquillo" on Justia Law