Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order of removal of petitioner as an alien convicted of aggravated felonies after his admission to the United States. In this case, petitioner was a citizen when he was convicted. At issue is whether a denaturalized alien is removable as an aggravated felon based on convictions entered while he was an American citizen.The court explained that, by its plain terms, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) does not apply to aliens who were citizens when convicted. Therefore, the court held that the plain meaning of section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) forecloses the BIA's interpretation. Furthermore, binding precedent, Costello v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 376 U.S. 120 (1964), forecloses treating petitioner's denaturalization as retroactive for removal purposes. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hylton v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

McKiver is serving a mandatory 25-year sentence for a crime he committed shortly after he graduated high school. He admitted to stealing oxycodone pills from his neighbor; the state never disputed that he consumed those pills within 48 hours of acquiring them. A state postconviction court granted McKiver a new trial based on allegations of ineffective assistance. An appellate court reversed in a one-sentence order. McKiver filed a federal habeas petition that argued his trial counsel failed to investigate and present certain witnesses who would cast doubt on the state’s case and the criminal history of a key state witness.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court did not unreasonably apply "Strickland" in rejecting the witness-testimony claim. The only evidence before that court was McKiver’s own conclusory testimony about what the witnesses would have said and whether they would have been available and willing to testify. Fair-minded jurists could agree that McKiver’s evidentiary presentation failed to establish that he met Strickland’s test, especially with respect to its prejudice prong. McKiver cannot surmount the procedural default of his criminal-history claim. There is no reasonable probability that McKiver’s trial would have reached a different conclusion if his trial counsel had investigated the criminal history of the witness. View "McKiver v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that this court's and the Florida state courts' precedent are clear that petitioner's amended state-court motion for postconviction relief relates back to his initial postconviction motion, tolling the statute of limitations for the time in between his initial motion was dismissed and his amended motion was filed. In this case, petitioner's amended rule 3.850 motion relates back to his initial motion, tolling the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's limitations period for the time in between. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the petition as untimely and remanded for further proceedings. View "Morris v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. Petitioner argues that the district court erred by taking judicial notice of the online state court dockets without providing him an opportunity to be heard. However, the court concluded that petitioner himself provided all the information needed to show that his filing was late, and he was given a chance to argue that the district court erred. In this case, when petitioner admitted untimeliness and provided the dates to prove it, he eliminated any need for the district court to look elsewhere before dismissing his petition. Furthermore, petitioner had an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice here and simply did not take advantage of it. View "Turner v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for five counts of armed robbery and carrying a firearm in furtherance of the robberies. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to continue the trial date; the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss Juror 20 for cause based on her employment with the Department of Community Supervision because she did not qualify as a member of a police department; even assuming without deciding that the Google geo-location data should have been excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree," any error in admitting that evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for the robberies; the special agent's testimony does not warrant vacatur of the convictions; and, even assuming error, cumulative error does not warrant vacatur of the convictions. View "United States v. Pendergrass" on Justia Law

Defendants Mayweather, Fluelllen, Williams, and Tucker appealed their convictions for Hobbs Act extortion and attempted distribution of cocaine and methamphetamine. Defendants were corrections officers caught in an FBI sting operation for accepting bribes to smuggle contraband into prison.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Williams and Fluellen were entitled to an entrapment defense jury instruction, the omission of which was reversible error. Therefore, the court reversed Williams and Fluellen's convictions and remanded for a new trial. The court also concluded that Tucker and Mayweather were not entitled to an entrapment instruction, and thus affirmed their respective attempted drug distribution convictions. Finally, the court concluded that it was reversible error not to provide the jury with any definition of "official act" for purposes of the Hobbs Act extortion counts. Accordingly, the court reversed the Hobbs Act extortion convictions as to all four defendants and remand for a new trial as to those counts. View "United States v. Mayweather" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition collaterally attacking his conviction for conspiracy to possess a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(o). Defendant argued that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a valid crime-of-violence predicate after United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019), and Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2019), and that his conviction must be vacated based on the possibility that the jury relied on an invalid predicate and thus convicted him of a non-existent crime.The court concluded that defendant cannot overcome the procedural default of his claim (which he raises for the first time on collateral attack), nor could he otherwise prevail on the merits. The court explained that all of the section 924(o) predicates are inextricably intertwined, arising out of the same cocaine robbery scheme. On this record, the jury could not have found that defendant conspired to possess a firearm in furtherance of a Hobbs Act conspiracy without also finding that he conspired to possess a firearm in furtherance of his attempted Hobbs Act robbery, as well as in furtherance of conspiring and attempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and in furtherance of attempting a carjacking. Each of these crimes remains a lawful predicate for the section 924(o) conviction. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant cannot show actual prejudice or actual innocence to excuse his procedural default. Furthermore, the overlapping factual relationship between the alternative predicate offenses renders any error in the jury instructions harmless. View "Granda v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted defendant's motion for panel rehearing, vacated the original opinion in this appeal, and substituted in its place the following opinion.The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence officers found in an investigatory stop and the statements he made to the officers. In this case, the officers saw defendant and another individual at 1:00 a.m. in a car that was parked in the front yard of a home; suspecting that the men might be trying to steal the car, the officers parked near it and approached defendant, who was in the driver's seat; when defendant opened the door, an officer immediately smelled marijuana; and an ensuing search of the car revealed ammunition and firearms.The court held that the officers did not violate defendant's right to be free from unreasonable seizures because defendant's interactions with the officers was an initially consensual encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that a reasonable person in defendant's position would have felt free to leave. Here, the officers parked alongside the car with enough space for him to drive away. When the officers approached defendant to speak to him, they did not convey that defendant was required to comply. Defendant's other arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. The court clarified that race may not be a factor in the threshold seizure inquiry. View "United States v. Knights" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's 360-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two counts of production of child pornography and one count of distribution of child pornography. The court concluded that there was no error in applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2G2.2(b)(4) for sadism/masochism for three separate images. The court also concluded that the application of USSG 2G2.2(b)(5) and 4B1.5 did not constitute impermissible double counting and there was no plain error; the district court did not abuse its discretion during the sentencing hearing in excluding evidence regarding the two pending state statutory rape cases involving one victim; and defendant's sentence is substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated its previously issued opinion and substituted this one in its place.The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release. The court explained that the district court was permitted to reduce defendant's sentence if it found, among other things, that extraordinary compelling reasons warrant it. In this case, the district court concluded that defendant's medical conditions did not. The court reasoned that, of the conditions defendant argued to the district court, only hypertension appears on the CDC's list of conditions, and it appears only as one that means an adult with it "might be at an increased risk."Furthermore, the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and section 1B1.13 n.1, which further contributes to the court's holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court explained that regardless of whether the district court was required to consider USSG 1B1.13 n.1, it did so. In this case, the district court's order makes clear that it independently considered whether defendant's reasons were "extraordinary and compelling" under section 3582(c)(1)(A), and then separately and "[m]oreover" considered and rejected her reasons in light of section 1B1.13 n.1. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law