Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to petitioner, who was convicted and sentenced to death for the kidnapping, forcible rape, and malice murder of two little girls. At issue was whether the lawyers who represented petitioner at the 1999 retrial deprived him of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in failing to attain and present mitigation evidence.The court held that, on this record, it would be hard put to say that the district court erred in rejecting petitioner's Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder claim. Furthermore, petitioner failed to demonstrate that defense counsel's conduct in connection with the retrial of the penalty phase fell below Strickland v. Washington's performance standard. As for its prejudice standard, the court held that a retrial of the penalty phase would result in the same verdict, a death sentence. View "Presnell v. Warden" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner was sentenced to death for three murders and two attempted murders of two young children. Petitioner alleged that trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective at sentencing because they relied on residual doubt and because they failed to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence concerning petitioner's childhood, substance abuse, and cognitive deficits.The court held that counsels' performance was not constitutionally deficient. Furthermore, the state court's determination that petitioner suffered no prejudice on account of any alleged deficiencies in the performance of his counsel was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. View "Franks v. GDCP Warden" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's motion to postpone his execution by several months on the ground that two of his three appointed lawyers are currently unable to meet with him due to circumstances caused by COVID-19. The court held that neither it nor the district court has the authority to postpone petitioner's execution—at least absent a demonstration that a stay is warranted, a showing that petitioner has not attempted to make.Moreover, and in any event, the court held that petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits where 18 U.S.C. 3596(a), which states that execution shall be implemented in the manner prescribed by the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed, does not extend to ensuring a lawyer's presence at execution. View "LeCroy v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the government's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal based on his sentence-appeal waiver. The court held that the sentence-appeal waiver is unambiguous and was made knowingly and voluntarily. In this case, when defendant decided to plead guilty and enter into a plea agreement, he waived any right to an appeal or other collateral review of his sentence unless the district court imposes a sentence that exceeds the advisory guideline range, which it did not. Furthermore, the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy established that defendant's appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary. View "United States v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of federal habeas corpus relief. Petitioner was sentenced to death for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated battery, aggravated sodomy, kidnapping with bodily injury, and aggravated assault.The court held that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes where the Georgia Supreme Court correctly applied the well-established burden-shifting framework, noting that the statistical disparities to which petitioner pointed were insufficient to establish a prima facie case absent "additional facts which may give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." The court rejected petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of trial and declined to disturb the state habeas court's conclusion that trial counsel's performance was not deficient. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying petitioner's claim of juror misconduct where he failed to exhaust, and thus has procedurally defaulted, his only argument for overcoming the original procedural default. Finally, for similar reasons, the court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing. View "Ledford v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaint of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment against defendant, a police officer. In order to succeed on plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff must prove (1) that defendant violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizures pursuant to legal process and (2) that the criminal proceedings against plaintiff terminated in his favor.The court agreed with defendant that the district court correctly incorporated the dismissal order into plaintiff's complaint, but the court disagreed with defendant's argument that plaintiff did not receive a favorable termination. Even though the court considered the dismissal order, the court must construe the order in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all reasonable inferences in his favor. When placed in that light, the court concluded that the order does not eliminate every reasonable inference that plaintiff received a favorable termination. In this case, the court can reasonably infer that plaintiff did not admit to felony murder during the hearing. View "Luke v. Gulley" on Justia Law

Hepatitis C (HCV) is a bloodborne virus. Only about 1% of the general population suffers from HCV; its prevalence among prison inmates is much higher. HCV primarily attacks the liver, causing scarring, or “fibrosis,” which is measured from F0 (no fibrosis) to F4 (cirrhosis). Many people “spontaneously clear” HCV without treatment. HCV patients were previously prescribed weekly injections of Interferon, which caused unpleasant side effects, and succeeded in eradicating HCV only about 30% of the time. In 2013, a new HCV treatment became available—direct-acting antiviral (DAA) pills, with few side effects and a 95% cure rate. DAAs are very expensive.Chronic-HCV inmates incarcerated in Florida prisons filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious medical needs. Florida then hired Dr. Dewsnup, who had developed and implemented an HCV-treatment plan for the Oregon prison system. Florida adopted Dewsnup's proposal of providing DAAs for all inmates at level F2 and above and monitoring F0- and F1-level inmates and treating them with DAAs under certain circumstances. Ultimately, the court ordered DAA treatment of all F0s and F1s within two years of their initial staging. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The state’s plan to monitor all HCV-positive inmates, including those who have not exhibited serious symptoms, and provide DAAs to anyone with an exacerbating condition, showing signs of rapid progression, or developing even moderate fibrosis, satisfies constitutional requirements. View "Hoffer v. Secretary, Florida Department Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the government's unopposed motion to amend the decision, vacated the previous opinion, and issued this opinion with the government's requested amendment.After determining that it has jurisdiction to consider the petition for review, the court held that the BIA erred by retroactively applying the stop-time rule to petitioner's pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) conviction. The court held that neither IIRIRA section 309(a) nor 309(c)(5) mandates retroactivity, and that the BIA's interpretation of the stop-time rule does not warrant Chevron deference. In this case, by pleading guilty, petitioner gave up constitutionally protected rights with the reasonable expectation that his resulting sentence would not affect his ability to remain present in this country. The court explained that applying the stop-time rule retroactively would add a new and unforeseen consequence to his guilty plea by rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court reversed the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rendon v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendants, three foreign nationals in a foreign vessel in the territorial waters of Jamaica, were arrested by the United States Coast Guard with the consent of the foreign country and prosecuted in the United States for drug-trafficking crimes under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Defendants pleaded guilty and preserved their right to appeal the denial of their motion to suppress.The Eleventh Circuit vacated defendant's convictions, holding that the MDLEA is unconstitutional and exceeded Congress's authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause. The court also held that, as applied to defendants, the MDLEA was not a valid exercise of Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to effectuate the subsequently enacted 1989 Convention Against Illicit Traffic Treaty and the 1997 Jamaica Bilateral Agreement between the United States and Jamaica. View "United States v. Davila-Mendoza" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The gun fell from defendant's waistband as he complied with a police order to get on the ground and crawl out of a room during the execution of fugitive task force arrest warrants.The court held that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering the hotel room to execute the arrest warrants, because they reasonably believed that the hotel room was the dwelling of two gang members. Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent, Summers v. Michigan, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981), foreclosed defendant's argument that requiring him, an innocent bystander who was not sought by police, to crawl out of the hotel room was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. Rather, requiring defendant to lower himself to the ground allowed officers to peer over him and look for any emerging threats from the room. Finally, the court held that the district court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him where the questions he wished to ask would not have been probative of any bias or lack of truthfulness; they would have confused the issues; and the district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion by restricting cross-examination on these topics. View "United States v. Mastin" on Justia Law