Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Xavier Rashad Brooks, a felon, pled guilty to possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 100 months in prison by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Brooks appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining his base offense level, applying a two-level enhancement for possessing a stolen firearm, and applying a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense.The district court determined Brooks's base offense level was 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1) due to his prior convictions for armed robbery and robbery. Brooks argued that his 2008 robbery conviction was not a "crime of violence." The court found that the statute under which Brooks was convicted was divisible and that Shepard documents showed he was convicted of robbery by force, which qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).The district court also applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) because Brooks possessed a stolen Smith & Wesson pistol in January 2021. Brooks contended that this possession was not relevant to his October 2020 conviction for possessing a Glock. The court found that the possession of the stolen Smith & Wesson was part of the same course of conduct as the possession of the Glock, thus qualifying as relevant conduct.Finally, the district court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, specifically theft by receiving stolen property. Brooks argued that the firearm did not facilitate the theft offense. The court held that the firearm, being the fruit of the theft, had the potential to facilitate the offense, thus justifying the enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on all counts, upholding Brooks's 100-month sentence. View "USA v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Frederick Bush was convicted of escaping from the Keeton Residential Reentry Center in Tallahassee, Florida, before completing his required stay. The government indicted him on a single count of knowingly escaping from custody by willfully failing to remain within the extended limits of his confinement, citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 751(a) and 4082(a). Bush argued that he left the center because an employee threatened him and that he did not know his actions were illegal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida handled the initial trial. Bush represented himself after a Faretta hearing, with Joseph Debelder as standby counsel. Throughout the trial, Bush contended that the government needed to prove he knew his actions were illegal. The district court, however, instructed the jury that the government only needed to prove Bush knew he was not allowed to leave the facility without permission and that he intentionally left. The jury found Bush guilty, and the district court denied his motion for a new trial, sentencing him to 37 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court's jury instructions were erroneous because they did not include the requirement that Bush acted "willfully," as mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a). The appellate court held that the district court's instruction allowed the jury to convict Bush without proving he knew his actions were unlawful, which was a plain error likely responsible for an incorrect verdict. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit vacated Bush's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "United States v. Bush" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. (CME) and CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A. (FMO). CME sought to confirm a New York Convention arbitration award of $187.9 million against FMO. FMO opposed the confirmation, alleging that CME procured the underlying contract through fraud, bribery, and corruption, arguing that enforcing the award would violate U.S. public policy. The district court confirmed the award, ruling that FMO was barred from challenging the confirmation on public policy grounds because it failed to seek vacatur within the three-month time limit prescribed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. CME moved to confirm the arbitration award in December 2019. FMO opposed the confirmation nearly two years later, citing public policy concerns. The district court granted CME’s motion, explaining that FMO was barred from opposing confirmation on public policy grounds due to its failure to seek vacatur within the FAA’s three-month time limit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, based on its recent en banc decision in Corporación AIC, SA v. Hidroélectrica Santa Rita S.A., FMO should have been allowed to assert its public policy defense in opposition to confirmation. The court clarified that the grounds for vacating a New York Convention arbitration award are those set forth in U.S. domestic law, specifically Chapter 1 of the FAA, which does not recognize public policy as a ground for vacatur. However, the court affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award, concluding that FMO’s public policy defense failed on the merits because it attacked the underlying contract, not the award itself. View "Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco C.A." on Justia Law

Three years after becoming a U.S. citizen, Melchor Munoz pleaded guilty to a drug-conspiracy offense, admitting under oath that he began trafficking marijuana in 2008. The government sought to denaturalize Munoz under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), alleging that his prior participation in the drug conspiracy made him ineligible for citizenship. The government moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Munoz was collaterally and judicially estopped from denying his 2008 involvement. The district court granted the motion and entered a judgment denaturalizing Munoz.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida accepted Munoz’s guilty plea, where he admitted to drug trafficking starting in 2008. Munoz later moved to vacate his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, but the motion was denied. The government then filed the denaturalization action, and the district court granted the government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, applying both collateral and judicial estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that collateral estoppel was unavailable because the starting date of Munoz’s drug offense was unnecessary to his prior conviction. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in applying judicial estoppel, as the findings lacked evidentiary support. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing Munoz to litigate the issue of when he began participating in the drug conspiracy. View "USA v. Munoz" on Justia Law

Jo Ann Macrina, the former Commissioner of the Department of Watershed Management for the City of Atlanta, was charged with taking bribes from a contractor, Lohrasb “Jeff” Jafari. Macrina made several decisions that favored Jafari’s company in the bidding process for a city contract. After the contract was awarded, Macrina received $10,000 in cash, a diamond ring, and other perks from Jafari. She also went to work for Jafari’s company shortly after leaving her city position. Macrina later contacted the FBI to report possible corruption, but during interviews, she admitted to receiving gifts from Jafari, which she later retracted.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia admitted portions of a recorded conversation between Macrina and federal agents, as well as the City of Atlanta’s Code of Ethics, over Macrina’s objections. The court also declined to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction that any payments received after an official act were a gratuity and not a bribe. The jury convicted Macrina of bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery, and she was sentenced to 54 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recorded conversation and the Code of Ethics, as both were relevant to proving Macrina’s corrupt intent. The court also found that the district court’s refusal to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction was not an abuse of discretion, as the instruction misstated the law by failing to acknowledge that a payment received after an official act can still be considered a bribe if there was an agreement to accept the payment before the act was completed. View "USA v. Macrina" on Justia Law

The case involves Johnnie Davis, who was convicted of committing multiple carjackings in Montgomery, Alabama. Before his trial, Davis sought to suppress evidence obtained through a geofence warrant that tracked his girlfriend’s phone and his inculpatory statements made after his arrest. He also argued that the government failed to prove his intent to cause death or serious harm during the carjackings. The district court denied his motions.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama initially reviewed the case. Davis moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the geofence warrant and his post-arrest statements, arguing that the warrant was invalid and that he should have been presented to a federal magistrate judge before being interviewed. The district court found that Davis lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the geofence warrant and that the federal presentment requirements did not apply as he was in state custody. The court also found sufficient evidence of Davis’s intent to cause death or serious harm and denied his motion for judgment of acquittal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Davis lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the geofence warrant because the search did not disclose any information about his own electronic device and only reflected his limited movements in public areas. The court also agreed with the district court that the federal presentment requirements did not apply since Davis was in state custody and there was no improper collusion between federal and state law enforcement. Finally, the court found that Davis’s use of a gun during the carjackings sufficiently established his intent to cause death or serious harm. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. View "USA v. Davis" on Justia Law

In the early morning of August 26, 2021, an Uber driver named J.T. picked up Terius Thomas in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Upon reaching the drop-off location, Thomas threatened J.T. with a firearm and demanded his wallet. A struggle ensued, and Thomas exited the vehicle without obtaining the wallet. As J.T. drove away, he heard two gunshots, and responding officers later found shell casings and a bullet hole in J.T.'s car. Thomas was indicted on charges of attempted Hobbs Act Robbery and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. He pled guilty to the robbery charge, and the firearm charge was dismissed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida calculated Thomas's guidelines range based on a total offense level of 24 and a criminal history category (CHC) of III, resulting in a range of 63 to 78 months' imprisonment. The court noted Thomas's extensive criminal history, including juvenile offenses and pending burglary charges, and granted the government's motion for an upward variance, sentencing Thomas to 120 months' imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Thomas did not object to the CHC calculation at sentencing but later appealed, arguing that the miscalculation affected his substantial rights and that his sentence was unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that although the district court erred in calculating Thomas's CHC, the error did not affect his substantial rights. The appellate court noted that the district court's extensive comments indicated that the sentence would have been the same regardless of the guidelines range. The court also found that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable, given Thomas's criminal history and the severity of the offense. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Peters Young was convicted of conspiring to pay and receive kickbacks from federal reimbursements for medical creams and lotions dispensed by pharmacies she worked with. The district court sentenced her to 57 months in prison and ordered her to pay $1.5 million in restitution and forfeiture, representing the gross proceeds she controlled during the conspiracy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. Young challenged her conviction, restitution order, and forfeiture judgment, arguing insufficient evidence for her conspiracy conviction, improper calculation of restitution, and errors in the forfeiture amount. The district court denied her motion to set aside the verdict and sentenced her, including the contested financial penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Young’s conspiracy conviction, finding sufficient evidence that she conspired with others, including a pharmacy, to receive kickbacks. The court also upheld the forfeiture judgment, ruling that Young was liable for the gross proceeds she controlled, even if she distributed some to co-conspirators. However, the court vacated the restitution order, agreeing with Young that the government did not prove the amount of loss it experienced due to her conduct. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the correct restitution amount. View "USA v. Young" on Justia Law

Bryan Jennings was convicted of the murder and sexual battery of six-year-old Rebecca Kunash in 1979. He was found guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, and sentenced to death. Jennings's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court, and his initial state postconviction relief efforts were unsuccessful. He filed his first federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 2002, which was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal.Jennings later filed additional postconviction motions in state court, including claims under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States, alleging prosecutorial misconduct based on new evidence, such as an affidavit from a cellmate who testified against him. The state trial court held an evidentiary hearing but did not find the new evidence credible and denied relief. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed this decision.In 2018, Jennings filed a second federal habeas corpus petition, including the Brady and Giglio claims. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling it was a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), and denied Jennings's motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that Jennings's second-in-time § 2254 petition was indeed a second or successive petition subject to § 2244(b)’s restrictions, as established in Tompkins v. Secretary, Department of Corrections. The court concluded that Jennings's Brady and Giglio claims were ripe at the time of his first petition and thus did not fall under the exception outlined in Panetti v. Quarterman. Consequently, the district court correctly dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Jennings v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Police officers responded to a 911 call about a suspicious individual in a residential neighborhood. Officer Sanchez encountered Victor Grandia Gonzalez, who matched the description given by the complainant. Gonzalez was walking in the street, wearing dark clothing, and carrying a backpack. He appeared nervous and sweaty. Officer Exantus, after speaking with the complainant, learned that Gonzalez had been seen looking into mailboxes and concealing himself between cars. Upon arrival, Exantus patted down Gonzalez and found scissors. Gonzalez admitted to living out of his car and showed a photo of his ID listing a home county 30 minutes away. Based on these observations and the complainant’s report, Gonzalez was arrested for loitering and prowling. A search of his backpack revealed stolen mail.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Gonzalez’s motion to suppress the mail evidence and statements, finding that the officers had probable cause for the arrest. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to one count of possessing stolen mail but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. He was sentenced to time served and two years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require a misdemeanor to occur in an officer’s presence for a warrantless arrest. The court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Gonzalez for loitering and prowling under the totality of the circumstances, including the complainant’s report and the officers’ observations. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law