Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Kendrick Eugene Duldulao and Medardo Queg Santos for the roles they played in a Florida “pill mill,” the Supreme Court vacated the court’s judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Ruan v. United States.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Duldulao’s conviction on count one of the second superseding indictment; affirmed Santos’s conviction on count one, vacated Santos’s convictions on counts seven, eight, and nine, vacated Santos’s sentence, remanded for resentencing, and remanded for a new trial on counts seven, eight, and nine. The court explained that in the context of sentencing errors, the Supreme Court has explained that “the risk of unnecessary deprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” when the court is responsible for the error. The court explained it has repeatedly upheld jury instructions that misstated the mens rea requirement under Section 841. A jury then convicted Santos based in part on that misstatement. Santos received a prison sentence on these counts, and “the possibility of additional jail time . . . warrants serious consideration in a determination whether to exercise discretion under Rule 52(b).” Further, the court explained that the jury was reasonably able to find that the government had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Duldulao violated Section 841 on that occasion but had nevertheless knowingly joined a conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances in the abstract and on other occasions. View "USA v. Kendrick Eugene Duldulao, et al." on Justia Law

In late 2018 a grand jury in Mobile, Alabama, charged Defendant with possessing a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(j). The district court allowed him to be released on bond pending trial. Defendant then faked his own kidnapping. After trial, but before sentencing, the government filed a notice informing Defendant that it was going to seek a ten-year consecutive sentence pursuant to Section 3147. The district court ruled that there was no Apprendi problem because the jury found Defendant guilty of receiving a firearm while under indictment in violation of Section 922(n), and sentenced him to a prison term of 300 months. Defendant appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that a sentence imposed pursuant to Section 3147 can exceed the maximum term prescribed for the underlying offense(s) of conviction. But in such a circumstance, the issue of whether the person committed a felony offense while on pretrial release must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), and its progeny. The court explained that the Apprendi error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant did not dispute at any point that he was on pretrial release at the time of the Section 922(n) offense, and his counsel recognized that this fact was undisputed at oral argument. The court explained that no reasonable jury could have convicted Defendant of the Section 922(n) offense without also finding that he committed this crime while on pretrial release. View "USA v. Marco Antonio Perez" on Justia Law

While losing in a high-stakes poker game, Defendant allegedly used his cell phone to arrange an armed robbery to reclaim his losses. Because a cell phone was directly tied to the crime, no one disputes that there was probable cause to search that device. But the police went one step further. They secured a warrant to search an iCloud account that backed up the phone twelve hours before the poker game and robbery. The iCloud warrant permitted a search of almost all the account’s data with no time limitation. Based on evidence secured by that warrant, the government prosecuted, and a jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Given the warrant’s breadth and the account’s indirect link to the crime, Defendant argued that the district court should have suppressed the iCloud evidence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that although Fourth Amendment standards are largely settled, their application to developing areas of technology is not. Like judges, law enforcement officers operating in good faith may struggle to apply existing standards to new circumstances. That is where the exclusionary rule’s good faith exception comes in. The court explained that the government concedes that the iCloud warrant fell short in certain respects, but it argues that reasonable officers could have believed it to be valid. The court wrote that it agreed that the warrant was not so deficient in probable cause, particularity, or otherwise that it would be unreasonable for an officer to rely on it in good faith. View "USA v. Kevin McCall" on Justia Law

Defendant filed liens against property owned by a slew of people he thought had wronged him—including, as relevant here, a former Commissioner of the IRS and a former Secretary of the Treasury. Defendant was thereafter charged with and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 1521, which criminalizes the filing of retaliatory liens against the property of “an individual described in” Section 1114, which, in turn, refers to “any officer or employee of the United States. At issue on appeal is whether a former civil servant counts as an “officer or employee of the United States” within the meaning of Section 1114 and, thus, of Section 1521.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s convictions on four counts and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury and Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. establish that words like “officer” and “employee” can sometimes include formers—but only when the statutory context makes clear that they should. Neither suffices to show that the ordinary meaning of those terms includes ex-officers or erstwhile employees. Here, given the absence of textual indicia supporting a broader reading of the terms, the court declined to adopt the government’s strained interpretation. The court wrote that because Defendant filed the liens at issue when the relevant parties were no longer government “officer[s] or employee[s]” within the meaning of Section 1114, his conduct wasn’t covered by 18 U.S.C. Section 1521. View "USA v. Timothy Jermaine Pate" on Justia Law

After entering a conditional guilty plea, Defendant appealed his convictions on four counts related to child pornography. At the start of the COVID-19 global pandemic, Defendant was arrested on a criminal complaint on March 10, 2020. Thereafter, the district court entered a series of pandemic-related administrative orders that continued grand jury sessions five times at the ends of justice, spanning March 26, 2020, to November 16, 2020. Due to the pandemic, a grand jury did not formally indict Defendant until December 1, 2020. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment for failure to indict him within thirty days from his arrest, as required by the Speedy Trial Act. Defendant does not challenge the time between indictment and his guilty plea, but only between his arrest on March 10 and grand jury indictment on December 1, 2020.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The court concluded that the pandemic-related continuances in 2020 were not an abuse of discretion and were within the ends-of-justice exception to the Speedy Trial Act. The court explained that the magistrate judge was not required to expressly consider each statutory factor in its order or recite specific language from the statute. The court explained that not every statutory factor will be relevant to the circumstances warranting the continuance. Instead, it is sufficient if the record shows, as it does here, that the magistrate judge considered the pertinent factors. View "USA v. Robert Dunn" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 20 years of imprisonment following the revocation of his probation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3565. Defendant argued that, where the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 12 to 18 months of imprisonment, his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. One of his arguments is that the district court failed to give a specific reason for imposing an upward variance to the statutory maximum.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The court wrote that upon finding that a defendant violated a condition of probation, a district court may revoke the term of probation and impose a term of imprisonment as long as the court considers the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), such as the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the “seriousness of the offense” and “afford adequate deterrence,” among others. The court noted that a district court commits a “significant procedural error” in imposing a sentence if it calculates the guidelines incorrectly, fails to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or, of particular relevance here, “fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” The court explained that the record reflects that the district court did not give any reason for why it was imposing an above-guideline sentence. The court explained that the district court’s statements at the conclusion of the revocation proceeding were not sufficiently specific to allow the court to understand why the district court imposed an above-guideline sentence. View "USA v. Henry Martin Steiger" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that Petitioner is removable as an aggravated felon and denied his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner petitions for review, arguing that his Massachusetts conviction for armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G) and therefore is not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition in part and granted in part. The court rejected Petitioner’s argument that armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G). However, the court agreed with the parties that a remand to the BIA is nevertheless required. The Attorney General has issued an intervening decision that might impact Petitioner’s request for withholding of removal, and the BIA should have the opportunity to consider the effect of that decision. The court wrote that Petitioner was sentenced to less than five years in prison. His aggravated felony conviction, therefore, does not per se constitute a particularly serious crime with respect to withholding of removal. View "Mucktaru Kemokai v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

TASER International, Inc., obtained an injunction against “Phazzer [Electronics] and its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with Phazzer Electronics or its officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys” (the “2017 injunction”). The injunction prohibited Phazzer Electronics from distributing or causing to be distributed certain stun guns and accompanying cartridges that infringed on TASER’s intellectual property. At the time of the TASER-Phazzer Electronics litigation, Steven Abboud controlled Phazzer Electronics, and Phazzer Electronics employed, among others, Defendant. In 2018, after the district court found Abboud in contempt for violating the 2017 injunction, Abboud and Defendant went to work for other entities with “Phazzer” in their names. Based on that activity, the district court found Defendant (and others) in contempt of the 2017 injunction. At issue on appeal is whether the 2017 injunction extended broadly enough to bind Defendant and prohibit her conduct under the theories of liability that the government has pressed and the district court decided   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court concluded that the record cannot sustain Defendant’s conviction.  The court explained that the district court did not make factual findings about whether Defendant was a key employee. Nor did it determine whether she so controlled Phazzer Electronics and the litigation that resulted in the 2017 injunction that it would be fair to say she had her day in court on that injunction. View "USA v. Diana Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2002, the grand jury indicted Petitioner for (1) armed bank robbery, (2) knowingly carrying, using, possessing, and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and (3) possessing a firearm as a felon. The government then filed a notice that Petitioner qualified for the enhanced sentence under section 3559. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner then filed in the district court a second section 2255 motion. The issue here is whether the Supreme Court has announced a “new rule of constitutional law” that applies to the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. section 3559.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for Petitioner’s motion to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted that its decision is narrow, and it has not decided whether the three-strikes law’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The court wrote that it has not decided whether the three-strikes law’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Further, the court explained that it has not decided whether Petitioner met his burden under Beeman. Instead, the court’s review was limited to the threshold question of whether Petitioner has met the jurisdictional requirements of section 2255(h)(2).   The court reasoned that the district court had jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's second section 2255 motion only if he could establish that a new constitutional rule supported his claim. But no decision from the Supreme Court has announced the new rule that Petitioner needs. The district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to decide whether Petitioner’s motion had any merit. View "Charles Edward Jones v. USA" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of various drug crimes. Now on appeal, Defendant attacked his indictment, claiming that the grand jury’s probable cause determination was rendered defective by the district court’s special procedures related to the Covid-19 pandemic. Under these procedures, grand jurors met in three separate federal courthouses but were joined together by videoconferencing. Defendant also argued that the wiretaps used to gather evidence against him did not meet the statutory necessity requirement.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the COVID-19 accommodations that Defendant criticized introduced no fundamental error into his prosecution. The court wrote that Defendant does not claim that they affected the grand jury’s decision in any way. As for the statutory necessity claim, the district court did not clearly err in deciding that the wiretaps were necessary. The court further explained that a review of the wiretap affidavits themselves shows that they provided more than enough explanation to comply with the law. After describing the investigation’s history and goals, the affidavits comprehensively outlined the “Need for Interception” and discussed “Alternative Investigative Techniques.” They exhaustively detailed why previous sources of information and reasonable alternative methods—including physical surveillance, cameras, interviews, undercover agents, subpoenas, search warrants, trash searches, and more—would not suffice. The court found that such thorough and specific affidavits easily satisfy the legal requirements. View "USA v. James Lamount Graham" on Justia Law