Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for two counts of using a deadly weapon to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with a federal officer. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give defendant's requested "forcibly" jury instruction, use of a deadly weapon instruction, and lesser included offense instruction. The court also held that the district court's response to the jury's question -- regarding whether a car is still a deadly weapon if you do not intend to use it that way -- correctly stated the principle of law. Finally, the court held that evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction and there was no error in the district court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on count two of the indictment. View "United States v. Gumbs" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence and held that USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knew, intended, or had reason to believe (rather than hoped, wished, or dreamed) the gun was going to be used to buy drugs, and the sale would have (rather than may or might have) happened but for the defendant's arrest or something else getting in the way. In this case, the district court found that defendant intended that his stolen shotgun would be bartered for a pound of dope. Therefore, the court held that the district court's finding was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 as untimely. The court held that its decisions in Hall v. Secy, Dep't of Corr., 921 F.3d 983, 988–90 (11th Cir. 2019); Green v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 877 F.3d 1244, 1247–49 (11th Cir. 2017), issued after the district court dismissed the petition, foreclosed the government's arguments.Hall and Green held that the one-year limitations period tolled the day a petitioner filed a procedurally noncompliant Rule 3.850 motion if he was permitted to and did later file a compliant motion. Therefore, a compliant Rule 3.850 motion relates back to the date of filing of a noncompliant motion, such that the compliant motion was "properly filed" and "pending" as of that date for purposes of tolling the limitations period in section 2244 of Title 28. In this case, because the limitations period tolled on the date of petitioner's initial motion, the court held that he timely filed his petition in federal court. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Bates v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Approximately 25 years after his guilty plea to resisting a police officer with violence, an IJ found petitioner removable and ruled he was no longer eligible for cancellation of removal on account of the stop-time rule.The Eleventh Circuit held that it was error to retroactively apply the stop-time rule to petitioner's pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) conviction. The court found no clear congressional statement that the stop-time rule should be applied retroactively to pre-IIRIRA plea agreements like petitioner's and held that in the circumstances presented here—specifically, where petitioner's pre-IIRIRA plea agreement did not render him immediately deportable—applying the stop-time rule to his 1995 conviction would have an impermissibly retroactive effect. Therefore, the court reversed the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rendon v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for healthcare fraud and conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud. The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions, and that the indictment was plainly sufficient. The court rejected defendant's two evidentiary claims, holding that the district court did not err in permitting an FBI forensic accountant to testify as a lay witness or in allowing a government witness to testify as an expert. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motions for continuance; there was no cumulative error requiring reversal; and the district court did not clearly err in calculating the loss amount and thus the guidelines range. View "United States v. Chalker" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and denial of habeas relief to petitioner. Petitioner was convicted of capital murder for leaving an elderly woman in the hot trunk of a car, where she eventually suffered a heart attack and died, after robbing her.The court held that the state court's determination that petitioner's counsel was not encumbered by an actual conflict that adversely affected his performance was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also held that the petition failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his capital trial where his lawyers failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence, because petitioner failed to establish prejudice. View "Dallas v. Warden" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for multiple counts of mail fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering, as well as conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud and conspiracy to obstruct justice. This case comes before the court a second time, because defendant claims that the district court did not remedy the original errors found in his sentence. After review, the court held that the district court addressed and entirely solved the issues raised by the previous panel.The court declined to address defendant's challenges to his conviction based on the mandate rule and the law of the case doctrine. The court affirmed the district court's calculation of loss, holding that the district court reasonably relied on evidence and analysis provided by a qualified expert who had earlier served as the acting division director and chief economist of the SEC's Division of Economic and Risk Analysis. The court held that defendant's remaining due process and forfeiture claims fall outside the scope of the limited remand in this case. Finally, the court rejected defendant's challenges to the district court's forfeiture order. View "United States v. Stein" on Justia Law

Defendants Ruan and Couch, pain management physicians, appealed their convictions for charges related to their involvement in a health care fraud scheme. Defendants were convicted of conspiring to run a medical practice constituting a racketeering enterprise in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; conspiring to violate the Controlled Substances Act by dispensing Schedule II drugs, fentanyl, and Schedule III drugs outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose; conspiracies to commit health care fraud and mail or wire fraud; and conspiracies to receive kickbacks in relation to a Federal health care program. Ruan and Couch were individually convicted of multiple counts of substantive drug distribution in violation of the Controlled Substances Act and Ruan was convicted of a money laundering conspiracy and two counts of substantive money laundering.The court vacated defendants' convictions on Count 16 of the Superseding Indictment for conspiring to violate the Anti-Kickback statute based on their operation of their medical clinic’s in-house workers' compensation dispensary. In this case, the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that an insurance provider paid for prescriptions with federal funds or that federal monies otherwise passed through the clinic's workers' compensation dispensary. The court remanded for resentencing and affirmed defendants' remaining convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Xiulu Ruan" on Justia Law

In United States v. Ross, No. 18-11679, 2020 WL 3445818 (11th Cir. June 24, 2020) (en banc), the full court unanimously overruled United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015), and held that a suspect's alleged abandonment of his privacy or possessory interest in the object of a search or seizure implicates only the merits of his Fourth Amendment challenge—not his Article III standing—and, accordingly, that if the government fails to argue abandonment, it waives the issue.The Eleventh Circuit applied the en banc court's holding here and held that the government waived its abandonment argument by failing to raise it in the district court. Therefore, the court assumed for purposes of its decision that defendant has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the entry and sweep, which resulted in the seizure of the gun. The court also held that defendant's challenge to the initial entry and sweep failed on the merits. In this case, the officers had reason to believe that defendant was in the motel room, and they had authority to execute their arrests warrants, to conduct a protective sweep, and to seize the gun found in plain view. Finally, the court held that defendant has no Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the ensuing search of the room, during which officers discovered the drug-related evidence. Accordingly, the court reaffirmed the balance of its earlier decision. View "United States v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied petitioner's application to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3). The court held that petitioner failed to make, and cannot make, a prima facie showing that his Davis claim would succeed. In this case, the court must presume that when the jury found petitioner guilty of the 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) convictions, it followed the district court's instructions and predicated those findings on the two bank robbery charges and the jury necessarily found that petitioner committed the two robberies. Furthermore, bank robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)'s elements clause.The court also held that petitioner's Rehaif claim failed to meet the statutory criteria for a second or successive application, because Rehaif did not announce a new rule of constitutional law and, even if it did, it has not been made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. View "In re: Michael Price" on Justia Law