Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court held that probable cause supported defendant's arrest because the informant's information was veritable, reliable, and corroborated. The court also held that the district court did not err by refusing to apply a two-level sentence reduction for truthful disclosure under USSG 2D1.1(b)(17), because defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proving his truthful disclosure. View "United States v. Mancilla-Ibarra" on Justia Law

On petition for rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and reconsidered its original opinion, substituting the following opinion.The court affirmed the district court's grant of GDC's motion to quash plaintiffs' subpoena directing GDC to testify at a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and to produce documents concerning Georgia's lethal injection protocol. Plaintiffs argued that the information was necessary to support their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims pending in the Southern District of Mississippi challenging the legality of Mississippi's lethal injection protocol.The court held that the district court applied the correct standard of review, the clearly erroneous or contrary-to-law standard, to the magistrate judge's ruling on the motion to quash. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by affirming the magistrate judge's ruling to grant GDC's motion to quash where the relevance of the information sought in the GDC subpoena to the pending section 1983 litigation was highly questionable; the subpoena subjected GDC to an undue burden which mandated the quashing of the subpoena under Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iv); and compliance with plaintiffs' subpoena would impose an undue burden on the State of Georgia. View "Jordan v. Georgia Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for procuring naturalization unlawfully, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1425(a), and misuse of evidence of an unlawfully issued certificate of naturalization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1423.The court held that the annotated Form N-400 was (1) admissible non-hearsay as an adopted admission of a party-opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, and, (2) alternatively, was properly admitted under the public record hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803. Furthermore, the officer's red marks in the annotated Form N-400 Application was not testimonial and did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting defendant's post-Miranda statement, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction as to Count 1. View "United States v. Santos" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a juror after the juror stated that the Holy Spirit had "told" him to return a certain verdict irrespective of what the evidence showed. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to question Juror 13.The court held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that Juror 13 was not capable of returning a verdict based on the evidence adduced at trial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Juror 13 after finding that he was not capable of reaching a verdict based on the evidence.The court also held that Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to the court's inquiry into Juror 13's statement. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment by excusing Juror 13. Finally, the court held that the district court did not plainly err in issuing the forfeiture order. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit published this opinion in place of its previous opinion, which was vacated by order of the court.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief, holding that a district court may, on its own initiative and without hearing from the State, decide that the statute of limitations bars the petition. In this case, petitioner was provided ample notice and opportunity to explain why his petition was timely in his form petition and again when he was given the opportunity to respond to the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation that his petition be summarily dismissed as untimely. Furthermore, the Secretary was notified of the court's action, had an opportunity to respond, and remained silent. No one contests that the petition was untimely and the State has never indicated a desire to waive the limitations bar. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition. View "Paez v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. The court held that defendant's prior Georgia conviction for making terroristic threats under O.C.G.A. 16-11-37(a) (2010), is not a predicate violent felony under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The court held that because section 16-11-37(a) is indivisible and overbroad under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016), a violation of that statute categorically does not constitute a predicate offense under the elements clause. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's revocation of defendant's supervised release after defendant was arrested while on supervised release for unlawful possession of marijuana in the first degree, certain persons forbidden to possess a firearm, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At issue was whether the evidence seized during defendant's arrest should have been suppressed during his revocation of supervised release proceedings.The court held that neither this court nor the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule applies in that context. Furthermore, defendant failed to offer anything to indicate why, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in the state parole revocation context, the exclusionary rule should apply to the supervised release revocation proceedings at issue here. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that petitioner, a convicted drug trafficker who has illegally entered into the United States three times, was not entitled to an emergency stay of removal. The court denied his motion to stay removal and held that, although petitioner presented evidence that he faced a risk of grave harm if he was removed to Jamaica, more was required to prevail on his motion. In this case, petitioner failed to establish a strong showing that he was likely to succeed in proving that the BIA erred when it concluded that he was not entitled to file an untimely motion to reopen. The court granted petitioner's motions to seal his records before this court and will carry his motions for judicial notice with the case. View "Blake v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing body armor as a violent felon, and distributing methamphetamine. The court held that the district court plainly erred by applying a two-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 3B1.5 for "use" of body armor in the commission of a drug trafficking offense. The court explained that, although the presentencing report asserted that defendant's sale of body armor amounted to use as a means of bartering, selling is an activity that under both common usage and dictionary definition falls outside of bartering. Rather, "barter" means to trade goods or services without using money. View "United States v. Bankston" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment charging him with failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The court held that defendant's prior conviction for sexual battery under Tennessee law qualified as a sex offense under SORNA.The court held that the case law cited by defendant did not support his argument that Tennessee has expanded its definition of sexual contact to include contact with the back or abdomen; the term sexual contact as defined in Tennessee's sexual battery statute categorically matches the plain meaning of sexual contact as used in SORNA; and, although it was clear that the definition of sexual contact used in 18 U.S.C. 2246(3) was inapplicable here, it was equally clear that Tennessee's statutory definition of sexual contact categorically matches section 2246(3) as well. View "United States v. Vineyard" on Justia Law