Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that Petitioner is removable as an aggravated felon and denied his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner petitions for review, arguing that his Massachusetts conviction for armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G) and therefore is not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition in part and granted in part. The court rejected Petitioner’s argument that armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G). However, the court agreed with the parties that a remand to the BIA is nevertheless required. The Attorney General has issued an intervening decision that might impact Petitioner’s request for withholding of removal, and the BIA should have the opportunity to consider the effect of that decision. The court wrote that Petitioner was sentenced to less than five years in prison. His aggravated felony conviction, therefore, does not per se constitute a particularly serious crime with respect to withholding of removal. View "Mucktaru Kemokai v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

TASER International, Inc., obtained an injunction against “Phazzer [Electronics] and its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with Phazzer Electronics or its officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys” (the “2017 injunction”). The injunction prohibited Phazzer Electronics from distributing or causing to be distributed certain stun guns and accompanying cartridges that infringed on TASER’s intellectual property. At the time of the TASER-Phazzer Electronics litigation, Steven Abboud controlled Phazzer Electronics, and Phazzer Electronics employed, among others, Defendant. In 2018, after the district court found Abboud in contempt for violating the 2017 injunction, Abboud and Defendant went to work for other entities with “Phazzer” in their names. Based on that activity, the district court found Defendant (and others) in contempt of the 2017 injunction. At issue on appeal is whether the 2017 injunction extended broadly enough to bind Defendant and prohibit her conduct under the theories of liability that the government has pressed and the district court decided   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court concluded that the record cannot sustain Defendant’s conviction.  The court explained that the district court did not make factual findings about whether Defendant was a key employee. Nor did it determine whether she so controlled Phazzer Electronics and the litigation that resulted in the 2017 injunction that it would be fair to say she had her day in court on that injunction. View "USA v. Diana Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2002, the grand jury indicted Petitioner for (1) armed bank robbery, (2) knowingly carrying, using, possessing, and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and (3) possessing a firearm as a felon. The government then filed a notice that Petitioner qualified for the enhanced sentence under section 3559. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner then filed in the district court a second section 2255 motion. The issue here is whether the Supreme Court has announced a “new rule of constitutional law” that applies to the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. section 3559.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for Petitioner’s motion to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted that its decision is narrow, and it has not decided whether the three-strikes law’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The court wrote that it has not decided whether the three-strikes law’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Further, the court explained that it has not decided whether Petitioner met his burden under Beeman. Instead, the court’s review was limited to the threshold question of whether Petitioner has met the jurisdictional requirements of section 2255(h)(2).   The court reasoned that the district court had jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's second section 2255 motion only if he could establish that a new constitutional rule supported his claim. But no decision from the Supreme Court has announced the new rule that Petitioner needs. The district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to decide whether Petitioner’s motion had any merit. View "Charles Edward Jones v. USA" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of various drug crimes. Now on appeal, Defendant attacked his indictment, claiming that the grand jury’s probable cause determination was rendered defective by the district court’s special procedures related to the Covid-19 pandemic. Under these procedures, grand jurors met in three separate federal courthouses but were joined together by videoconferencing. Defendant also argued that the wiretaps used to gather evidence against him did not meet the statutory necessity requirement.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the COVID-19 accommodations that Defendant criticized introduced no fundamental error into his prosecution. The court wrote that Defendant does not claim that they affected the grand jury’s decision in any way. As for the statutory necessity claim, the district court did not clearly err in deciding that the wiretaps were necessary. The court further explained that a review of the wiretap affidavits themselves shows that they provided more than enough explanation to comply with the law. After describing the investigation’s history and goals, the affidavits comprehensively outlined the “Need for Interception” and discussed “Alternative Investigative Techniques.” They exhaustively detailed why previous sources of information and reasonable alternative methods—including physical surveillance, cameras, interviews, undercover agents, subpoenas, search warrants, trash searches, and more—would not suffice. The court found that such thorough and specific affidavits easily satisfy the legal requirements. View "USA v. James Lamount Graham" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in district court to one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The district court sentenced Defendant in 2016 to 100 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant completed his custodial sentence and began serving his three-year term of supervised release on May 10, 2018. Less than four months before his supervision was set to expire, his probation office filed a petition alleging that Defendant violated two conditions of his supervised release and asked the district court to issue a warrant for his arrest. The court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to serve an additional 18 months’ imprisonment “to be concurrent with any sentence already served or to be served” that a state court imposed. Defendant appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The court explained that it rejected the government’s position that a term of supervised release is tolled while an offender absconds from supervision. Accordingly, Defendant’s supervised release term expired as scheduled in May 2021. Because his 2022 battery and resulting conviction did not occur until after that date, the district court lacked the authority to revoke Defendant’s supervised release on that basis. But because the district court nonetheless maintained jurisdiction to revoke his supervision based on his earlier violation, the court remanded for the court to decide whether to revoke Defendant’s supervision based on that violation alone and to decide what sentence to impose for that violation. View "USA v. James Reginald Talley" on Justia Law

After Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, Petitioner sought state post-conviction relief. As relevant here, he asserted that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him about the risks of not following through with his plea agreement and by not doing enough to persuade him to testify against his co-defendant. The Alabama courts rejected this ineffectiveness claim, ruling in part that Petitioner could not show prejudice resulting from his attorneys’ conduct. The district court denied Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition, concluding that the decision of the Alabama courts was not an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Alabama courts’ factual finding that Petitioner would have refused to testify against a co-Defendant, no matter what more his attorneys did, stands. Based on that finding, their ultimate conclusion that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his attorneys’ allegedly deficient performance—which constitutes a ruling on a mixed question of law and fact—is not unreasonable under Section 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, the court concluded that the Alabama courts’ factual finding that Petitioner would not have changed his mind no matter what more his attorneys might have done is entitled to a presumption of correctness. And that presumption has not been overcome by clear and convincing evidence. View "Robert Shawn Ingram v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

In 2006, Petitioner pleaded guilty to murdering his grandmother and stepgrandfather. He was sentenced to death. After exhausting his direct appeals, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court agreed with Alabama and summarily dismissed Petitioner's petition. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal.Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C 2254, which was dismissed on abandonment grounds. As an alternate holding, the district court found that Petitioner's claims were too conclusory to get around AEDPA.The Eleventh Circuit granted a COA on three issues, ultimately rejecting each on the basis that his claim were insufficient to overcome AEPDA deference to state court decisions. View "Ellis Louis Mashburn, Jr. v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted and convicted of tampering with a witness. Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offense in three respects: (1) the alleged threat of physical force only related to a criminal investigation, not an “official proceeding”; (2) the evidence failed to establish that he intended to prevent his girlfriend from testifying in an official proceeding; and (3) the evidence failed to establish that he was the person who threatened his girlfriend.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it was not persuaded by any of Defendant’s arguments. The court wrote that Defendant’s girlfriend was preparing to testify as a witness in an upcoming grand jury proceedings and possible trial against her crack supplier. The evidence in the record can reasonably support the conclusion that Defendant threatened his girlfriend in relation to those upcoming proceedings and that Defendant possessed the requisite intent to obstruct an official proceeding. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Defendant was the caller who threatened his girlfriend. View "USA v. William Raymond Beach" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. He made three arguments on appeal: (1) the district court abused its discretion by striking a juror for cause because of her religious beliefs, (2) the district court plainly erred by allowing law enforcement officers to identify Defendant in surveillance footage, and (3) his convictions for using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence should be vacated because aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in Taylor, the Supreme Court held that the attempted Hobbs Act is not a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3)(A). The court explained that the Supreme Court distinguished between the completed offense and an attempt to complete that offense. To obtain a conviction for completed Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove “that the defendant engaged in the ‘unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force.’” By contrast, to obtain a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government need only show that the defendant intended to complete the offense and performed a “substantial step” toward that end. The court wrote Taylor did not disturb the court’s holding that completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting a completed Hobbs Act robbery also qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3)(A). View "USA v. Tyvonne Wiley" on Justia Law

Defendants Gladden and Linton were convicted of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and mail fraud, and the substantive offenses of health care fraud, mail fraud, and aggravated identity theft, for their roles in a multi-year scheme to defraud insurance companies. The government alleged Defendants received inflated reimbursement payments by billing for medically unnecessary and fraudulent prescriptions.The Eleventh Circuit found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict as to all of Linton’s convictions and as to Gladden’s convictions for conspiracy, health care fraud, and mail fraud. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court did not clearly err in calculating Gladden’s restitution and forfeiture amounts. The Court also vacated Galdden's conviction for aggravated identity theft and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "USA v. John Gladden, et al" on Justia Law