Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Marken Leger, a Haitian citizen who has lived in the United States as an asylee since 2000. In 2009, Leger pleaded no contest to a charge of lewd and lascivious battery, in violation of Florida Statute § 800.04(4). In 2013 and 2018, Leger pleaded no contest to two other offenses, both for the possession of marijuana, in violation of Florida Statute § 893.13(6)(b). The government initiated removal proceedings against him in 2019, alleging that his convictions made him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The immigration judge concluded that Leger was removable, finding that his marijuana possession convictions constituted controlled substance offenses under the INA and that his conviction under Florida Statute § 800.04(4) was an aggravated felony. Leger appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that Leger's marijuana possession convictions did not constitute controlled substance offenses as defined under federal law, and thus, the BIA erred in determining that Leger was subject to removal on these grounds. The court also held that Leger's conviction under Florida Statute § 800.04(4) did not constitute the sexual abuse of a minor and was not an aggravated felony under the INA. The court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Marken Leger v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Derrick Morley was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of cocaine. Morley was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently. He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, the trial evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the district court erred in providing a deliberate ignorance jury instruction, and the district court erred in denying him a safety valve sentence reduction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Morley's motion to suppress the cocaine that was taken from his vehicle without a warrant. The court found that there was probable cause to believe Morley’s car contained contraband or evidence of a crime and that apparent authority existed under the circumstances. Morley proceeded to a four-day jury trial and was found guilty as charged in the indictment. The district court denied Morley's motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Morley’s convictions and sentence. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the automobile exception applied, allowing for a warrantless search of Morley's car. The court also found that the trial evidence was sufficient to support Morley's convictions and that the district court did not err in providing a deliberate ignorance jury instruction. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Morley's request for a reduced sentence, finding that Morley was ineligible for the safety valve reduction in light of a recent Supreme Court decision. View "USA v. Morley" on Justia Law

B'Quan Ferguson was convicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The conviction followed an incident where local police officers in Savannah, Georgia, recognized Ferguson as the subject of an ongoing investigation. The officers found a pistol in Ferguson's vehicle, and a DNA test confirmed that Ferguson's DNA was present on the pistol. Ferguson was subsequently charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon.Previously, Ferguson had been convicted under Georgia law for threatening physical harm to a witness, which was considered a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). This prior conviction led to Ferguson being classified as an armed career criminal, which mandated a minimum sentence of 15 years. Ferguson objected to this classification, arguing that his Georgia conviction for threatening a witness did not qualify as a violent felony for ACCA enhancement purposes. The district court overruled Ferguson's objection and sentenced him to 180 months' imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Ferguson argued that his prior Georgia conviction did not qualify as a "violent felony" under ACCA. The court disagreed, concluding that the Georgia statute under which Ferguson was convicted was divisible and that a conviction for threatening physical harm under the statute qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Ferguson's sentence. View "USA v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Sanchez Hicks, a convicted felon, was indicted on two counts of firearm possession. He pleaded guilty to both counts. At sentencing, it was undisputed that Hicks had two prior Georgia convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The presentence investigation report recommended a base offense level of 24, citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which applies when the defendant committed his firearm offense after two felony convictions for a “crime of violence” as defined in § 4B1.2(a), which includes “aggravated assault.” Hicks objected, arguing that his Georgia convictions were not “crimes of violence.” The district court overruled Hicks’s objection, citing a previous Eleventh Circuit ruling that a Georgia conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as a crime of violence.The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court relied on its previous ruling in United States v. Morales-Alonso, which held that a Georgia conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The court rejected Hicks's argument that the Georgia offense requires a mens rea of only recklessness, whereas generic aggravated assault requires a mens rea of “extreme indifference to human life.” The court held that Morales-Alonso foreclosed Hicks’s claim, as it had already concluded that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is not categorically broader than generic aggravated assault. Therefore, the court affirmed Hicks's 96-month total sentence. View "USA v. Hicks" on Justia Law

The case involves Victor Hill, the former Sheriff of Clayton County, Georgia, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for using his position to deprive detainees in his custody of their constitutional rights. Hill ordered individual detainees, who were neither violent nor uncontrollable, into a restraint chair for at least four hours, with their hands cuffed behind their backs and without bathroom breaks. Each detainee suffered injuries, such as “open and bleeding” wounds, lasting scars, or nerve damage.Hill was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. He appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that he lacked fair warning that his conduct was unconstitutional, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the district court improperly handled allegations of juror misconduct.The Eleventh Circuit rejected Hill's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that case law provided Hill with fair warning that his actions violated constitutional rights. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Hill's conduct had no legitimate nonpunitive purpose, was willful, and caused the detainees’ injuries. Lastly, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in investigating and responding to alleged juror misconduct. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jeffrey Boone, was charged with using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing child pornography, distributing child pornography, and possessing child pornography. The minor in question was Boone's four-year-old daughter. Boone pleaded guilty to all three counts. The evidence against Boone included images and videos of his sexual abuse of his daughter, which he had shared via Kik Messenger. The FBI was alerted to Boone's activities by an online covert employee who had received the explicit images from Boone.Boone's case was heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The Presentence Investigation Report grouped Boone's three counts together and assigned a total offense level of 43, factoring in enhancements based on the victim's age and other offense characteristics. The report recommended a five-level increase due to Boone's pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct. Boone did not object to the report. The district court imposed an 840-month sentence, comprised of consecutive terms of 360 months on Count 1 and 240 months each on Counts 2 and 3, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.Boone appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. He argued that the district court erred at sentencing by applying a pattern-of-activity enhancement and considering his military service as an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor. The Court of Appeals affirmed Boone's sentence, finding no procedural or substantive error in the district court's decision. The court noted that Boone had invited the error he was alleging by expressly agreeing to the application of the pattern-of-activity enhancement. The court also found that the district court had acted within its discretion in considering Boone's military service as an aggravating factor. View "United States v. Boone" on Justia Law

The case involves Nihad Al Jaberi, who was convicted and sentenced for attempted smuggling, failure to notify a common carrier, and submitting false or misleading export information. Al Jaberi appealed his convictions and sentences, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of his guilt, his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, his due process rights were violated due to the Government's failure to correct false witness testimony and prejudicial statements, and his sentences were unreasonable.In February 2021, a federal grand jury indicted Al Jaberi for smuggling firearms from the United States, delivering firearms to a common carrier without giving written notice, and submitting false and misleading export information. The Government presented evidence that Al Jaberi admitted to shipping the firearms to Iraq without informing the common carrier of the firearms. The jury found Al Jaberi guilty on all counts.Al Jaberi appealed his convictions and sentences to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, his convictions and sentences violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, his due process rights were violated because the Government failed to correct false witness testimony and made prejudicial statements, and his sentences were unreasonable.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Al Jaberi’s convictions and sentences. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to convict Al Jaberi on all three charges. The court also found that Al Jaberi’s convictions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, his due process rights were not violated, and his sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Al Jaberi" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Victor Vargas, was convicted for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute heroin. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the 35-month delay between his indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the delay did not weigh heavily against the government.The court noted that the delay was broken down into three parts. The first ten months involved diligent efforts by the case agent to arrest Vargas. The second part was an eight-month period of inactivity due to the case agent being transferred to another position. The final period was a 16-month delay due to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.The court found that none of these delays were intentional or in bad faith. It further pointed out that throughout this period, Vargas was living freely and was not restricted in any way. Given these considerations, the court concluded that the delay did not uniformly weigh heavily against the government. Consequently, the court held that Vargas must demonstrate actual prejudice from the delay, which he admitted he could not do. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision that Vargas's right to a speedy trial was not violated. View "USA v. Vargas" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an appeal by Quinton Handlon, a prisoner convicted of producing, coercing, and possessing child pornography. Handlon had requested compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) because his elderly father needed a caregiver. The district court denied the request as Handlon failed to provide substantial evidence about his father's condition or proving that he was the only available caretaker. Handlon appealed this decision.The Appeals Court upheld the district court's decision, affirming that Handlon's case did not meet the extraordinary and compelling reasons necessary for compassionate release under the policy statement of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. At the time of Handlon's motion, the policy statement recognized four categories for compassionate release, none of which included the incapacitation of a parent when the defendant could serve as a caregiver.The court noted that a recent amendment to the policy statement now includes such a scenario, but clarified that it could not be applied retroactively in this appeal because it was a substantive amendment, not a clarifying one. The court affirmed the denial of Handlon's motion for compassionate release, but hinted that Handlon might be able to file a new motion for compassionate release under the updated policy. View "USA v. Handlon" on Justia Law

The case involves Haitham Yousef Alhindi, the defendant-appellant, who was charged with five counts of cyberstalking. Alhindi's counsel requested a competency evaluation, which was conducted by the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau), albeit late. Based on limited information and caution, the Bureau's report deemed Alhindi incompetent. The court ordered Alhindi to be hospitalized for treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). However, before Alhindi was hospitalized, the Bureau reported that he was not exhibiting any signs of mental illness and recommended a second competency evaluation, which the court ordered over Alhindi's objection. The second evaluation also concluded that Alhindi was incompetent. Alhindi appealed, arguing that the district court lacked authority to order a second competency evaluation and commitment for hospitalization.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 4241 authorizes district courts to order multiple competency evaluations and commitments for hospitalization when appropriate under the statute's terms. The court also found that the four-month limit in § 4241(d)(1) applies to the period of hospitalization, not the entire commitment period. The court emphasized the importance of district courts’ continued close supervision of competency proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's entry of the commitment order. View "USA v. Haitham Alhindi" on Justia Law