Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. In 2003, plaintiff pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d) and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). Defendant received a mandatory life sentence for the armed bank robbery, as required by the federal three-strikes law, 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(1), because the offense was a serious violent felony and defendant had two prior convictions for serious violent felonies. Defendant argues that his life sentence should be vacated in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597 (2015).The court concluded that, because plaintiff's prior convictions qualify as serious violent felonies without relying on the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii), the district court did not err in denying defendant's 2255 motion. In this case, defendant's prior conviction for bank robbery under section 2113(a), is an enumerated offense that falls within the statute's definition of serious violent felony. Furthermore, defendant's prior conviction for Louisiana armed robbery meets the definition of robbery as described in section 2111 and thus it qualifies as a serious violent felony under section 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). The court additionally determined that Louisiana armed robbery is a serious violent felony under the force clause of section 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's revocation sentence and supervised-release conditions in a case where defendant, a serial sexual predator of children and people with disabilities, violated the conditions of his supervised release. The court concluded that, although the district court may have made a one-word misstatement regarding defendant's criminal history, any error did not prejudice defendant. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court unlawfully delegated judicial authority in directing him to "follow the instructions of the U.S. Probation Officer." In this case, the court found no plain error. View "United States v. Tinney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims based on allegations that defendants illegally extradited him from Pennsylvania to Louisiana and impermissibly extended his state sentence by thirty years. Plaintiff's claims arose from a records clerk's reversion of his release date to the 2052 date, rather than the 2023 date, on the grounds that he had stopped serving his state sentence when he escaped from prison and that his state and federal sentences were intended to run consecutively.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's sentence-based claims, but reversed and remanded with respect to the extradition-based claims. The court held that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not present a jurisdictional hurdle that would require a remand of this case to state court. The court explained that Heck implicates a plaintiff's ability to state a claim, not whether the court has jurisdiction over that claim. As to plaintiff's claim regarding his sentence enhancement, the court concluded that a claim for speedier release is actionable by writ of habeas corpus, and a section 1983 damages action predicated on the sentence calculation issue is barred by Heck because success on that claim would necessarily invalidate the duration of his incarceration. The court also concluded that the district court never analyzed whether plaintiff's extradition-based claims were barred by Heck, and the district court should have considered whether his extradition-based claims survived Heck in the first instance. Furthermore, the district court should consider the qualified immunity, absolute immunity, and limitations ruling issues on remand. The court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colvin v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion on April 21, 2021 and substituted the following opinion.After petitioner was convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death, on federal habeas corpus review, the district court granted him relief. The Fifth Circuit court then affirmed the grant of relief, petitioner was retried, and petitioner was resentenced to death. Petitioner again sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, but the district court denied relief on all claims.The Fifth Circuit denied petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on the issue of whether the admission of testimony from a defense expert was fruit of the poisonous tree where petitioner has not identified any clearly established Supreme Court precedent extending Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), to his incriminating statements to his own expert; whether the State's peremptory strike of a black juror violated petitioner's right to a fair and impartial trial under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), where the prosecutor gave six reasons for striking the juror and petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the determination as objectively unreasonable; whether the State suppressed evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), where he failed to establish cause for defaulting his Brady claim; and (4) whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and habeas counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), where he failed to prove either the deficiency prong and/or prejudice prong of Strickland and thus could not overcome the procedural bar. View "Guidry v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of murder. Petitioner asserts that the State used race-based peremptory strikes during jury selection in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The court concluded that the state appellate court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in deciding petitioner's Batson claim by considering the jury panelists' voir dire answers among all the circumstances in deciding whether a prima facie case under Batson was shown. In this case, petitioner identifies no Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing that holistic consideration may not include the remarks of panelists on whom a peremptory strike was exercised. Nor does petitioner identify any evidence in the state court proceedings showing an unreasonable determination of fact by the state courts.Moreover, circuit precedent holds that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under the Batson framework is a factual finding entitled to the section 2254(e)(1) presumption of correctness. The court concluded that the district court correctly stated the law in that regard. However, that presumption is not dispositive here because petitioner's habeas claim independently fails both under section 2254(d) and on de novo review. Finally, regardless of section 2254(d) and (e), petitioner must establish entitlement to habeas relief on the merits by showing, as relevant here, a violation of the constitutional right defined in Batson. In this case, petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case, and thus his claim for federal relief is foreclosed. View "Seals v. Vannoy" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas petition on the merits and concluded that petitioner failed to obtain permission from a three-judge panel of this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3). Because petitioner never sought or obtained that permission, the district court had no jurisdiction to accept the second-or-successive petition—much less to consider the merits of it. Furthermore, the district court erred by deciding the petition on the merits. Even if the court previously authorized a successive application under section 2244(b), petitioner still could not appeal the district court's merits determination without a certificate of appealability (COA). In this case, petitioner is not entitled to a COA. Therefore, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction and denied the COA application as moot. View "Davis v. Sumlin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief to petitioner who was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child—his 7 year old daughter—and sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment. Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to investigate and challenge a juror who demonstrated impartiality during voir dire. The court concluded that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was not unreasonable in concluding that the juror was not biased and counsel's performance was not deficient. Furthermore, even if the juror were biased, the state court did not unreasonably conclude that her presence on the jury did not change the outcome of the trial where the evidence of petitioner's guilt is overwhelming. View "Canfield v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit held that petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering plainly constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(D). Section 1101(a)(43)(D) defines "aggravated felony" to include those offenses that are "described in section 1956 of Title 18 (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) . . . if the amount of funds exceeded $10,000." The court concluded that this provision applies here because petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), and the funds involved well exceeded $10,000. The court need not decide petitioner's contention that section 1101(a)(43)(U) requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court found petitioner's remaining contentions were either meritless or unexhausted. Accordingly, the court denied in part and dismissed in part his petition for review. View "Maniar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ramirez was the target of a drug trafficking investigation, and wiretaps were placed on his phones, providing access to voice and text conversations. Torres was a member of the Latin Kings, and purportedly a methamphetamine supplier for Ramirez. Torres and nine co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) and 846.During the first and second days of Torres's trial, the government presented the testimonies of multiple witnesses. On the second day, the last government witness finished at 7:09 P.M. Defense counsel informed the court that Torres intended to testify, expressing that it would take “several hours” to complete direct examination. Torres took the stand at 7:13 P.M. After approximately 50 minutes of direct examination, the judge declared an overnight recess and dismissed the jury. The court instructed Torres: You are to talk to no one about your testimony. The judge told defense counsel: You may not speak to him. Now that he’s started his testimony, you may not consult with him anymore.Convicted, Torres was given a within-Guidelines sentence of 240 months of imprisonment. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Torres’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was barred from speaking with his attorney during an overnight recess. View "United States v. Torres" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied the motions for authorization to file a successive federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244 and for a stay of execution. Movant was convicted of capital murder for killing his aunt and sentenced to death. The court concluded that, even if movant establishes a prima facie showing under section 2244(b)(2), he fails to demonstrate that either claim is within the one-year period of limitations provided in section 2244(d). Furthermore, while the one-year time limitation may be equitably tolled, movant makes no argument that equitable tolling is warranted here. The court also concluded that, because the necessary factual predicate for movant's false and misleading testimony claim could have been discovered through due diligence more than a year ago, this claim is also untimely. View "In Re: Jones" on Justia Law