Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought review of the denial of his motion to reopen his application for cancellation of removal. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review and held that petitioner effectively conceded that he was convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance and thus the court had jurisdiction over only constitutional claims or questions of law. In this case, the BIA and IJ denied the motion to reopen as untimely and not subject to equitable tolling because petitioner had not shown ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Therefore, insofar as petitioner raised a constitutional claim of IAC, the court held that it had jurisdiction to resolve both that question of law and any factual questions necessary to its resolution. However, petitioner failed to show IAC because, if nothing else, he failed to show that he was prejudiced by any ineffectiveness where he was unlikely to obtain cancellation of removal. View "Diaz v. Sessions" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 1425(a), which prohibits knowingly procuring citizenship contrary to law, the district court revoked his citizenship as part of his sentence. While defendant's appeal was pending the Supreme Court issued Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017), in which it (1) clarified the Government's burden of proof in a Section 1425(a) prosecution and (2) held that qualification for citizenship, notwithstanding any materially false statement, is a complete defense to prosecution. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that, even post-Maslenjak, the indictment and factual resume provided a sufficient factual basis for defendant's plea and for all statutory elements of Section 1425(a), the offense of conviction. In the alternative, even if the court assumed that the district court's acceptance of the plea was plain error, defendant failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights. View "United States v. Nepal" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences for charges related to his efforts in convincing about a hundred people to lend his companies millions of dollars. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the mail and wire fraud counts; there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for giving false testimony during a bankruptcy court proceeding; the district court's decision denying defendant's motion to suppress some prior statements under the Fifth Amendment was unreviewable because defendant neither testified nor proffered what he would have said; challenges to the admission of several summary charts denied; challenges to jury instructions as infirm were rejected; and there was no procedural error in defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Spalding" on Justia Law

Godoy was arrested for public intoxication in 2015. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials detained him. Godoy pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal and for having reentered “subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony.” The probation officer compared sentencing under the 2015 Guidelines with sentencing under the 2016 Guidelines and opted for the 2016 Guidelines. The PSR recommended an eight-level enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(3)(B), which applies when a defendant has previously been convicted of a felony offense “for which the sentence imposed was two years or more” based on Godoy’s two prior Texas burglary convictions, resulting in a 2016 Guidelines range of 24–30 months. Godoy argued that using the 2016 Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and that burglary of a habitation is not a “crime of violence” under 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The Fifth Circuit upheld his sentence as a "wash." The 2016 Guidelines’ cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. 16(b)—the “residual clause” in the federal definition of “crime of violence”—is constitutionally unproblematic. Although the Supreme Court recently ruled it was impermissibly vague as used in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s crime-based removal provisions, it remains validly incorporated into the advisory Guidelines for definitional purposes. Godoy’s total offense level is identical under both the 2015 and 2016 Guidelines. View "United States v. Godoy" on Justia Law

Vega-Garcia was convicted on a guilty plea for being found in the United States following a prior deportation, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The pre-sentence report addressed Vega-Garcia’s prior conviction under Florida law for abuse of an elderly or disabled adult under the 2015 Guidelines then in effect and concluded that the conviction constituted a crime of violence (COV), warranting a 16-level increase under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), which would yield a Guidelines range of 57-71 months. Vega-Garcia objected that it was not a COV, yielding only an 8-level increase under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), with a Guidelines range of 24-30 months. At sentencing, the district court applied the 2016 Guidelines; overruled Vega-Garcia’s objection, observed that Vega-Garcia had once again entered the U.S. unlawfully, despite previously serving a 60-month sentence for that offense; noted that Vega-Garcia had numerous uncounted offenses; and determined that an above-Guidelines sentence was necessary to dissuade Vega-Garcia from continuing to enter the country unlawfully. The Fifth Circuit affirmed a 72-month sentence. The government did not defend the determination that the Florida elder abuse statute qualified as a COV but argued harmless error. The district court considered the different potential Guidelines and concluded that the 72-month sentence was necessary because of Vega-Garcia’s recidivism. View "United States v. Vega-Garcia" on Justia Law

Sanchez-Arvizu pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). Applying the 2015 Sentencing Guidelines, the probation officer assessed a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), finding that Sanchez-Arvizu was deported after a conviction for a “crime of violence,” his Texas conviction for indecency with a child by sexual contact, and calculating an advisory Guidelines range of 41-51 months of imprisonment. Under the November 2016 Guidelines, Sanchez-Arvizu’s sentencing range would be 15-21 months. The probation officer arrived at a range of 1-7 months under those Guidelines. The district court stated that “a sentence of 51 months would be entirely appropriate,” but sentenced Sanchez-Arvizu at the low end of the Guidelines range because this was his first conviction for illegal reentry. The court stated that it had considered all of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and sentenced Sanchez-Arvizu to 42 months in prison. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded because, while this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that for "statutory rape offenses focused solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ . . . requires the age of the victim to be less than 16.” The statute under which Sanchez-Arvizu was convicted is categorically broader than the generic federal definition, so the court erred by deeming Sanchez-Arvizu’s conviction a crime of violence under Guidelines section 2L1.2. View "United States v. Sanchez-Arvizu" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted respondent's petition for rehearing en banc and withdrew the prior opinion, substituting the following opinion.The court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 application. The court held that, under Gonzalez v. Crosby, petitioner's purported Rule 59(e) motion was not an unauthorized successive section 2254 application and, if timely filed, would toll the deadline for filing a notice of appeal until the entry of the order disposing of the motion. In this case, petitioner's Rule 59(e) motion, which was delivered by petitioner's "next friend," was timely filed and tolled the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. Finally, the court held that petitioner was not entitled to section 2254 relief because the circumstances in this case did not rise to the level of the extreme situations wherein courts have previously imputed juror bias. View "Uranga v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted respondent's petition for rehearing en banc and withdrew the prior opinion, substituting the following opinion.The court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 application. The court held that, under Gonzalez v. Crosby, petitioner's purported Rule 59(e) motion was not an unauthorized successive section 2254 application and, if timely filed, would toll the deadline for filing a notice of appeal until the entry of the order disposing of the motion. In this case, petitioner's Rule 59(e) motion, which was delivered by petitioner's "next friend," was timely filed and tolled the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. Finally, the court held that petitioner was not entitled to section 2254 relief because the circumstances in this case did not rise to the level of the extreme situations wherein courts have previously imputed juror bias. View "Uranga v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting the possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction even if he never exercised dominion or control over the marijuana. In this case, defendant associated with a criminal venture, ensured that his coconspirator possessed the marijuana in order to transport it across the border, purposefully participated in the venture, and sought by his actions to make the venture succeed. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that defendant's prior Texas conviction for robbery was not a violent felony because it did not have the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" as an element. Accordingly, defendant lacked the three requisite prior violent felonies to be sentenced as an armed career criminal. The court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Burris" on Justia Law