Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search and seizure of his vehicle, holding that the warrantless seizure of Defendant's vehicle was unlawful.Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. On appeal, Defendant argued that law enforcement officers had no right to seize and tow his car, thereby setting it up for the inventory search that produced the evidence leading to his conviction. The First Circuit agreed, holding (1) the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in this case; (2) the government did not have probable cause to seize the vehicle pursuant to the Puerto Rico Uniform Forfeiture Act; and (3) the doctrine of inevitable discovery did not apply to justify the warrantless seizure of Defendant's vehicle. View "United States v. Del Rosario-Acosta" on Justia Law

In this case involving the bombing at the 2013 Boston Marathon, the First Circuit vacated Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's death sentences and reversed his three convictions for carrying a firearm during crimes of violence, holding that the judge did not meet the standard set by Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 318 (1st Cir. 1968), and erred in denying Tsarnaev's post-trial motion for judgments of acquittal.A jury convicted Tsarnaev of all charges for which he was indicted arising from the Boston Marathon bombing. The district judge imposed a sentence of death on six of the death-eligible counts. On appeal, Tsarnaev argued, among other things, that the judge erred in the way he handled Tsarnaev's venue-change motions and the jury-selection process. The First Circuit held (1) the trial judge in this high-profile case did not fully comply with Patriarca by running a voir dire sufficient to identify prejudice, which provided a sufficient ground to vacate Tsarnaev's death sentences; and (2) because not each of the underlying offenses constituted a crime of violence, three of Defendant's convictions for carrying a firearm for crimes of violence are reversed. View "United States v. Tsarnaev" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed on Defendant for intimidating or interfering with United States probation officers (count one) and influencing United States probation officers by threat (count two), holding that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.Defendant pled guilty to both charges without a plea agreement. The judge gave Defendant an above-guidelines sentence of sixty months in prison, consisting of twelve months on count one and forty-eight months on count two, to run concurrent with each other. Defendant appealed, challenging the substantive and procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was no reversible procedural defect in Defendant's sentence; and (2) the challenged sentence was neither implausible nor indefensible. View "United States v. Davila-Bonilla" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for failing to update his registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), holding that venue for a section 2250 prosecution is proper in the departure jurisdiction.Defendant, a state sex offender, failed to update his registration after he moved from Massachusetts to New York. Defendant was indicted in Massachusetts for his failure to register. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016), he committed no crime in Massachusetts because his failure to register occurred in New York. The district court denied the motion, concluding that venue was proper where Defendant's interstate travel began. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that venue for Defendant's prosecution was proper in Massachusetts because the nature of the offense shows that its locus delicti encompasses the departure jurisdiction. View "United States v. Seward" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's plea-based conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, holding that Defendant's prosecution did not violate constitutional double jeopardy protections.In 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court of the District of Puerto Rico to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. In 2016, Defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court of the District of Puerto Rico to a drug trafficking conspiracy charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that his double jeopardy rights were violated because the two conspiracy prosecutions concerned conduct at the same "places" and charged him with violations of "the same statutory provision." The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was a rational basis to conduct that the two conspiracies were distinct. View "United States v. Perez-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court on resentencing pursuant to the 2018 First Step Act that Defendant was a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, holding that Defendant failed to establish that the scope of joint venture liability under Massachusetts law is broader than under the generic standard.In classifying Defendant as a career offender, the district court relied on two Massachusetts drug convictions. On appeal, Defendant argued that the two Massachusetts drug convictions did not qualify as predicate controlled substance offenses under the career-offender guideline. Specifically, Defendant argued (1) the convictions implicitly included what was then called joint venture liability, which was broader in scope than generic aiding and abetting liability; and (2) therefore, there could not be a categorical match between the convictions and the definition of "controlled substance offense." The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) Defendant's contention that his two prior state convictions were over broad and did not qualify as controlled substance offenses was unavailing; and (2) the district court properly sentenced Defendant under the career-offender guideline. View "United States v. Capelton" on Justia Law

The First Circuit declined to grant Defendant's petition for leave to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to once again challenge his 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) conviction and sentence for use of a firearm during a crime of violence, holding that 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)'s force clause.Defendant was convicted of several offenses, including bank robbery and use of a firearm during a crime of violence. In his petition to file a second or successive motion under section 2255 to challenge his section 924 conviction, Defendant argued that section 2113(a) bank robbery is not a crime of violence under section 924(c)'s force clause because it is an indivisible statute setting forth a single offense that may be violated by alternative means, which do not necessarily have as an element the use of physical force against the person or property of another. The First Circuit denied the requested relief, holding (1) section 2113(a) bank robbery is a divisible statute setting forth distinct offenses with alternative elements; and (2) under the modified categorical approach, Defendant's offense of conviction was a crime of violence under section 924(c)'s force clause. View "King v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed Defendant's appeal challenging his sentence imposed in connection with his plea of guilty to drug-related offenses, holding that there was no miscarriage of justice and that the appeal waiver Defendant signed controlled.Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to several crimes stemming from a drug conspiracy that distributed drugs in three states. The plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. Defendant nonetheless appealed, arguing that his appeal waiver must be set aside under the "miscarriage of justice" standard set forth in United States v. Morillo, 910 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2018). The First Circuit disagreed, holding that there was no miscarriage of justice and that the appeal waiver controlled. View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed both of Defendant's federal racketeering-related convictions but vacated and remanded the prison sentence, forfeiture order, and restitution order, holding that the district court erred in several respects.Defendant was convicted of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, federal mail fraud, and violating the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 331(a), 333(a). The district court sentenced Defendant to ninety-six months' imprisonment, issued a forfeiture order in the amount of $175,000, and ordered restitution. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions for racketeering and racketeering conspiracy and his sentence. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding (1) the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the district court erred in its reasoning declining to apply certain enhancements; (3) neither of the two reasons the district court gave for limiting the forfeiture order was sustainable; and (4) the district court too narrowly construed who counts as a "victim" under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. View "United States v. Chin" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated and remanded his prison sentence and forfeiture order, holding that the district court erred in calculating Defendant's recommended sentencing range and erred in determining the amount of the forfeiture.A jury found Defendant guilty of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy, mail fraud, and violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 331(a), 333(a). The district court sentenced Defendant to a prison term of 108 months - the high end of the range that it had calculated under the Guidelines. The court also imposed a forfeiture order on Defendant in the amount of $7,545,501. The First Circuit remanded the convictions but vacated the prison sentence and forfeiture order, holding (1) the district court's reasons for declining to apply two enhancements were legally erroneous; and (2) the district court erred in its forfeiture calculation. View "United States v. Cadden" on Justia Law