Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Daniel Paul Sansone, the defendant-appellant, was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 46 months of imprisonment, the upper end of the sentencing guideline range. Sansone challenged the procedural integrity and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed his claims.Sansone had argued that his criminal history score was erroneously inflated due to the inclusion of his juvenile adjudications, asserting that his commitment to the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (DYS) was not a sentence of confinement. The court rejected this argument, noting that prior case law had upheld the inclusion of such adjudications as constituting sentences of confinement.Sansone also claimed there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that his juvenile adjudications resulted in confinement for at least sixty days, which was necessary for the assignment of criminal history points under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). The Court of Appeals found that Sansone could not show a plain error in this regard, as the record was ambiguous and did not allow for a clear determination of the length of his confinement.Regarding the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, Sansone argued that the sentencing court had overstated the seriousness of his past criminal record and failed to adequately consider his personal history. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the sentencing court had considered all relevant factors, and Sansone's real complaint was about the weight given to certain factors, not their consideration. The court upheld the sentence, affirming the district court's decision. View "US v. Sansone" on Justia Law

The case concerns the appeal of Gilbert Perez, who sought to have his federal drug conviction overturned on the basis that the United States District Court for the District of Maine had incorrectly denied his motion to suppress the outcomes of a warrantless search of his backpack. Perez argued that the search was not justified under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The District Court, relying on a previous case (United States v. Eatherton), had upheld the search. Perez contended that subsequent Supreme Court decisions had undermined the validity of Eatherton.On the night of his arrest, Perez had been seen acting suspiciously in a McDonald’s parking lot in Lawrence, Massachusetts. When he left the lot, carrying a backpack, he was monitored by state troopers. He was seen exiting a taxi, and large quantities of cash were found in the vehicle, arousing suspicion that he had been involved in a drug transaction. When Perez returned to the McDonald’s lot, he was approached by Trooper Jason Conant, who identified himself as a state trooper. Perez ran but was caught, and the backpack was removed from him and searched. The search revealed it contained fentanyl and cocaine. Perez was subsequently indicted on a federal drug-related charge.In his appeal, Perez maintained that the backpack's search was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit disagreed, affirming the judgement of conviction. It concluded that neither of the Supreme Court cases cited by Perez had invalidated the Eatherton ruling. The panel also rejected the notion that Perez's backpack could be considered separate from his person at the time of arrest. As such, it fell within the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. View "US v. Perez" on Justia Law

In November 2010, Mario Cruzado was brought in for questioning by Boston police regarding the death of Frederick Allen III, a gay, African-American man. During the interview, Cruzado used a racial slur when referring to a picture of Allen. In 2012, Cruzado was charged and convicted of first-degree murder for killing Allen and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Cruzado's conviction was based, in part, on the recorded police interview, which was admitted as evidence to show Cruzado's racial animus and thus his motive for the killing. Cruzado appealed his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that the admission of the recorded police interview violated his right to due process.The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) consolidated Cruzado's appeals and denied them, holding that the state trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. The SJC also stated that Cruzado's argument that the admission of the racial slur violated his due process rights was unavailing, as the slur came from his own mouth. Cruzado then filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was denied by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.In an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Cruzado argued that the admission of the recorded police interview violated his right to due process. The Court held that Cruzado's due process rights were not violated, as the racial slur held substantial probative value in demonstrating whether the crime may have been partially motivated by racial animus. The Court also noted that the potential prejudicial effect of the racial slur was mitigated by the trial judge conducting an individual voir dire of potential jurors to eliminate potential bias and that Cruzado did not request a limiting instruction to disregard or not infer anything from his use of the racial slur. Therefore, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's rejection of Cruzado's petition for habeas relief. View "Cruzado v. Alves" on Justia Law

In this case, Gary E. Leach was convicted of cyberstalking and extortion and subsequently sentenced to a term of forty-two months in prison, followed by thirty-six months of supervised release. The supervised release included a condition prohibiting Leach from working or volunteering in any capacity that would put him in direct contact with children without prior approval from his probation officer. Leach appealed his sentence and the condition of his supervised release, raising several arguments.First, Leach argued that the district court erred in not providing him with sufficient notice of its intention to impose an upwardly variant sentence. However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that a sentencing court is not required to give the parties advance notice before imposing an upwardly variant sentence. The court also noted that the factors justifying the upward variance were plainly apparent from the record.Second, Leach argued that his sentence was procedurally flawed due to the lack of a sufficient explanation to justify the above-guidelines sentence. The First Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that the district court had identified relevant factors justifying an upward variance and explained why the guidelines did not adequately account for each factor, given the idiosyncrasies of the case at hand.Third, Leach argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit disagreed, finding that the sentence fell within the "wide universe of supportable sentencing outcomes."Finally, Leach challenged the condition of his supervised release that prohibited him from working or volunteering in any capacity that would put him in direct contact with children. The First Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the condition was reasonably related to protecting the public from future crimes by Leach. The court also noted that the condition was not overly restrictive, as it only required Leach to secure advance approval from a probation officer for such activity if it would put him in direct contact with children.Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed Leach's sentence and the conditions of his supervised release. View "US v. Leach" on Justia Law

Shaun Walker appealed his 36-month sentence for participating in a failed Hobbs Act conspiracy to rob a home business. Walker raised four objections to his sentence, including challenges to enhancements for economic loss and possession of dangerous weapons and denials of reductions for incomplete conspiracy and mitigating role. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found no error in the enhancements for economic loss and dangerous weapon possession, as well as the denial of incomplete conspiracy reduction. However, the Court vacated and remanded for resentencing on the issue of the mitigating role reduction. The Court was unable to affirm the district court's denial of the reduction due to a lack of explanation, and was unable to conclude that any error in the district court's application of the reduction was harmless. Therefore, the case was remanded for the district court to reevaluate Walker's role in the conspiracy. View "US v. Walker" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant-appellant, Augusto Valdez, who appealed from his guilty plea and conviction for which he received 120 months' imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Valdez raised two issues: firstly, he asserted that the district court should have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he conspired only with a confidential source and not a co-conspirator, and that the court did not ensure that he knew he couldn't conspire illegally with a government agent. Secondly, he sought to vacate his sentence because the district court should have, on its own initiative, verified his eligibility for the safety valve under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The court found that Valdez knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and was not misled about the nature of the conspiracy charge, thereby rejecting his argument that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. His argument that he could not be convicted for conspiring only with a government agent was rejected because the facts revealed two true conspirators: Valdez and a Texas source. The court also found that Valdez waived his right to argue for the application of the safety valve because he failed to object to the PSR and requested the mandatory minimum sentence, which was inconsistent with his later argument for the application of the safety valve. View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law

In this case, Ángel Menéndez-Montalvo, while serving a term of supervised release arising from his conviction for a federal firearm offense, violated the conditions of his release by breaching Article 3.1 of Puerto Rico's Domestic Violence Law. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had to determine whether a violation of Article 3.1 is a "crime of violence" as used in section 7B1.1(a)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The court found that it is not because Puerto Rico courts have applied the law to encompass less-than-violent force. As such, the court vacated Menéndez's sentence because the district court had held to the contrary in calculating a sentencing range that was higher than it should have been. The court further clarified that its decision does not prevent the district court from considering Menéndez's conduct while on supervised release as it bears on the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "US v. Menendez-Montalvo" on Justia Law

In a drug trafficking case, the defendant, Amanda Cowette, appealed the district court's denial of her motion to suppress statements she made to law enforcement officers on July 16 and 17, 2018. Cowette argued that she unequivocally invoked her Fifth Amendment right to counsel and any subsequent questioning by law enforcement officers was in violation of that right. She contended that the district court's ruling to the contrary was in error. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with Cowette and held that she properly invoked her Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The court found that the phrase "I guess" used by Cowette did not create any ambiguity in her clear invocation of her right to counsel. The court vacated the decision of the district court in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "US v. Cowette" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions of Rafael Cardona Sr. and Isaac Cardona for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. Isaac Cardona was also convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering with intent to promote the carrying on of unlawful activity. The defendants raised several arguments on appeal.Rafael Cardona Sr. argued that his two convictions were multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court concluded that this argument was not reviewable because it was raised for the first time on appeal and not supported by good cause, as required under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) and 12(c)(3).Isaac Cardona argued that the money laundering statute under which he was charged is unconstitutionally vague. The court determined that this argument was not reviewable because it was not raised before trial, as required by Rule 12(b)(3). Isaac Cardona also argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his money laundering conviction and that the court gave erroneous jury instructions on this charge. The court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction and concluded that the erroneous instructions did not affect his substantial rights.The case arose from surveillance footage, recorded communications between the defendants and other co-conspirators, and other evidence showing that the defendants conspired to distribute cocaine and heroin and that Isaac Cardona conspired to commit money laundering by using the proceeds of cocaine distribution to procure and resell heroin. View "US v. Cardona" on Justia Law

A plaintiff, Elvin Torres-Estrada, brought claims against several Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Bivens, alleging violations of his constitutional and statutory rights. The district court dismissed his complaint, arguing that some of his claims were not filed within the required time frame and that the FTCA's discretionary function exception stripped the court of jurisdiction over his other claims. Torres-Estrada appealed the dismissal, arguing that his claims are timely, the discretionary function exception does not apply, and even if it does, it does not cover the alleged misconduct of the FBI.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the discretionary function exception. The court explained that this exception does not serve as a bar to FTCA tort claims that plausibly allege constitutional violations. In addition, at least two of Torres-Estrada's claims could be subject to the "continuing violation" doctrine, which means the district court erred in dismissing his claims as untimely without considering this doctrine. Given that new facts have emerged throughout the litigation, the court granted Torres-Estrada leave to amend his complaint. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.The background facts of the case are that Torres-Estrada was detained at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, pending prosecution for drug and money laundering offenses. During this time, he was investigated by the FBI as a potential suspect in the murder of a correctional officer at the MDC. Torres-Estrada alleges that the FBI violated his rights through various actions, including the use of informants to elicit incriminating statements about the murder, subjecting him to invasive body searches, and maintaining records falsely linking him to the murder. View "Torres-Estrada v. Cases" on Justia Law