Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Jean Carlos Aponte-Colón ("Aponte") who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment longer than the range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Aponte had pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute marijuana and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Under his plea agreement, Aponte committed to request an upwardly variant sentence on the firearm charge due to the "nature and quantity of evidence seized" during his arrest. Despite Aponte and the government requesting an aggregate imprisonment sentence of ninety-four months and 100 months respectively, the district court sentenced him to an upwardly variant sentence of 120 months.The district court's decision was appealed on the grounds that the government materially breached the plea agreement, the district court improperly based its sentence on Aponte's national origin, and the district court's sentence was procedurally unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the law and the record did not support Aponte's arguments and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no breach of the plea agreement, no evidence that the district court based its sentence on Aponte's national origin, and no procedural unreasonableness in the district court's sentence. View "US v. Aponte-Colon" on Justia Law

The defendant, Yavier Mojica-Ramos, was on supervised release after serving a five-year sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. In 2020, he was arrested for unlawfully possessing two modified machine guns, discovered when police officers were enforcing a COVID-19 mask mandate. Mojica entered into a plea agreement in 2021, promising to plead guilty to the unlawful possession charge. The agreement required both parties to request a sentence within the guidelines range, later calculated as thirty-seven to forty-six months.The government filed a sentencing memorandum requesting an upper-end guidelines sentence of forty-six months, attaching photos and a video from Mojica's cellphone as evidence of his involvement in other criminal behavior. Mojica filed a motion to compel specific performance of the plea agreement, alleging that the government breached the agreement by advocating for an upwardly variant sentence. The district court denied Mojica's motion.The district court imposed an upwardly variant seventy-two-month sentence for the unlawful possession charge, rejecting the parties' recommendations for a guidelines sentence. Immediately following this, the court held a supervised release revocation hearing and issued a sixty-month statutory maximum revocation sentence to run consecutively to Mojica's unlawful possession sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the prosecutor's sentencing advocacy did not conform to the meticulous standards of performance required by Mojica's entrance into the plea agreement. The court vacated Mojica's sentences for unlawful possession and revocation, remanding the cases for resentencing before a different judge. View "United States v. Mojica-Ramos" on Justia Law

The defendant, Ronald Yoel Marte Carmona, was convicted on charges related to multiple fentanyl sales. He appealed, challenging the district court's denial of his motions to suppress the fruits of a Terry stop and arguing that the evidence supporting his six convictions was insufficient.Previously, the defendant had been indicted on one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl, and five counts of distribution and possession with intent to distribute forty grams or more of fentanyl. Each of the distribution counts corresponded with a particular controlled buy. The defendant moved to suppress the fruits of a traffic stop and the fruits of a search of an apartment, arguing that the stop was unconstitutional because it was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motions, finding that the agents possessed reasonable suspicion to effectuate the stop.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the Terry stop was reasonable, grounded in articulable suspicion, and that the verdicts were supported by the record evidence. The court also found that the agents who stopped the defendant possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was involved in past criminal conduct, making the Terry stop permissible. The court further held that the evidence presented at trial established that a rational factfinder could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of the charges. View "US v. Carmona" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jean Carlos Polaco-Hance, was convicted of being a felon in unlawful possession of a machinegun. He was sentenced to seventy-two months in prison, a sentence that was forty percent higher than the upper end of the range recommended under the federal sentencing guidelines. Polaco appealed his sentence, arguing that it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.In the lower courts, Polaco had pled guilty to attempting to smuggle about $100,000 in cash from the United States to the Dominican Republic and making a false statement to a United States agency. He was sentenced to fifteen months of imprisonment for each offense, to be served concurrently, and three years of supervised release. He began his supervised release term on May 29, 2020. About three months later, Polaco was arrested for the offenses that form the basis of this appeal. A federal grand jury indicted Polaco on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of unlawfully possessing a machinegun. The case proceeded to trial, after which a jury found Polaco guilty on both counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the district court had provided sufficient reasons to justify its higher sentence, including the large amount of ammunition in Polaco's possession. The court also found that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court noted that the district court had considered Polaco's machinegun possession alongside other case-specific factors, including the large cache of ammunition and the high-capacity magazines Polaco had when he was arrested, as well as what the district court viewed as a heightened need for deterrence. View "US v. Polaco-Hance" on Justia Law

Nathan Reardon, who had been self-employed for 24 years, was convicted of bank fraud after submitting fraudulent applications for loans under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a financial assistance program enacted by Congress in response to the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Reardon used several of his businesses to submit the fraudulent applications and misused the funds from the approved loan. He was sentenced to twenty months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. As part of his sentence, the district court imposed a special condition prohibiting Reardon from all forms of self-employment during his supervised release term.Reardon appealed this special condition, arguing that it was overly restrictive and unnecessary. The government suggested a "middle ground" where the condition could be modified to avoid a total prohibition against self-employment, but the district court overruled Reardon's objection and imposed the self-employment ban without explaining why it was the minimum restriction necessary to protect the public, as required by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that while the district court was justified in imposing an occupational restriction, it did not provide sufficient explanation for why a total ban on self-employment was the minimum restriction necessary to protect the public. The court therefore vacated the self-employment ban and remanded the case for reconsideration of the scope of that restriction. View "United States v. Reardon" on Justia Law

Suzanne Brown, a federal prisoner, appealed the denial of her habeas corpus petition. Brown was convicted on twelve counts of making a materially false statement to a federal agency and was sentenced to twelve months of imprisonment and a two-year term of supervised release. She began her term of imprisonment in January 2022, with release scheduled for January 2023. However, in March 2022, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) calculated that Brown had earned fifteen First Step Act (FSA) credits, which it applied to accelerate her release date to December 17, 2022. In August 2022, BOP transferred Brown to home confinement under the emergency measures of the CARES Act, still with a calculated release date of December 17, 2022.Brown filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, arguing that she had earned enough FSA credits to qualify for release on September 2, 2022, and that BOP's decision not to correct her FSA credit calculation and apply FSA credits to accelerate her release would result in her being held unlawfully in custody. A magistrate judge recommended that Brown's petition for habeas corpus be denied, and the district court adopted that recommendation and denied the petition. Brown timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the denial of the habeas petition de novo. Brown conceded that controlling precedent foreclosed some of the relief she sought earlier. She now asked only that the court hold her term of supervised release began on August 2, 2022, when she was transferred to home confinement. However, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief, stating that the BOP's transfer of Brown to home confinement was a form of BOP custody, and her term of supervised release could not begin until the BOP released her from that custody. The court expressed no view as to whether Brown could receive relief under other procedural mechanisms, such as 18 U.S.C. § 3583. View "Brown v. Penders" on Justia Law

The defendant, Victor J. Calderon-Zayas, was convicted of aiding and abetting another person to illegally possess a machine gun, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 922(o). This conviction occurred while Calderon-Zayas was on supervised release for a previous conviction related to drug distribution. The machine gun in question was a modified pistol, which the court deemed more dangerous than an average machine gun. Calderon-Zayas was sentenced to a sixty-month sentence, which was above the guidelines range, and an additional eighteen-month sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, where Calderon-Zayas pled guilty to the charges. He challenged the length of his sentence, arguing that the court overemphasized the aggravating factors and overlooked the mitigating factors. He also argued that the court improperly relied on the dangerous nature of the firearm involved as a basis for the upward variance. As for the revocation sentence, he argued that the court erred by not considering the § 922(o) sentence when crafting the punishment for the supervised release violation.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court found no error in the lower court's decision and affirmed both the § 922(o) and revocation sentences. The court held that the sentencing court properly balanced the § 3553(a) factors and that the dangerousness of the modified pistol was a valid consideration for an upward variance in the sentence. The court also found that the consecutive revocation sentence was within the court's discretion and did not require consideration of the § 922(o) sentence. View "United States v. Calderon-Zayas" on Justia Law

The case involves Ricardo Villa-Guillen, who was convicted by a jury for conspiring to traffic cocaine from Puerto Rico to the continental United States. Villa appealed, alleging errors in the district court proceedings. The court agreed with Villa that two of the district court's evidentiary rulings led to prejudicial error. These rulings involved the admission of a letter discussing Villa's potential interest in a plea deal, which the government claimed was tantamount to a confession, and the admission of testimony suggesting that Villa was more likely to have committed this crime because he had supposedly participated in a different drug transaction. The court reversed and ordered a new trial.The district court had admitted a redacted version of a letter Villa had written to the court seeking information about a pending motion. In the letter, Villa stated that he "ha[d] expressed . . . [his] desire to reach an agreement with the Government." The court believed the letter was "relevant because Villa's assertions convey a consciousness of guilt," and the court thought its admission was fair because Villa sent the "incriminating letter to the Court on his own accord." The court also noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had affirmed its ruling admitting what it considered to be a similar letter in a different case, although the earlier case did not involve a Rule 403 objection.The court concluded that the district court's instruction combined with the government's argument indicated that the "natural and intuitive" inference to draw from the letter was that Villa's interest in a plea agreement meant he was guilty. The court therefore reversed and ordered a new trial. View "United States v. Villa-Guillen" on Justia Law

The case involves Ángel Cruz-Agosto, who was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm following a guilty plea. Cruz-Agosto was arrested after police officers observed him pull a pistol from his waistband and drop it on the floor of his vehicle. At the time of his arrest, Cruz-Agosto was serving a term of federal supervised release. He entered into a plea agreement with the government, which calculated a Total Offense Level of nineteen and agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of thirty-seven months' imprisonment.The district court, however, found that the recommended sentence did not reflect the seriousness of the offense and sentenced Cruz-Agosto to seventy-one months' imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The court also held a sentencing hearing for the revocation of Cruz-Agosto's supervised release, sentencing him to an additional eighteen months' imprisonment to be served consecutively.Cruz-Agosto appealed his sentences, focusing on an alleged breach of the plea agreement by the prosecutor at sentencing. He argued that the government failed to argue for a concurrent sentence or a maximum of a four-month consecutive sentence on the revocation, and failed to correct a perceived error made by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the sentences given by the district court. The court found that the government did not breach the plea agreement, as it had fulfilled its obligation to jointly recommend a sentence of thirty-seven months' imprisonment. The court also found that Cruz-Agosto failed to show that any alleged error by the government affected his substantial rights or the outcome of the proceedings. View "United States v. Cruz-Agosto" on Justia Law

The case involves Alejandro Cortés-López, who was serving a 24-month prison term after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. Cortés-López had entered into a plea agreement with the government, admitting to a fraudulent financial scheme that solicited residents in Puerto Rico to invest in short-term, high-interest loans in the Dominican Republic. The plea agreement stipulated a total offense level (TOL) of 18, which, combined with a criminal history category of I, suggested a guidelines sentencing range (GSR) of 27-33 months' imprisonment. However, both parties agreed to jointly request a variant sentence of 24 months of probation.The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated a higher TOL due to the financial fraud scheme resulting in more than $5.4 million in losses to the investors. Cortés-López objected to these enhancements, but the probation office maintained that the higher loss amount and additional enhancement were correct. At the sentencing hearing, the government acknowledged the PSR's calculation but stated it was standing by its plea agreement recommendation of 24 months of probation. The district court, however, imposed a sentence of 24 months' imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release and $5.4 million in restitution.Cortés-López appealed, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement by supporting the higher TOL calculated in the PSR and failing to advocate meaningfully for the agreed-upon 24-month probation sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed, finding that the government's conduct at the sentencing hearing was a breach of the plea agreement. The court vacated Cortés-López's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Cortes-Lopez" on Justia Law