Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this consolidated appeal, the First Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that the court that issued a wiretap warrant could have found the facts in the application to be at least minimally adequate to support the issuance of the warrant, thus affirming the judgments below.A federal grand jury handed up an indictment charging all four defendants in this consolidated appeal with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine and distribution and possession with intent to distribute heroin and/or cocaine. The four defendants eventually pleaded guilty to all charges. On appeal, the defendants challenged the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress wiretap evidence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the wiretap application, read in tandem with its supporting affidavit, was more than minimally adequate to support the wiretap authorization. View "United States v. Santana-Dones" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence of seventy-one months' incarceration plus three years of supervised release in connection with his conviction for one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, holding that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense without a plea agreement. The district court accepted the straight plea. The district court determined that a sentence at the higher end of the guideline range was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, and imposed the seventy-one-month incarcerate term and three years of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant asserted procedural and substantive error. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no reversible procedural error in sentencing, and Defendant's claim of substantive error in his sentencing similarly failed. View "United States v. Ortiz-Mercado" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the decision of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment against them for failing to satisfy the "obtaining of property" element of Hobbs Act extortion, holding that the "obtaining of property" element was satisfied in this case.Defendants were two officials of the City of Boston, Massachusetts, who allegedly threatened to withhold permits from a production company that need the permits to hold a music festival unless the company agreed to hire works from a specific union to work at the event. Defendants were indicted for Hobbs act extortion and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show, as it interpreted "obtaining of property" in the Hobbs Act extortion provision to require, that Defendants received a personal benefit from the transfer of wages and benefits to the union workers that Defendants allegedly directed the production company to make. The First Circuit vacated the order of dismissal, holding that the "obtaining of property" element may be satisfied by evidence showing that Defendants induced the victim's consent to transfer property to third parties that Defendants identified, even where Defendants did not incur any personal benefit from the transfer. View "United States v. Brissette" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of ten counts of mail fraud and one count of embezzlement from an organization receiving federal-program benefits, holding that the district court did not err by improperly restricting cross examination of the government's principal witness.During trial, the government presented evidence that Defendant, who was a police lieutenant, submitted fraudulent detail and overtime timesheets, which double counted his work time. The government's principal witness was the executive officer of the police department. The trial court prevented Defendant from asking this witness whether any other police officers faced disciplinary action On appeal, Defendant challenged the court's decision to prevent Defendant from asking whether any other police officers faced disciplinary action for violating the Department's policy on overlapping shifts. Defendant also claimed that the government's closing argument represented prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that no prejudicial error occurred in the proceedings below. View "United States v. Corliss" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence for violating conditions of supervised release related to an earlier conviction for possessing a machine gun, holding that Defendant's variant sentence for violating his conditions of supervised release was not unlawful.In 2012, Defendant pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a machine gun. In 2016, more than halfway through his supervised release term, Defendant pled guilty to being a felon-in-possession of a firearm and ammunition and illegal possession of a machine gun. The district court sentenced Defendant to 120 months' imprisonment for the new criminal conduct and a consecutive twenty-four-month sentence for violating conditions of supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) an appellate waiver provision in Defendant's plea agreement barred this Court from reviewing the sentence imposed on the new charges; and (2) as to Defendant's revocation sentence, the sentence was not an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Cruz-Olavarria" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction for knowingly possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant, as opposed to other people, downloaded the pornography.Law enforcement officers discovered that someone using an IP address registered to Defendant at a New Hampshire residence downloaded child pornography from a peer-to-peer file-sharing network and that two people in addition to Defendant received mail at that residence. While executing a search warrant, officers found Defendant's laptop computer, which was not password-protected and contained child pornography. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the government supported its case with insufficient evidence. View "United States v. Pothier" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, holding that the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements obtained from him during an interrogation and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's refusal to suppress his statements made during the interrogation after he received Miranda warnings, arguing that his mental capacity impeded his ability to waive his rights. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly found that Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. View "United States v. Rang" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the holding of the district court that Defendant had twice violated the conditions of his supervised release and sentencing Defendant to an eighteen-month term of immurement, to be followed by a new four-year term of supervised release, holding that any error was harmless and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the district court's findings.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the district court erred by relying on previously excluded evidence to find that Defendant violated a condition of his supervised release; and (2) the district court had insufficient evidence to find a second violation. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion when it relied upon previously excluded hearsay statements in formulating its decision, but the error was harmless; and (2) the evidence supporting the district court's two findings was sufficient. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to suppress, which Defendant filed before he was convicted of legal reentry after removal from the United States, holding that the district court did not err in not dismissing Defendant's indictment for delay in presentment or in not suppressing information that law enforcement had gathered about Defendant, including his identity.Defendant was a passenger in a van that was stopped for seatbelt violations. A Maine State Trooper who conducted the stop contacted an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer for help identifying the passengers, several of whom did not appear to speak English. When he was asked for his identification, Defendant produced a consular ID card. ICE officers ran the card through ICE databases and determined that Defendant was suspected of illegal reentry. Defendant was subsequently convicted of illegally entering the United States after removal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant made his initial appearance just as the criminal process was initiated, there was no unnecessary delay before his initial appearance and so no violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a); and (2) the district court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Garcia-Zavala" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to deprive a person of civil rights and sentence of eighty-seven months in prison, holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction and that there was no other reversible error.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the district court properly admitted testimony of two government witnesses under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); (3) the district court did not violate Defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's second motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (5) Defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Martinez-Mercado" on Justia Law