Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Charles Pittman pleaded guilty to violating a federal law that criminalizes burning or attempting to burn buildings owned by institutions that receive federal funding. He was charged with aiding and abetting others in maliciously damaging and destroying the Market House, a building owned by the City of Fayetteville, which receives federal financial assistance. During his plea hearing, Pittman confirmed his understanding of the charges and admitted to committing acts constituting the elements of the crime.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina accepted Pittman's guilty plea and later sentenced him to 60 months of imprisonment. Before sentencing, Pittman moved to dismiss Count 1, arguing that the statute required a nexus between the federal financial assistance and the damaged property, and that the criminal information failed to allege such a nexus. He also argued that the City of Fayetteville is not an "institution or organization" under the statute. The district court denied the motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Pittman argued that his conduct did not violate the statute and that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. The court held that Pittman waived his statutory construction arguments by pleading guilty, as a guilty plea admits that the conduct violated the statute. The court also found that Pittman's as-applied constitutional challenge was forfeited because he did not timely raise it before the district court, and he failed to show plain error.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Pittman's guilty plea waived his statutory arguments and that his constitutional challenge was both forfeited and failed to meet the plain-error standard. View "United States v. Pittman" on Justia Law

Johnnie Franklin Wills, a state prisoner, filed a habeas petition challenging his life sentence under West Virginia’s recidivist statute. He argued that the judicially crafted test for determining whether a recidivist life sentence is proportional to the crime is unconstitutionally vague. Wills was convicted of grand larceny and conspiracy to commit grand larceny in 2016, and due to his prior eight felony convictions, he was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after fifteen years under the recidivist statute.The West Virginia courts denied Wills relief, stating that the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply to their proportionality test. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed this decision, distinguishing Wills’s case from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya, which invalidated certain statutory provisions as unconstitutionally vague. The state court maintained that the proportionality test was clear and did not fall under the same scrutiny as the statutes in Johnson and Dimaya.Wills then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia also denied. The district court found that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court noted that the proportionality test serves as a judicial limitation on the recidivist statute, unlike the statutory mandates in Johnson and Dimaya.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the state court’s ruling was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the U.S. Supreme Court has not extended the void-for-vagueness doctrine to judicially crafted proportionality tests. Therefore, Wills’s habeas petition was denied. View "Wills v. Pszczolkowski" on Justia Law

The defendant, Thuy Tien Luong, was convicted of forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589. Luong used threats and coercion to force the victim, a nail technician, to continue working against her will. The victim, who had a limited education and poor English skills, was subjected to physical abuse and threats of reputational harm and legal consequences by Luong. The victim was coerced into writing checks for alleged mistakes and a fabricated debt of $180,000. The abuse included physical violence, such as beatings and threats, which led to visible injuries and scars on the victim.The case was initially reviewed by the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. After a five-day trial, the jury found Luong guilty of forced labor. At sentencing, the district court applied several enhancements, including a two-level vulnerable victim enhancement and a four-level permanent scarring enhancement, resulting in a final offense level of 37. Luong was sentenced to 180 months in prison. She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing insufficient evidence for her conviction and errors in the application of sentencing enhancements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Luong's conviction, finding substantial evidence that she knowingly coerced the victim into forced labor through threats and physical abuse. However, the court vacated and remanded her sentence for resentencing. The court found that the district court did not provide sufficient findings to support the application of the two-level vulnerable victim enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). The court upheld the four-level permanent scarring enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2H4.1(b)(1)(A), finding sufficient evidence that the victim's scars were permanent. View "U.S. v. Luong" on Justia Law

Cornelius Mayberry was involved in a narcotics sting operation where he was arrested at a Red Roof Inn in Gaffney, South Carolina. Mayberry was found with a backpack containing over four pounds of methamphetamine. He entered a conditional guilty plea to charges including possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, and assault and resistance to official search or seizure. Mayberry reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence obtained from his backpack and his post-arrest statements, as well as the court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied Mayberry’s motions to suppress, finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest him and that he had abandoned his backpack. The court also denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that Mayberry had not provided a fair and just reason for the withdrawal. Mayberry was sentenced to 414 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mayberry’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, as the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. The court also found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Mayberry based on the information provided by a cooperating individual and the real-time observations of Mayberry’s actions. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s finding that Mayberry had abandoned his backpack, thus relinquishing any reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Consequently, the search of the backpack was deemed lawful. View "US v. Mayberry" on Justia Law

Between September 2021 and January 2022, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, along with local law enforcement in Sanford, North Carolina, coordinated controlled buys of narcotics using a confidential informant (CI). The CI purchased drugs from various individuals, including the appellant, Brian Thomas Bright. The CI primarily interacted with Keyonta McDougald, who facilitated drug buys from Bright. Bright also directed William Samuel Pergerson to assist in drug transactions. Bright and seven others were indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina sentenced Bright to 97 months of imprisonment after he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated Bright’s base offense level as 26, with a three-point enhancement for a managerial role under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) § 3B1.1(b). Bright objected to the enhancement, arguing that his criminal activity involved fewer than five participants. The district court overruled the objection, finding that the three-level enhancement was appropriate due to the extent of Bright’s involvement in the conspiracy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court committed procedural error by not making the necessary findings regarding the scope of the criminal activity and the number of participants involved, as required by Guidelines § 1B1.3 and United States v. Evans. The Fourth Circuit vacated Bright’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to make the requisite particularized findings or determine if the criminal activity was "otherwise extensive." View "US v. Bright" on Justia Law

Felix Jacobo Salomon-Guillen, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 on an O-3 visa as the spouse of Lucia Parker Salomon, a recording artist who later became a naturalized citizen. Salomon-Guillen became a permanent resident and managed his wife's music career. In 2013, he began working as a marketing director for a book publisher and engaged in a fraudulent scheme that cost the company $1.4 million. He was indicted for wire fraud, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 18 months in prison.The government sought to remove Salomon-Guillen from the country due to his aggravated felony conviction. He conceded removability and applied for adjustment of status and an inadmissibility waiver. The immigration judge denied his applications, finding that he failed to demonstrate that his removal would cause "extreme hardship" to his wife or mother, both U.S. citizens. The judge also concluded that Salomon-Guillen did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion due to the severity of his fraud offense.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision. The BIA, with Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge Denise G. Brown participating, found that Salomon-Guillen failed to show that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if she accompanied him to El Salvador. The BIA also agreed that he did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the regulation allowing temporary Board members to serve six-month terms did not preclude their reappointment for additional terms. The court also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary denial of the inadmissibility waiver. Consequently, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Saloman-Guillen v. Garland" on Justia Law

Matthew Ryan Hunt was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits individuals convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year from possessing firearms. Hunt's 2017 conviction for breaking and entering in West Virginia served as the predicate offense. In May 2022, Hunt pleaded guilty without raising a Second Amendment challenge. On appeal, Hunt argued that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him. He also contended that the district court erred in applying a four-point enhancement to his offense level under the federal sentencing guidelines.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia accepted Hunt's guilty plea and applied the four-point enhancement, finding that Hunt had fired a gun inside an apartment building during a domestic violence incident, which constituted wanton endangerment under West Virginia law. Hunt appealed the decision, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional and that the district court's factual findings were erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reaffirmed that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional, consistent with its prior decision in United States v. Canada. The court also rejected Hunt's as-applied challenge, holding that neither the Supreme Court's decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen nor United States v. Rahimi abrogated the Fourth Circuit's precedent foreclosing as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1). Additionally, the court concluded that § 922(g)(1) would survive Second Amendment scrutiny even if decided anew.The Fourth Circuit also upheld the district court's application of the four-point enhancement, finding no clear error in the factual determination that Hunt fired a gun in the apartment. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "US v. Hunt" on Justia Law

In early 2022, Abel Gaspar, Jr. and his co-defendant, Sergio Emmanuel Cervantes Moran, sold methamphetamine to undercover officers on multiple occasions. On January 26, Gaspar delivered 111 grams of methamphetamine to a confidential source in a Walmart parking lot. On February 15, Gaspar sold 419 grams of methamphetamine to a DEA officer in Raleigh. On February 25, Gaspar was pulled over for speeding and fled, leaving behind 2,002 grams of methamphetamine, a firearm, and other drugs. On May 4, officers arrested Moran and searched Gaspar’s home, finding more drugs, cash, and firearms.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina sentenced Gaspar after he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The presentence investigation report recommended a downward variance to 210 months’ imprisonment. Gaspar requested a further reduction to 120 months, arguing he participated in the conspiracy out of fear for his family’s safety due to threats from Moran. The district court sentenced Gaspar to 188 months, considering the seriousness of the offense, his criminal history, and mitigating factors including his family support and childhood exposure to drugs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Gaspar’s appeal, in which he argued that the district court failed to adequately address his claim of duress. The Fourth Circuit found that the district court had considered Gaspar’s argument, noting the court’s acknowledgment of the presentencing memorandum and the bench conference where Gaspar’s concerns were discussed. The court concluded that the district court’s explanation was sufficient and affirmed the 188-month sentence, finding it procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Gaspar" on Justia Law

Stanley Lubkin pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a), and 924(e). In his plea agreement, Lubkin waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence in exchange for several concessions from the government, including the dismissal of additional charges and a recommendation against state prosecution. The plea agreement and plea colloquy informed Lubkin that he could be sentenced as an armed career criminal, which would entail a mandatory minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison. The district court sentenced him to 15 years as an armed career criminal.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina accepted Lubkin's guilty plea after a thorough plea colloquy, ensuring that he understood the charges, potential penalties, and the appeal waiver. The court later sentenced him to 15 years in prison, finding that his prior convictions qualified him as an armed career criminal under the ACCA. Lubkin appealed, arguing that the court erred in classifying him as an armed career criminal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal. The court held that Lubkin's appeal waiver was valid and enforceable, as it was made knowingly and voluntarily. The court found that Lubkin's argument fell within the scope of the waiver, and no exceptions applied. The court emphasized that enforcing the waiver preserved the value of plea agreements and the benefits of the plea system, such as speed, economy, and finality. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the district court's sentence. View "United States v. Lubkin" on Justia Law

Robert Keshaun Turner pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after police seized a gun from a car in which he was sitting. Turner challenged the denial of his motion to suppress the gun on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the search was unlawful. He also contended that inconsistencies between the supervised-release conditions announced at his sentencing and those in his written judgment constituted an error.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied Turner’s motion to suppress, holding that the search of the car was a lawful search incident to arrest under Arizona v. Gant. The court found that it was reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the crime of arrest. Turner then pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. At sentencing, the district court adopted a Sentencing Guidelines advisory range of 46 to 57 months, based on an offense level of 19 and seven criminal history points, placing Turner in criminal history category IV. Turner was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, agreeing that the search was justified under Gant. The court found no Fourth Amendment violation. However, the court vacated Turner’s sentence due to a miscalculation of his criminal history score, which resulted in an incorrect advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The court remanded the case for resentencing under the correct range. The court also found no material discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment regarding the supervised-release conditions, thus no error under United States v. Rogers. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law