Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves defendants Aghee William Smith II and David Alcorn, who were convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for their roles in fraudulent schemes that defrauded investors of millions of dollars. The schemes included marketing and selling phony investments in a dental services marketing program and fraudulent spectrum investments. The fraudulent activities primarily targeted elderly victims, resulting in significant financial losses.In the district court, Smith and Alcorn were tried together before a jury in February 2022. They raised three main issues on appeal: a joint constitutional challenge to the district court’s COVID-19 trial protocol under the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Smith’s separate challenge to the admission of videotaped depositions under the Confrontation Clause, and Alcorn’s challenge to the imposition of supervised release conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Smith and Alcorn’s joint contention that the COVID-19 trial protocol violated their rights under the Public Trial Clause, finding that the protocol did not constitute a partial courtroom closure and was justified by substantial public health reasons. The court also rejected Smith’s Confrontation Clause challenge, concluding that the government had made a good faith effort to secure the witnesses’ presence at trial and that the witnesses were unavailable due to health concerns.However, the court found merit in Alcorn’s challenge regarding the imposition of supervised release conditions. The district court had failed to properly incorporate the standard conditions of supervised release during the oral pronouncement of Alcorn’s sentence, leading to a Rogers error. As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing.In summary, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentences, affirmed Alcorn’s convictions, but vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

In April 2024, Russell Richardson Vane, IV, was arrested and charged with attempting to produce a biological agent or toxin, specifically ricin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 175(a). The FBI found castor beans and equipment for producing ricin in his home. Vane had previously been involved with a militia group, the Virginia Kekoas, and had shared information on making explosives. The group expelled him, suspecting entrapment, and reported him to the FBI. Vane was detained pending trial based on the government's evidence, including proffered information.A magistrate judge granted the government's motion for pretrial detention, and the district court affirmed this decision. Vane argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) only allows the defendant, not the government, to introduce information by proffer. The district court disagreed, noting that other circuit courts have allowed the government to use proffers in detention hearings. The court found that the totality of the circumstances, including the proffered evidence, justified Vane's detention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3142 does not prohibit the government from making evidentiary proffers during detention hearings. The court emphasized that the statute's text and context support allowing both parties to present information by proffer, promoting efficiency in detention proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's order, concluding that the government met its burden to justify Vane's pretrial detention. View "US v. Vane" on Justia Law

The case involves Makel Elboghdady, who was convicted of traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and (e). The conviction stemmed from an undercover operation where a West Virginia State Police officer posted an ad on Craigslist to attract child predators. Elboghdady responded to the ad and engaged in a series of communications with the undercover officer, which led to his travel from Ohio to West Virginia for a face-to-face meeting. Upon arrival, he was arrested and charged.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Elboghdady was denied an entrapment defense and subsequently convicted by a jury. The district court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment, applying an enhancement and cross-reference for crimes involving a victim under the age of 12. Elboghdady appealed, arguing that he was entitled to an entrapment defense and that his sentence was unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the entrapment defense, finding no evidence of government overreach or inducement. However, the appellate court vacated Elboghdady’s sentence, determining that the district court improperly applied sentencing enhancements that required evidence of intent to engage with a minor under 12 years old. The appellate court found that the district court’s factual findings did not support the application of these enhancements. Consequently, the case was remanded for resentencing without the improper enhancements. View "United States v. Elboghdady" on Justia Law

In 1999, a Virginia state court jury convicted Askari Lumumba of second-degree murder and other related charges, sentencing him to fifty-eight years in prison. While serving his sentence, Lumumba engaged in communications that led to disciplinary action. He spoke on the phone about organizing inmates and sent emails discussing potential group actions within the prison. As a result, he was charged with attempting to garner support for a group demonstration, violating Disciplinary Offense Code 128, which prohibits participating in or encouraging work stoppages or group demonstrations.Lumumba's disciplinary hearing concluded with a finding of guilt, resulting in 30 days of disciplinary segregation and a loss of 180 days of good-conduct sentence credits. His appeals to the Warden and Regional Director were denied. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia, which was denied on jurisdictional grounds. Subsequently, Lumumba filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that Offense Code 128 was void for vagueness and violated the First Amendment. The district court dismissed his petition, finding the regulation clear and reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Offense Code 128 is not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as it reasonably relates to maintaining order and security in prisons. The court also found that the regulation is not void for vagueness, as it provides sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lumumba's petition. View "Lumumba v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The case involves Izzat and Tarik Freitekh, who were convicted of various offenses related to a fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan scheme. They received $1.75 million in PPP loan funds through false representations and fabricated documents. Izzat owned several businesses, and with Tarik's help, they submitted fraudulent loan applications. The funds were deposited into accounts controlled by Izzat, and he distributed some of the money to family members under the guise of payroll.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially reviewed the case. Both defendants were indicted for bank fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and other related charges. During the trial, the court admitted testimony from their former attorneys, who had received and submitted falsified documents to the government. The jury found Izzat guilty of conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and making false statements, while Tarik was found guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, bank fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and falsifying material facts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that sufficient evidence supported the convictions. The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including emails and checks, was enough to prove Izzat's involvement in the money laundering conspiracy. The court also upheld the district court's reliance on acquitted conduct to calculate the sentencing enhancements, noting that the evidence presented at trial proved Izzat's participation in the fraudulent scheme by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also found no error in the district court's application of the "intended loss" definition in the sentencing guidelines. Tarik's arguments regarding the calculation of the loss amount and the application of the sophisticated means enhancement were also rejected. The court concluded that the district court had properly considered the relevant sentencing factors and affirmed the sentences imposed. View "United States v. Freitekh" on Justia Law

Maggie Anne Boler was convicted of six counts of presenting false claims against the United States by submitting fraudulent tax returns to the IRS and one count of making a false statement on a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan application. Boler submitted six fraudulent tax returns, receiving refunds on four, totaling $116,106. Additionally, she falsely claimed a $20,833 PPP loan. She was sentenced to 30 months in prison.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina calculated Boler's sentencing range based on the total intended financial harm, including the two denied tax returns, amounting to $180,222. Boler objected, arguing that only the actual loss should be considered, not the intended loss. The district court overruled her objection, holding that the term "loss" in the Sentencing Guidelines could include both actual and intended loss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the term "loss" in the Sentencing Guidelines is genuinely ambiguous and can encompass both actual and intended loss. The court deferred to the Sentencing Guidelines' commentary, which defines "loss" as the greater of actual or intended loss. The court found that the district court correctly included the full intended loss in Boler's sentencing calculation. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Boler's 30-month sentence. View "United States v. Boler" on Justia Law

Harry Nolan Moody was convicted in 2002 for conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. He was sentenced as a career offender to 360 months’ imprisonment. If sentenced today, Moody would no longer qualify as a career offender, and the advisory minimum would be 210 months. Moody moved for compassionate release based on this disparity, but the district court denied relief, holding that the sentencing disparity, considering Moody’s individual circumstances, didn’t constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against a reduced sentence.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially denied Moody’s motion for compassionate release, finding that the career-offender designation only increased his offense level by one level and didn’t impact his criminal history category. Moody appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, directing the district court to reassess the drug quantity attributable to Moody and reevaluate the effect of the career-offender designation on the guidelines range.On remand, the district court again denied Moody’s motion. It found that Moody was responsible for at least 50 grams of actual methamphetamine and concluded that the sentencing disparity didn’t amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The court reasoned that Moody’s conduct fell within the enhancement’s scope and that his criminal history and risk of recidivism justified an upward variance sentence. The court also considered Moody’s age, time served, and rehabilitative efforts but found that these factors, either singly or in combination, didn’t warrant release. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the court didn’t abuse its discretion in its analysis. View "United States v. Moody" on Justia Law

Timothy Olson, a fifth-grade teacher, used peer-to-peer software to download approximately 100 child pornography videos depicting the sexual abuse of prepubescent children. Olson admitted to downloading the videos and understanding the software due to his master's degree in information systems management. He pled guilty to transporting and possessing child pornography involving minors under twelve.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina sentenced Olson to 120 months’ imprisonment and a 30-year term of supervised release with numerous special conditions. Olson did not object to these conditions at sentencing. He later appealed, challenging six of the supervised release conditions as substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the plain error standard because Olson did not object to the conditions at the time of sentencing. The court found that each of the six challenged conditions was reasonably related to Olson’s offense, history, and characteristics, and that none involved a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary. The conditions included restrictions on interacting with felons, refraining from excessive alcohol use, submitting to suspicionless searches, avoiding places frequented by children, and not possessing children’s items without permission.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing these conditions. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the conditions were substantively reasonable and aligned with statutory goals of deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation. View "U.S. v. Olson" on Justia Law

Detective Frias of the Richmond Police Department observed an Instagram video showing known gang member J.S. and others brandishing firearms at the Belt Atlantic apartment complex. The video, posted shortly before the incident, depicted two men later identified as Anthony Cornelius Brown, Jr., and Dequane Aquil McCullers. Detectives accessed live surveillance footage showing individuals matching the video’s description at the same location. Upon arrival, the officers approached the men, who attempted to walk away. Brown and McCullers were detained and frisked, leading to the discovery of firearms.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Brown and McCullers' motions to suppress the evidence of the firearms. The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendants based on the video and their behavior. Brown and McCullers entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown and McCullers based on the Instagram video and their actions upon the officers' arrival. The court also found that the frisk of McCullers was justified as the officers reasonably believed he was armed. Additionally, the court ruled that the length of Brown’s detention was reasonable given the circumstances and the need to ensure officer safety. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motions to suppress. View "US v. Brown" on Justia Law

Robert Dale Ellis, after being convicted under North Carolina law for child pornography offenses, failed to register as a sex offender, leading to a federal conviction and subsequent supervised release. Ellis repeatedly violated the conditions of his supervised release, resulting in multiple revocations and re-impositions of prison terms and new supervised release conditions. His violations included unauthorized travel, failure to report to his probation officer, and non-compliance with treatment programs.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina handled Ellis' supervised release violations. The court modified his conditions multiple times, including imposing home detention and location monitoring. Despite these measures, Ellis continued to violate his release conditions, leading to further revocations and re-impositions of supervised release terms. In his latest revocation, the district court imposed two contested conditions: requiring probation officer approval for internet-capable devices and six months of location monitoring.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Ellis' appeal, where he challenged these two conditions. Ellis argued that the device-approval condition improperly delegated judicial power, effectively banned internet use, and was overbroad. He also contended that the location-monitoring condition was not reasonably related to his sentencing factors and imposed an excessive deprivation of liberty. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that the device-approval condition did not delegate judicial power improperly and was not a complete internet ban. The court found that the condition was reasonably related to Ellis' history and characteristics and did not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary. Similarly, the location-monitoring condition was deemed reasonably related to Ellis' offense and necessary for public protection and deterrence. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Ellis" on Justia Law