Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of producing and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) and 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A, respectively, and sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by identifying him for a key government witness after the witness was initially unable to make the in-court identification herself. Defendant also contends that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offenses in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it cannot infer that Defendant’s fifty-five-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to his offenses. The court reasoned that even if it assumes that his sentence is the functional equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole,his child pornography offenses “are at least as grave as the drug offense in Harmelin, which the Supreme Court deemed sufficiently egregious to justify a similar sentence.” On multiple occasions, Defendant paid a woman in the Philippines not only to pose very young children in a pornographic manner, but also to molest them for his own sexual gratification. Defendant’s offenses, which directly facilitated the exploitation and sexual abuse of particularly vulnerable victims, are far from “one of the most passive felonies a person could commit.” View "US v. Jacob Ross" on Justia Law

Before his trial on child-pornography charges, Defendant moved to suppress evidence related to the search of his van. Defendant argued that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed that required them to immediately enter the van without a warrant to see if anyone was in medical distress inside. He also argued that the officers did not have legal authority to tow the van. Last, he argued that the inventory search was a pretext for a warrantless criminal investigation. The district court held an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that police discovered while searching his van without a warrant.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that warrantless searches of vehicles carried out as part of law enforcement’s community caretaking functions do not violate the Fourth Amendment if reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the court found no error in the district court’s determination that the officers searched Defendant’s van in exercising those community caretaking functions and not as a pretext for a criminal investigatory search. The court likewise concluded that the district court did not err in holding the search was reasonable. View "US v. Alexander Treisman" on Justia Law

Suspecting that Defendant was engaged in drug-trafficking activity, law enforcement officers in Chesapeake, Virginia, stopped the vehicle he was driving to investigate. After a drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs, the officers searched the vehicle and recovered methamphetamine and related evidence. After Defendant was charged with drug trafficking offenses, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his vehicle (and later from his apartment), contending (1) that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to make the stop and (2) that, in any event, they unduly prolonged the stop — all in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the totality of the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity, justifying a brief stop to allay the officer’s suspicion. In this case, the investigatory stop did not allay that suspicion but confirmed it. Shortly after the stop, a drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs in Defendant’s vehicle, leading to the recovery of drugs and other evidence used in this case. Further, the mission of the stop was to investigate potential drug-trafficking activity, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the officers failed to “diligently pursue” their investigation to confirm or allay that suspicion. View "US v. Xavier Howell" on Justia Law

While living in Japan, Defendant sexually abused a young girl. The government brought charges under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. The government’s theory was that Defendant was employed by the Armed Forces because he worked for a Department of Veterans Affairs subcontractor. Or, the government argued, he was accompanying a member of the Armed Forces because he lived with his wife, who worked at the Kadena Air Base in Japan. Defendant pleaded guilty to two charges in exchange for the government’s dropping the rest. As part of the deal, he also agreed to waive any right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Defendant to 420 months imprisonment. But, despite his waiver, Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Defendant attempted to get around his appeal waiver by arguing that jurisdiction cannot be waived, and thus he has every right to proceed. The court reasoned that Defendant confuses a crime’s jurisdictional element with federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. Here, Defendant is not challenging the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. He’s challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on his crimes’ jurisdictional element. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge falls under his appeal waiver, and thus the court dismissed his appeal. View "US v. Emilio Moran" on Justia Law

Defendant, a medical doctor, pleaded guilty to multiple charges under Section 841 for prescribing oxycodone and other controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical need. After Defendant was sentenced, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022), which held that the statutory knowing-or-intentional mens rea applies not only to the distribution-related elements of the crime but also to the question of authorization. Accordingly, if a defendant charged under Section 841 “produces evidence that he or she was authorized to dispense controlled substances, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that he or she was acting in an unauthorized manner, or intended to do so.” Defendant contends his plea was not valid because the district court did not inform him that, if he went to trial, the government would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant subjectively knew or intended that his conduct was unauthorized, as required by Ruan.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if the district court’s explanation of the charges alone did not properly reflect the mens rea required by Ruan, the language of the indictment does reflect Ruan’s holding. The Fourth Circuit has made it clear that when explaining the nature of the charges, a district court may rely on the defendant’s sworn statement that he has read the indictment and discussed it with his attorney. View "US v. Jong Kim" on Justia Law

After Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), the district court sentenced him to 120 months imprisonment, the bottom of the advisory guidelines range. That range was determined, in part, by the district court’s conclusion that Defendant was subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment that is required by Section 2252A(b)(2) when a defendant has a prior conviction for a qualifying sex offense. The district court found that Defendant’s prior conviction under Maryland law for a sexual offense in the third degree qualified as a predicate for the Section 2252A(b)(2) enhancement. Defendant then sought a review of the district court’s ruling that his prior Maryland conviction qualified as a predicate conviction under Section 2252A(b)(2), which triggered the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court agreed with the government that Defendant waived his right to appeal that issue in his plea agreement. The court explained the indictment’s allegation that a 120-month minimum sentence applied because of Defendant’s prior Maryland conviction and the limitations that Defendant’s plea agreement placed on his right to challenge that allegation, as well as Defendant’s broad waiver of his right to appeal any determination that the district court made on that issue, preclude the present appeal. And this is confirmed by Defendant’s express waiver of the district court’s determination of the applicable sentencing guidelines range. View "US v. Bruce Sturtz" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. He claimed that his guilty plea wasn’t voluntary because he didn’t know that Maryland’s sentencing guidelines were merely advisory. But a Maryland court denied his request for postconviction relief, finding that he understood the terms of his plea agreement, including his maximum sentencing exposure. The district court held that the Maryland court’s decision denying Defendant postconviction relief was reasonable.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that AEDPA forecloses habeas relief unless the PCR court’s decision was “based on” an erroneous finding, 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(2), and Defendant doesn’t make that showing. Further subsection (d)(1) corrects only the most “extreme malfunctions.” Here, the PCR court’s decision wasn’t “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent because it didn’t “arrive at a result different from” a Supreme Court case with “materially indistinguishable” facts. Nor was the PCR court’s decision an “unreasonable application” of principles announced by the Supreme Court. Here, the PCR court concluded that Defendant couldn’t reasonably believe that the guidelines were mandatory or that he was entitled to a sentence between 30 and 51 years. That’s because the plea court correctly advised him that each of his charges carried a possible sentence of 30 years. So this isn’t a case in which Defendant was clueless about the endpoints of his sentencing exposure. View "Calvin Currica v. Richard Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally reentering the United States after an aggravated felony conviction. He challenged his conviction on numerous fronts, claiming vindictive prosecution and violations of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial, due process, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant failed to demonstrate that the presumption of vindictiveness applies. The presumption of regularity that attends a prosecutor’s pretrial charging decision, therefore, remains in place. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial on the aggravated reentry charge attached when the government obtained the indictment charging him with that offense, the second indictment in this case. Because Defendant does not argue that the time between the second indictment and his trial—just short of 6 months—is presumptively prejudicial, he has not met the threshold requirement for evaluating the remaining Barker factors. Finally, the court held that Defendant has not shown that officers arrested and fingerprinted him for an investigative purpose; therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of his second suppression motion. View "US v. Francisco Villa" on Justia Law

Defendant a citizen and resident of New Zealand, carried on an online relationship with a thirteen-year-old girl in Virginia that involved several sexually explicit video calls. A federal grand jury charged him with nine counts of producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). He entered a conditional guilty plea to one of the counts and was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. Defendant challenged both his conviction and sentence on appeal. He first argued that his conviction involves an impermissible extraterritorial application of Section 2251(a) because he was in New Zealand when the unlawful images and videos were produced. Second, he contends that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because he lacked adequate notice that the victim was underage. Third, and finally, he challenges his sentence on the grounds that the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement for offenses involving “sexual contact.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s conviction stands as a permissible domestic application of Section 2251(a) because the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in Virginia, where the visual depiction that forms the basis of Defendant’s conviction was produced and transmitted. Further, the court held that although Defendant argued otherwise, the fact that a violation of Section 2251(a) carries a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence does not give him a due process right to a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense. Finally, the court held that because Defendant admitted to masturbating during the video calls,it was appropriate for the sentencing court to apply the two-level enhancement. View "US v. Troy Skinner" on Justia Law

After committing or attempting to commit thirteen robberies, Defendant was indicted on twenty-two counts of robbery-related activity and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Before a jury could return a verdict in Defendant’s original trial, it was deemed a mistrial. Before a retrial the district court severed Defendant’s charges into two trials—one for the felon in possession of a firearm charge and another for the robbery-related charges. After both trials resulted in guilty verdicts on all counts, Defendant filed motions for a judgment of acquittal in each case, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. The district court denied the motions. Defendant appealed, contesting the district court’s decisions on both motions for acquittal, the district court’s enforcement of a stipulation in the retrial, and the district court’s use of certain jointly proposed jury instructions, and alleging a speedy trial violation.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties entered into an open-ended stipulation in which they both agreed that Defendant’s alleged robberies affected commerce. That Defendant later regretted entering into the stipulation is not sufficient to relieve him of its continuing effect. Further, there was sufficient evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant stipulated that he was previously convicted of a felony and knew of his status as a felon. As to the possession element, the relevant firearm was purchased by Defendant’s on-again-off-again girlfriend. Finally, the court held that Defendant waived his right to assert a speedy trial violation. View "US v. Christopher Robertson" on Justia Law