Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Mohamed Lamine Kouyate, a 36-year-old native and citizen of Guinea, entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2014 due to concerns about political unrest in Guinea. He overstayed his visa and was later convicted in Maryland for identity fraud involving over $100,000, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence. Following his release on parole, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability for overstaying his visa. Kouyate applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be persecuted or tortured if returned to Guinea due to his father's political notoriety.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Kouyate's applications, ruling that his identity fraud conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime," making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The IJ also denied his application for deferral of removal under the CAT, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured if returned to Guinea. The IJ noted that the political climate in Guinea had changed, and Kouyate's fears were speculative and based on generalized concerns of violence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Kouyate's appeal, deeming his challenge to the IJ's particularly serious crime ruling waived and affirming the IJ's denial of deferral of removal under the CAT. The BIA agreed with the IJ's assessment that Kouyate's fears were speculative and not supported by sufficient evidence of a particularized risk of torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and BIA's decisions, finding no reversible error. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Kouyate had not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the particularly serious crime ruling and affirmed the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The petition for review was denied. View "Kouyate v. Garland" on Justia Law

Stephen Bullis was convicted of six federal crimes, including two counts of using a firearm during and in relation to other crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After serving twenty-three years in prison, the United States Supreme Court struck down the “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as unconstitutional. This led the district court to set aside Bullis’s two Section 924(c) convictions and resentence him on the remaining four counts. Bullis argued that the resentencing violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had fully served his sentence on these counts at the time of the resentencing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially sentenced Bullis to 235 months of imprisonment on each of Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, all to run concurrently. On Count 3, Bullis was sentenced to 360 months, and on Count 6, he received a lifetime sentence, both to run consecutively to the 235-month concurrent sentences. After the Supreme Court’s ruling, the district court vacated Counts 3 and 6 and resentenced Bullis to 450 months on Count 2 and 240 months on Counts 1, 3, and 5, all to run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Bullis’s resentencing did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his sentences for Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 were part of a consecutive sentence package that had not been fully served. However, the court found that the district court committed reversible errors by imposing a special condition of supervised release that differed materially from the court’s oral pronouncement and by failing to incorporate clearly the Standard Conditions of Supervision as adopted in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case for resentencing. View "US v. Bullis" on Justia Law

Rose-Marie Nsahlai was convicted for her involvement in a scheme to fraudulently obtain Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans. Nsahlai and her husband, Didier Kindambu, applied for two PPP loans using false information and then used the loan proceeds for unauthorized purposes. The fraudulent applications included fabricated payroll documentation created by Nsahlai, which falsely represented that the Papillon companies had substantial payroll expenses. The loans, totaling over $2.5 million, were approved and deposited into their accounts, and the funds were subsequently used for personal expenses, including the purchase of a new residence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia convicted Nsahlai on charges of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud, and unlawful monetary transactions. Before trial, the district court excluded evidence related to Nsahlai's claims of domestic abuse by Kindambu, ruling it irrelevant and prejudicial. Nsahlai argued that this evidence was necessary to explain her actions and lack of intent to commit fraud. The court allowed her to testify that she felt compelled by her relationship but prohibited specific references to abuse.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The appellate court found no reversible error in the exclusion of the domestic abuse evidence, concluding that it was not relevant to the charges and that any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Nsahlai's guilt. The court also rejected Nsahlai's challenge to the jury instructions, determining that the instructions, when read as a whole, did not mislead the jury or affect her substantial rights. The court held that the instructions properly required the jury to find the elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Nsahlai's convictions. View "US v. Nsahlai" on Justia Law

David Chang participated in a drug-trafficking conspiracy from March to October 2021, supplying large quantities of cocaine from California to Harold Campbell, a mid-level distributor in Virginia Beach, Virginia. After an investigation, Chang and Campbell were indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment and four years’ supervised release. Both pleaded guilty, and Chang was initially sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment and four years’ supervised release.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found Chang eligible for the safety valve under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) but erroneously applied the statutory minimum sentence. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. At the resentencing, the district court imposed a sentence of 69 months’ imprisonment and ten years’ supervised release, citing Chang’s significant role in the drug conspiracy and his criminal history.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the increased term of supervised release, despite a slight reduction in imprisonment, constituted a harsher sentence. The court held that this harsher sentence raised a presumption of vindictiveness under North Carolina v. Pearce, which was not adequately rebutted by the district court. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated Chang’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, emphasizing the need to avoid any appearance of vindictiveness in the sentencing process. View "United States v. Chang" on Justia Law

The case involves Russell Lucius Laffitte, who was convicted of bank and wire fraud in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The government alleged that between 2006 and 2021, Laffitte, as CEO of Palmetto State Bank, conspired with Alex Murdaugh, a disbarred attorney, to defraud Murdaugh’s clients. Laffitte was accused of using his position to access settlement accounts, collecting fees, and extending unsecured loans to Murdaugh, resulting in nearly two million dollars being stolen from the accounts. Laffitte was charged with conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, bank fraud, wire fraud, and misapplication of bank funds.During the trial, the government presented fifteen witnesses, and Laffitte called eight witnesses and testified in his own defense. After the jury began deliberations, the court received notes from jurors indicating issues, including one juror needing medication and another feeling pressured. The district court decided to remove two jurors, Juror No. 88 and Juror No. 93, and replaced them with alternates. The jury then returned a guilty verdict on all counts.Laffitte appealed, arguing that the removal of the jurors violated his Fifth Amendment right to be present and his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the removal of Juror No. 88 violated Laffitte’s Sixth Amendment right because there was a reasonable and substantial possibility that her removal was related to her views on the case. The court also found that the removal violated Laffitte’s Fifth Amendment right to be present, as he was not present during the in camera interview when the decision to remove Juror No. 88 was made. The court concluded that these errors were not harmless and vacated Laffitte’s convictions and sentence, remanding the case for a new trial. View "US v. Russell Laffitte" on Justia Law

Christopher Ladariss Mitchell was charged with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and one substantive count of Hobbs Act robbery. The indictment alleged that Mitchell and his co-defendants conspired to rob employees of two wireless communication retailers, referred to as Company A and Company B, at various locations within the Middle District of North Carolina and elsewhere. Mitchell pleaded guilty to the charges in January 2023.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina sentenced Mitchell based on a presentence investigation report (PSR) that included four separate robberies in the calculation of his total offense level. Mitchell objected, arguing that only two robberies should be considered. The district court rejected his argument, finding that the evidence supported his involvement in all four robberies beyond a reasonable doubt, and sentenced him to 108 months in prison.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Mitchell contended that the district court erred in including the four robberies in the offense level calculation. He argued that the conspiracy count should only include two robberies, one for each company. The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(d), a conviction on a count charging a conspiracy to commit more than one offense should be treated as if the defendant had been convicted on a separate count of conspiracy for each offense. The court found that the indictment's broad language encompassed the four robberies and that the district court correctly applied the guideline by including all four robberies in the offense level calculation. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In 2002, Chadrick Fulks and Brandon Basham engaged in a violent crime spree across several states, including carjacking, kidnapping, and murdering Alice Donovan. They were convicted in the District of South Carolina on multiple counts, including carjacking and kidnapping resulting in death, and were sentenced to death by a jury.Fulks and Basham later filed a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that their firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924 were invalid. They contended that their carjacking convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 no longer qualified as predicate “crimes of violence” under § 924, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime of violence. They argued that if attempted carjacking was not a crime of violence, then completed carjacking should not be considered a predicate crime of violence either. The district court denied their motion and granted a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the federal carjacking statute is divisible into completed and attempted carjacking. It concluded that completed carjacking is categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)’s force clause, relying on its previous decisions in United States v. Evans and United States v. Runyon. The court found that the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor did not undermine these precedents. Additionally, the court determined that Fulks’s and Basham’s § 924 convictions were validly predicated on their carjacking convictions, as the carjacking and kidnapping were inextricably intertwined. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the § 2255 motion. View "US v. Fulks" on Justia Law

In 2000, Antonio Lamont Lightfoot was convicted by a jury in the District of Maryland for bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. The government identified two prior convictions for serious violent felonies: a 1985 armed bank robbery in Virginia and a 1990 armed bank robbery in Michigan. Consequently, Lightfoot was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment under the federal "three-strikes" law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), and an additional seven years for the firearm charge. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal, and subsequent collateral challenges were unsuccessful.Following the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) as unconstitutionally vague, Lightfoot sought to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argued that the residual clause of the "serious violent felony" definition in 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) was similarly void for vagueness. The district court denied his motion, holding that Michigan bank robbery is a divisible offense and that Lightfoot was convicted of the assaultive version, which qualifies as a serious violent felony under the enumerated offenses clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Michigan's bank robbery statute is divisible into assaultive and non-assaultive offenses. Lightfoot was convicted of the assaultive version, which involves taking from another by force or intimidation. The court held that this offense qualifies as a serious violent felony under the enumerated offenses clause of the federal three-strikes law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). Therefore, Lightfoot's life sentence was upheld. View "United States v. Lightfoot" on Justia Law

Alvin Johnson pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine under a plea agreement. The agreement included a stipulation regarding the drug quantity and its base offense level but allowed the Government to make a sentencing recommendation. Johnson was initially sentenced to 128 months in prison, classified as a career offender based on prior convictions. He later successfully challenged one of these convictions, leading to a recalculated Guidelines range of 57-71 months.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially sentenced Johnson to 128 months. Upon remand, after Johnson's successful challenge to his career offender status, the Probation Office recalculated his Guidelines range to 57-71 months. The Government then moved for an upward departure or variance, arguing that Johnson's criminal history warranted a higher sentence. The district court agreed and sentenced Johnson to 120 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Johnson argued that the Government breached the plea agreement by seeking a sentence above the recalculated Guidelines range. The court found that the plea agreement did not restrict the Government from recommending a higher sentence and that the Government had reserved the right to make a sentencing recommendation. The court held that the Government did not breach the plea agreement and affirmed the 120-month sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case involves defendants Aghee William Smith II and David Alcorn, who were convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for their roles in fraudulent schemes that defrauded investors of millions of dollars. The schemes included marketing and selling phony investments in a dental services marketing program and fraudulent spectrum investments. The fraudulent activities primarily targeted elderly victims, resulting in significant financial losses.In the district court, Smith and Alcorn were tried together before a jury in February 2022. They raised three main issues on appeal: a joint constitutional challenge to the district court’s COVID-19 trial protocol under the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Smith’s separate challenge to the admission of videotaped depositions under the Confrontation Clause, and Alcorn’s challenge to the imposition of supervised release conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Smith and Alcorn’s joint contention that the COVID-19 trial protocol violated their rights under the Public Trial Clause, finding that the protocol did not constitute a partial courtroom closure and was justified by substantial public health reasons. The court also rejected Smith’s Confrontation Clause challenge, concluding that the government had made a good faith effort to secure the witnesses’ presence at trial and that the witnesses were unavailable due to health concerns.However, the court found merit in Alcorn’s challenge regarding the imposition of supervised release conditions. The district court had failed to properly incorporate the standard conditions of supervised release during the oral pronouncement of Alcorn’s sentence, leading to a Rogers error. As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing.In summary, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentences, affirmed Alcorn’s convictions, but vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law