Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
US v. George Fowler
Defendant pled guilty to two federal weapons charges after local law enforcement executed a search warrant at his residence and discovered a multitude of firearms, ammunition, and drugs. The district court sentenced Defendant to 117 months imprisonment, at the lowest end of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The Fourth Circuit ordered supplemental briefing and oral argument on two issues– (1) whether the district court plainly erred in assigning one criminal history point to Defendant’s criminal domestic violence offense; and (2) whether the district court adequately explained its rejection of Fowler’s nonfrivolous arguments for a downward departure or variance.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court found no reversible error in this case. As a general proposition, this court reviews a criminal sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” The court reasoned that procedural reasonableness requires the court to “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,” which includes “improperly calculating . . . the Guidelines range.” Thus, any claim of error that was not pursued and preserved in the district court is reviewed only for plain error. The court explained that since Defendant failed to object to the PSR’s inclusion of his CDV conviction, the court found no error by the district court in adopting it. Moreover, Defendant has not borne the heavy burden of satisfying the plain error criteria, as he cannot prove “that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would be different.” View "US v. George Fowler" on Justia Law
US v. Ervin Leggette
Defendant and another person were trespassing in a public park after it closed. When officers saw their car, they investigated the trespass. The officers found a gun abandoned in a nearby trash can, so they frisked Defendant and questioned him about the gun. After first denying the gun was his, Defendant admitted he was a felon and that he owned the gun. The officers arrested Defendant, who was then federally indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He sought to suppress his incriminatory statements, arguing that his statements in the park were inadmissible because he was “in custody” under Miranda, and so the officers needed to read him his Miranda rights before questioning him about the gun. The district court disagreed, and Defendant pleaded guilty.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Miranda warnings are not required every time an individual has their freedom of movement restrained by a police officer. Nor are they necessarily required every time “questioning imposes some sort of pressure on suspects to confess to their crimes.” Instead, they are required only when a suspect’s freedom of movement is restrained to the point where they do not feel free to terminate the encounter, and the circumstances reveal “the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” The court found that, in this case, no such pressures existed. View "US v. Ervin Leggette" on Justia Law
US v. Michael Mangarella
Defendant filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), relying primarily on his vulnerability to COVID-19 due to his advanced age and chronic lung-related health conditions. Although the government originally supported Defendant’s motion, it later changed its position, and the district court ultimately denied relief. Defendant appealed that denial, arguing in part that the district court, in weighing the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), failed to address or consider his heightened risk of death or serious illness if infected with COVID-19.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Defendant and vacated the district court’s denial of compassionate release and remand for reconsideration. The court explained that it cannot say with any confidence that in denying Defendant’s motion, the district court properly “reconsidered the Section 3553(a) factors in view of” his age and health conditions, the COVID-19 outbreak at his correctional facility, and the “severe risks arising out of those circumstances.” Thus, the court wrote it cannot meaningfully review its denial of Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. View "US v. Michael Mangarella" on Justia Law
US v. Lonnie Malone
Defendant was sentenced to 330 months in federal prison for the use of a firearm to facilitate a drug offense and for a drug conspiracy. After serving eleven years in prison, Defendant filed his first motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A). Defendant argued that his significant health decline and advanced age justified his release. The district court denied his motion, relying solely upon a now in applicable policy statement, United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”). The following year, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) deemed Defendant severely at risk of contracting COVID-19 and placed him in home confinement through authority granted by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). Defendant filed a subsequent motion for compassionate release reiterating his advanced age and severe health conditions. In addition, Defendant presented supplementary arguments that focused on the COVID-19 pandemic, relevant 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors, the “extreme” nature of his sentence, and his inability to receive government benefits while in home confinement. The district court again denied Defendant’s motion for compassionate release.
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s decision with instructions to grant Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by failing to properly assess the following factors which would warrant Defendant’s compassionate release: his ailing health, advanced age, and relevant 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors. Had it addressed that evidence, as more fully discussed below, its analysis of whether Defendant is entitled to compassionate release would have likely merited a different outcome. View "US v. Lonnie Malone" on Justia Law
US v. Keanan Bond
Defendant, facing at least 1,054 months in prison for a string of armed robberies, reached a plea agreement and instead was sentenced to 384 months. Soon after, Congress passed the First Step Act, changing the calculations of relevant mandatory minimums. Had Defendant been sentenced after the Act became law, his minimum sentence would have been 168 months, less than half of his current sentence. Yet the district court denied Defendant’s motion for compassionate release in part because it “declined to disturb the parties’ carefully negotiated [plea] agreement.” Defendant appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered the plea deal.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court acted well within its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. The court agreed with the district court that (1) considering the plea agreement in this context reflected a “respect for the law” and (2) reducing Defendant’s sentence so far below the initial Guidelines range wouldn’t be “just punishment” for Defendant’s crimes. Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to modify Defendant’s sentence. View "US v. Keanan Bond" on Justia Law
US v. Keanan Bond
Defendant facing at least 1,054 months in prison for a string of armed robberies, reached a plea agreement and instead was sentenced to 384 months. Soon after, Congress passed the First Step Act, changing the calculations of relevant mandatory minimums. Had Defendant been sentenced after the Act became law, his minimum sentence would have been 168 months, less than half of his current sentence. Yet the district court denied Defendant’s motion for compassionate release in part because it “declined to disturb the parties’ carefully negotiated [plea] agreement.” Defendant appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered the plea deal.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court acted well within its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. The court explained that the original stacked sentence was properly calculated when imposed. And in any event, the district court’s task in weighing compassionate release “was not to assess the correctness of the original sentence it imposed. Rather, its task was to determine whether the Section 3553(a) factors counseled against a sentence reduction in light of the new, extraordinary circumstances identified.” The district court considered the relevant factors and concluded that the original sentence remained appropriate. Thus, the court wrote, that given its highly deferential standard of review, the district court was well within its purview to deny Defendant’s motion. View "US v. Keanan Bond" on Justia Law
US v. Roderick Williams
Defendant s filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) motion for relief from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. The district court denied the Rule 60(b)(3) motion and Defendant appealed. He argued that the district court erred in finding that his Rule 60(b)(3) motion, filed three and a half years after the district court’s Section 2255 order, was not entitled to equitable tolling.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Rule 60(b)(3)’s one-year time limit cannot be equitably tolled. The court explained that it recognizes the gravity of the stakes in habeas proceedings. Yet the court does not believe that equitable tolling can apply to motions brought under Rule 60(b)(3). And because Defendant filed his motion more than three and a half years after the applicable district court order, the district court correctly held that his motion was untimely filed. View "US v. Roderick Williams" on Justia Law
Dustin Dyer v. Shirrellia Smith
Appellee filed suit against two Transportation and Security Administration (“TSA”) officers, (collectively “Appellants”), alleging they violated the First Amendment by prohibiting Appellee from recording a pat-down search and the Fourth Amendment by seizing Appellee and seizing and searching his cell phone. To state a cause of action for damages, Appellee brought his claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Appellants moved to dismiss, challenging Appellee’s reliance on Bivens and also asserting qualified immunity as to Appellee’s First Amendment claim. The district court denied Appellants’ motion, recognizing that both claims presented new Bivens contexts but finding that no special factor counseled hesitation in extending Bivens as to either claim.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and concluded that Bivens remedies are unavailable in this case. The court explained that as “even a single sound reason to defer to Congress” will be enough to require the court refrain from creating a Bivens remedy, we decline to extend an implied damages remedy pursuant to Bivens against Appellants based on the existence of an alternative remedial structure and/or the interest of national security. And since Appellee has presented no cognizable claim for damages, we need not address Appellants’ qualified immunity defense as to Appellee’s First Amendment claim. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Dustin Dyer v. Shirrellia Smith" on Justia Law
US v. Shamauri Shivers
Defendant appealed his sentence for Hobbs Act robbery, asserting that the district court erred in applying the U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.2 sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight when he discarded a loaded firearm in view of pursuing law enforcement officers.
The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing without application of the Section 3C1.2 enhancement. The court agreed with Defendant that the record does not reflect sufficient evidence that he created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person when he fled from police. The court explained that the Government relies on this exchange to support its contention that any error in applying the enhancement was harmless. But even if the Guidelines range—and, therefore, the enhancement—was not a “significant factor” in the court’s sentence, the district court did not say that the enhancement was irrelevant to its sentencing decision despite several opportunities to do so. View "US v. Shamauri Shivers" on Justia Law
US v. Sonny Mack
Less than a year after being released from federal prison, Defendant “engaged in an unjustified, merciless beating” of an unarmed, 72-year-old security guard that caused “permanent damage” to one of the victim’s eyes. The probation officer petitioned to revoke Defendant’s supervised release. In rulings not challenged here, the district court found Defendant committed the alleged offense and that it constituted first-degree assault and battery under South Carolina law. The primary issue on appeal was whether that offense is a “crime of violence” under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that South Carolina Code Section 16-3- 600(C)(1)(b)(i) is a crime of violence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The court explained that even if it might be possible to imagine a case of first-degree assault and battery via a reckless offer, that would not change the court’s conclusion. To exclude a state offense under the elements clause, “there must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that a state would actually punish that conduct.” But given the text of this statute—and “the total absence of case law” involving any such prosecutions—we conclude “there is not a realistic probability that South Carolina would punish” a reckless offer as first-degree assault and battery. View "US v. Sonny Mack" on Justia Law