Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent has long struggled with mental illness and a proclivity to violent outbursts. In 2017, Williams assaulted a security guard in Portland, Oregon—a federal crime because it happened at a Social Security office. Respondent pleaded guilty and was sentenced to just over four years in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Federal prisoners on the cusp of being released may be civilly committed if they are “presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which [their] release would create a substantial risk” to the person or property of others. Here, the primary question is whether—in making such a risk assessment—a court must consider any terms of supervision that would govern the prisoner’s conduct post-release.   The Fourth Circuit held that a court must consider any terms of supervision that would govern the prisoner’s conduct post-release. Thus, because the record offers no assurances the district court appropriately considered the terms of Respondent’s supervised release before ordering him committed, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "US v. Nathaniel Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, challenging his conviction for using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court denied his motion and Defendant appealed.The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the federal arson statute which served as the predicate for Defendant's Sec. 924(c) conviction is not categorically a crime of violence. Because the statute Defendant was convicted under criminalized the arson of property fully owned by the defendant, and not just that of the property “of another” as required by Sec. 924(c). View "US v. Cecil Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder in the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News, Virginia. After exhausting direct appeals to the Virginia Court of Appeals and the Virginia Supreme Court, Petitioner filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus in the Newport News Circuit Court. That court dismissed the petition. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, unsuccessfully appealed the dismissal to the Virginia Supreme Court. After that, Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court ordered the state to file a responsive pleading to show cause why the writ should not be granted. It also instructed the state to treat the order as a “request that the records of the state criminal trial and habeas corpus proceedings, if pertinent and available, be forwarded to the Clerk’s Office in Alexandria, Virginia. Petitioner appealed the denial of Rule 60(b) motion. When the district court sent its records to the Fourth Circuit, the state habeas records were not included.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded to the district court with the following instructions: (1) the state must file a Rule 5-compliant Answer; (2) the district court shall determine if it has the records it requested—those “pertinent and available”— and, in this inquiry, address the state habeas records that were missing when the file was transferred to the Fourth Circuit; and (3) finally, the district court shall reconsider the state’s motion to dismiss, considering the complete answer and the records it first requested. View "Arthur Sanford v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 22 years for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and for three substantive wire-fraud counts, based on the three wire transmissions sent to victims in Maryland.The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that Defendant hatched a massive fraudulent scheme that targeted victims in the United States using wires in the United States. Even though the court agreed that the wire-fraud statute does not apply extraterritorially, its focus is the misuse of wires in the United States for fraudulent purposes, so Defendant was convicted of the domestic act of using wires in the United States. The district court did not err in refusing to impose the extraordinary remedy of granting use immunity to witnesses, and the court sufficiently cleansed the proceeding of any prejudice caused by the juror who overheard outside the discussion of the defendant. Any error based on the district court’s consideration of Defendant’s extraterritorial conduct at sentencing was harmless. But the district court too broadly imposed restitution, so the court remanded for a new restitution order. Finally, the court did not plainly err when imposing supervised release conditions, and the conditions were both reasonable and constitutional. The conviction and sentence are therefore affirmed except for the restitution order. View "US v. Lee Elbaz" on Justia Law

Defendant a member of the street gang in Newport News, Virginia, known as the “Dump Squad,” was charged in 2009 with counts of racketeering conspiracy, drug conspiracy, conspiracy to interfere with and interference with commerce by robbery, using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity, maiming in aid of racketeering activity, murder in aid of racketeering activity, and using a firearm causing death. The issue presented in this appeal is whether offenses under 18 U.S.C. Section 1959 (violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity, commonly referred to as “VICAR”) — in particular, VICAR assault and VICAR murder — must be committed with a sufficiently culpable mens rea to amount to “crime[s] of violence,” as necessary for conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, but for different reasons. The court held that the elements of both VICAR assault and VICAR murder in this case include a mens rea more culpable than mere recklessness and that the mens rea of both VICAR crimes satisfies the mens rea element of a “crime of violence” in Section 924(c).  A defendant who, as part of his role in a racketeering enterprise, commits an assault with a dangerous weapon or that results in serious bodily injury or commits second-degree murder, commits a crime of violence, as he used or threatened to use force against the person of another. View "US v. Martin Manley" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for two drug-related offenses, asserting that his jury trial on those charges did not occur within the timeframe established by the Speedy Trial Act. He also challenged his sentence, arguing that the district court procedurally erred in calculating the drug weight attributable to him and by not orally announcing during sentencing the discretionary conditions of supervised release imposed upon him in the written judgment.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Defendant that the record does not show that the district court complied with the Act’s procedural requirements for granting an ends-of-justice continuance for the period between July 22, 2019, and November 7, 2019. Because that 108-day period exceeds the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day timeframe within which his trial had to occur, the court reversed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss these two counts and vacate those convictions. The court further explained that vacating the convictions requires vacating Defendant’s entire sentence, which in turn moots his two sentencing challenges. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "US v. Enil Montoya Velasquez" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, defendants were convicted for drug-related murder under 21 U.S.C. Section 848(e)(1)(A), as well as distribution of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). On appeal, the defendants argued that their drug-related murder conviction and their sentences of death and life imprisonment can no longer stand under the First Step Act. The defendants also claimed that their convictions under 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) are "covered" offenses under the First Step Act and that their sentences should be reduced.The Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's appellate issues, affirming their convictions and sentences. The court explained that 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) is not a covered offense under the First Step Act as its penalties were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act and that the defendants' sentences for the distribution charges were substantively and procedurally reasonable. View "US v. James Roane, Jr." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (the “First Step Act”), which makes retroactive the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (the “Fair Sentencing Act”) that reduced sentencing disparities between cocaine and crack cocaine offenses. Appellant contends that pursuant to United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2021), section 404 decisions must be procedurally and substantively reasonable, and the district court’s decision not to reduce his sentence was substantively unreasonable. In contrast, the United States (the “Government”) insists that Collington is distinguishable and limited to section 404 grants as opposed to denials. Therefore, the Government argues that the more circumscribed review for abuse of discretion applies to the district court’s denial of section 404 relief in this case.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Appellant’s section 404 motion and remand for reconsideration. The court concluded that the requirements outlined in Collington apply generally in the section 404 context -- that is, regardless of whether the district court grants or denies the motion. Here, although the district court’s order denying Appellant’s section 404 motion was procedurally reasonable, it was not substantively so. View "US v. Mitchell Swain" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted at a bench trial of receiving and possessing child pornography found on his phone. He appealed, making six arguments. The Fourth Circuit explained that based on the totality of the circumstances of Defendant’s questioning show Defendant was not in custody, so his Miranda rights were not violated. Although admitting the cellphone report into evidence violated Defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights, the court found that the error was harmless. And the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of past wrongs, in allowing the Detective’s lay-opinion testimony, or in fashioning its restitution order. But the lifetime ban on internet and computer usage is foreclosed by the Fourth Circuit’s caselaw. So the court reversed as to that condition and remanded to the district court. View "US v. Augustin Arce" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant for his role in a drug trafficking conspiracy, and the district court sentenced him to 276 months in prison. On appeal, his counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), representing that Defendant has no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the district court erred by applying the Sentencing Guidelines’ two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises for the purpose of drug distribution.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the evidence supports the district court’s findings that Defendant and his coconspirator dealt drugs out of the coconspirator’s home, where they stored and packaged drugs that Defendant then sold directly outside the home and along the street. The district court, therefore, did not clearly err in applying the premises enhancement. View "US v. Keith Barnett" on Justia Law