Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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The Interim Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety (the “State”), appealed from the district court’s order granting state prisoner Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner’s sole claim in his Section 2254 petition is that his lead trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to withdraw and testify on his behalf to impeach one of the State’s key witnesses.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that it is not free to reweigh evidence or interpose our own interpretations of the facts when reviewing a Section 2254 petition, even if we disagree with them or believe they are wrong. The court wrote that because the district court did just that, the court held that it must reverse its decision.   The court further explained that whether Sullivan or Strickland would supply the clearly established law, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden to secure habeas relief because he has no claim. He has failed to upend the state court’s conclusion that the alleged November 20, 2001, conversation between the key witness and his trial counsel never occurred, meaning he has not shown that she was operating under any conflict of interest during his trial. Nor has he demonstrated that his trial counsel possessed any information to impeach the key witness’s testimony had she withdrawn from her representation. In short, there is no factual support for the lone claim raised in Petitioner’s Section 2254 petition. View "Terrence Hyman v. Casandra Hoekstra" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed from his convictions for conspiracy to commit fraud, conspiracy to launder money, and eight counts of mail or wire fraud. He argued that his trial was constitutionally defective, his indictment was constructively amended, his jury instructions prejudiced him, and his conviction for conspiracy to launder money must be reversed for lack of sufficient evidence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding that his arguments—most of which were not properly preserved—are meritless. The court held that Defendant’s right-to-compel challenge falters, at minimum, at the third step of the plain error inquiry because he fails to show how the district court’s alleged Fifth Amendment error affected the outcome of his proceedings. 
 Further, even if the probable-cause finding for Count 2 were flawed, the Government would still have been well within its rights to seize Defendant’s properties based on the underlying and unchallenged probable-cause findings for these other counts.   Next, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show that his indictment contained an error, much less a plain error. It is well established that “[t]he allegation in a single count of conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for [t]he conspiracy is the crime, and that is one, however diverse its objects.” United States v. Marshall, 332 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2003).   Moreover, the court explained that even if it assumed that the district court’s concealment-money-laundering instructions were flawed, that error did not affect the outcome of Defendant’s proceedings because he was nevertheless convicted of conspiring to commit transactional money laundering. View "US v. David Miller" on Justia Law

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Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). He appealed from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a firearm seized from his “fanny pack,” a small bag strapped around his waist. Defendant argued that the officers (1) lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him as he was walking at a fairground in Winston Salem, North Carolina, and (2) exceeded the scope of any permissible stop and frisk by placing him in handcuffs and by ultimately searching the fanny pack.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in denying the suppression motion. The officers had reasonable suspicion to think that Defendant, a convicted felon and gang member who had posted a recent incriminating statement on social media and whose residence had been the target of recent shootings, was engaged in criminal activity and was armed and dangerous. The court further concluded that the officers did not exceed the scope of the brief detention and frisk by handcuffing Defendant and, after feeling a hard object in his fanny pack, by opening the pack and seizing the firearm. Those actions were justified to ensure the safety of both the officers and other people nearby. View "US v. Chandler Gist-Davis" on Justia Law

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Defendant sought vacatur of his 2003 conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The basis for Defendant’s coram nobis petition is primarily the decision in United States v. Simmons, pursuant to which neither of the North Carolina criminal offenses underlying his 2003 firearm conviction qualifies as a felony. The district court denied Defendant’s coram nobis petition, ruling that he failed to explain why he had not challenged the 2003 conviction in a timelier fashion.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded. The court wrote that Defendant and the government — do not dispute that Defendant is actually innocent of his 2003 firearm conviction. And they also do not dispute that Defendant satisfies the first and fourth requirements of the coram nobis writ. Therefore the focus is on the other requirements of coram nobis relief: timeliness (the second) and adverse consequences (the third).   The court held that in considering the competing contentions the court has no reason to rule against Defendant on the second coram nobis prong. In an ideal world, Defendant would have promptly identified the Simmons and Miller decisions, as well as their impact on his 2003 firearm conviction, and he would have filed his coram nobis petition soon after Miller was rendered. However, in the ideal world, Defendant would not have been invalidly convicted in 2003. Further, the court explained that an essential purpose of the coram nobis remedy is to “achieve justice.” The court wrote that in order to achieve justice in this situation it is obliged to set the record straight. View "US v. Brooks Lesane" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to transmit national defense information to Chinese agents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 794(c), and making materially false statements to FBI agents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1001(a)(2). On appeal, Defendant challenges the district court’s application during trial of the “silent witness rule” — under which sensitive evidence is disclosed to the jury and the trial’s other participants but not to the public — contending that it violated his right to a public trial, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and his right to present a complete defense, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. He also mounted two distinct challenges to the district court’s instruction of the jury.   The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant’s challenges and affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court wrote it does not suggest that the use of the silent witness rule could never implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, as reliance on the silent witness rule has the potential to interfere meaningfully with the public’s ability to understand what is happening in the proceedings, despite their physical presence in the courtroom. But it doubts that the limited use of the silent witness rule as it was applied in this case amounted to a sanctionable closure of the courtroom.   Further, in response to Defendant’s argument that the district court “watered down” the mens rea requirement for the conspiracy offense, the court found Defendant’s reasoning unpersuasive, as he focuses too narrowly on one small segment of the instructions without context. View "US v. Kevin Mallory" on Justia Law

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Defendants led a violent street gang known as the Black Mob Gangstas, which was responsible for two murders. Several gang members were indicted, most of which entered guilty pleas and then testified against Defendants. Defendants were convicted of various offenses including murder in aid of racketeering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana. Each defendant received multiple consecutive life sentences.Defendants appealed on several issues, each of which was rejected by the Fourth Circuit. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to support each of Defendants' convictions. The court also rejected Defendants' claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes their convictions for drug conspiracy, firearms murder, and VICAR murder because they constituted the "same offense." The Fourth Circuit also held that the district court did not err in severing Defendants' trials, finding that Defendants did not suffer a miscarriage of justice as a result of the joint trial. Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court did not err in imposing consecutive life sentences.Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions and sentences in full. View "US v. Demetrice Devine" on Justia Law

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A jury in the Eastern District of Virginia convicted Defendant of defrauding investors in his technology company out of millions of dollars. The district court sentenced him to 151 months in prison, the bottom of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. Defendant appealed, raising two issues. First, he claimed that the indictment against him did not adequately allege venue in the Eastern District of Virginia. Second, he contended that the Fourth Circuit must vacate his sentence because the district court did not address his argument for a downward variance.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that Defendant’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. The court explained that although the district court did not address Defendant’s specific contention about the alleged policy failings of the fraud Guidelines, it did address and reject his argument that the fraud enhancements consequently overstated his culpability. Defendant did not raise any other objection to his sentence, and the record reveals that the district court provided a thorough and individualized explanation for its sentencing decision. View "US v. Andrew Powers" on Justia Law

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Defendant operated a multimillion-dollar fraud scheme out of Israel which targeted unsophisticated victims worldwide. Defendant was ultimately convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and substantive wire fraud, and sentenced to 22 years in prison.On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Defendant raised several challenges, including that she did not commit a crime under United States law because the wire-fraud statute does not apply to hee conduct that occurred out of the county. The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's position, finding that, although the wire-fraud statute does not apply extraterritorially, the focus of the statute is on the misuse of American wires. Because Defendant's conduct involved the misuse of American wires, the statute applied to her.The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's remaining challenges, with the exception of her challenge to the district court's restitution order that went beyond victims of domestic wire fraud. View "US v. Lee Elbaz" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff brought a False Claims Act challenge against two doctors, five medical companies, and an accounting firm, collectively referred to hereinafter as Defendants. She alleged that Defendants (1) knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare following the dissolution of one company’s corporate charter and the revocation of its certificate of corporate authorization and (2) engaged in a fraudulent medical upcoding scheme.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding that Plaintiff failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the falsity of statements made by one of the defendants. And she failed to adequately allege scienter, materiality, and the presentment of false claims regarding the remaining seven Defendants.   The court explained that the False Claims Act prohibits the knowing presentment of a “false or fraudulent claim” or a “false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.” 31 U.S.C. Section 3729(a)(1)(A), (B). At common law, a false statement encompassed any “words or conduct” that “amount[] to an assertion not in accordance with the truth.” But even under the broad, common-law definition of falsity, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the allegedly false statement made by one of the defendants. Further, the court wrote that it doesn’t help that Plaintiff inconsistently describes what that false statement was. View "United States ex rel. Taylor v. Michael Boyko" on Justia Law

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Defendants were convicted of honest services fraud and federal funds bribery in connection with a series of payments and offers of payment, in the form of campaign contributions, made to the elected Insurance Commissioner for North Carolina. The jury found that these payments were made in exchange for the official assigning a different Deputy Commissioner to oversee the affairs of Defendant’s insurance companies. Defendants now challenge the district court’s jury instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s judgment sentencing Defendants for honest services fraud and federal funds bribery. The court held that the district court erred by instructing the jury that an “official act”—an element of the crime of honest services fraud—was present as a matter of law. Further, the court found that the error was not harmless and, therefore, vacated Defendants’ convictions on Count One. The court also vacated Defendants’ convictions on Count Two because we find that the verdicts were improperly infected by the instructional error on Count One. The case is, therefore, remanded for a new trial. The court, however, did not find that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that an official act is an element of federal funds bribery. View "US v. Greg Lindberg" on Justia Law