Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to two child pornography offenses and was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment and ten years' supervised release. Subsequently, Defendant moved to challenge eight of his supervised-release conditions, claiming that six of the conditions restrict his liberty more than necessary and that intervening Supreme Court precedent rendered two other conditions limiting his internet use unconstitutional. The district court denied Defendant's motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction.The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's first claim pertaining to six of the challenged conditions because his arguments should have been raised at sentencing. By not doing so, he deprived the district court of jurisdiction to modify them. However, regarding Defendant's second claim, the court acknowledged that Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), created “new, unforeseen, or changed legal . . . circumstances” relevant to Defendant's internet-use conditions. Thus, the district court had jurisdiction to consider Defendant's challenge. The court remanded the case for the district court to decide whether to modify those conditions. View "US v. Sebastian Morris" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two sex offenses in Illinois state court. Subsequently, Defendant failed to register as a sex offender and then pleaded guilty to knowingly failing to update his sex-offender registration. At a revocation hearing for a violation of supervisor release, Defendant was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration to be followed by five years of supervised release. The district court noted that this was the "statutory available sentence" and that it was also recommended under the U.S.S.G. Defendant did not object.Defendant appealed, claiming that the district court misconstrued the sentencing guidelines and that there was no mandatory minimum term of supervised release. Reviewing for plain error, the Fourth Circuit agreed with Defendant. The language of Sec. U.S.C. Sec. 3583(h) is clear and the district court's misinterpretation affected Defendant's substantial rights. View "US v. Keith Nelson" on Justia Law

In 2012, Defendant was sentenced to 219 months of incarceration for drug conspiracy charges involving powder and crack cocaine. Defendant moved for relief under the First Step Act, which reduced penalties under the Fair Sentencing Act. The District Court determined Defendant was eligible for relief under the First Step Act but denied Defendant's motion finding that his sentence was already at the statutory minimum.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, albeit on alternate grounds. The court held that Defendant was ineligible for relief under the First Step Act. Section 404 of the First Step Act excludes defendants whose sentences previously were imposed in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act. Defendant committed the offense before the Fair Sentencing Act became effective date but was convicted and sentenced after that date. His sentencing also came after the Supreme Court clarified, in Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012), that the Fair Sentencing Act was to be applied to pre-Act offenders, like Defendant, who had yet to be sentenced when that Act became effective. Thus, Defendant was ineligible for relief. View "US v. Leroy Goodwin" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. Under the Armed Career Criminals Act, Defendant received a 15-year sentence. Included in Defendant's plea agreement was a waiver of the right to appeal and to collaterally attack his conviction for any reason aside from ineffective assistance of counsel of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant did not appeal, but filed a Sec. 2255 petition raising prosecutorial misconduct and ineffectiveness claims. The district court denied Petitioner's petition and he was denied a certificate of appealability.Subsequently, Defendant filed a second Sec 2255 petition in the wake of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). The Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on this issue; however, the matter was resolved against Petitioner based on the waivers in his plea agreement.Following the denial of his second Sec. 2255 petition, Petitioner filed a Sec. 2241 petition. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Sec. 2241 was unavailable to Petitioner because he could not satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2255(e), which limits federal prisoners’ access to Section 2241.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. A federal prisoner may pursue habeas relief through a Sec. 2241 petition only if it “appears that the [Section 2255] remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Here, the court determined that Sec. 2255 adequately provided an avenue of review, as evidenced by the Sixth Circuit's consideration of Petitioner's Johnson claim. View "Larry Slusser v. Acting Warden Vereen" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g), which prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm. Prior to sentencing, the Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). The PSR concluded that Defendant’s previous North Carolina conviction for felony assault inflicting physical injury by strangulation was a crime of violence that enhanced Defendant’s base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant’s prior conviction stemmed from an incident where he put “his hand around [a woman’s] neck and squeez[ed]. Defendant objected to the enhancement, arguing that assault by strangulation is not a crime of violence. The district court disagreed with Defendant and imposed the enhancement.   Defendant appealed his sentence and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that North Carolina crime of assault inflicting physical injury by strangulation is a crime of violence under the categorical approach. The court explained that North Carolina’s crime of assault by strangulation can only be committed with an intentional, knowing or purposeful state of mind. As such, it satisfies the mens rea required to qualify as a crime of violence. View "US v. Dennis Rice" on Justia Law

When Defendant was released from prison and began his term of supervised release for racketeering he assaulted his then-girlfriend N.D. In light of this assault the district court revoked supervised release and sentenced him to time served and a new eighteen-month supervised release term with the same terms as those previously imposed. His probation officer then filed a petition to revoke supervised release based on these convictions and his failure to report to counseling. N.D. — now Combs’ ex-wife — did not appear at the revocation hearing that followed. But at the hearing, the district court twice referred to N.D.’s out-of-court statements.   Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing the district court erred by admitting N.D.’s out-of-court statements during the revocation hearing. He contends the district court violated Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(1)(B) and (C) by admitting her statements without balancing the interests of the parties, requiring a showing of good cause, or first disclosing the statements to Defendant.   The court rejected the Government’s argument that Rules 32.1(b)(2)(B) and (C) do not apply to the sentencing phase of a revocation proceeding and concluded that the district court erred in introducing N.D.’s statements without balancing the interests of the parties. However, notwithstanding its disagreement with the Government’s arguments regarding the applicability of Rule 32.1(b)(2) to sentencing — and assuming that the district court plainly erred here in violating those provisions the court concluded that Defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different absent consideration of the undisclosed statements. View "US v. Thomas Combs" on Justia Law

A Virginia jury convicted Petitioner of involuntary manslaughter after his car crashed into a tree killing the front seat passenger. The jury concluded that Petitioner was driving under the influence at the time of the crash. Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief in Virginia state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner, who insisted he was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the accident, asserted that his lawyer failed to investigate evidence of the operation and use of the driver’s seatbelt. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Virginia, after considering the full record, held that, although the counsel’s performance fell below the standard of care, that failure did not prejudice Petitioner. Crockett brought a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s Section 2254 petition. The court reasoned that The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) precludes a federal court from granting habeas relief on a claim decided on the merits in a state court unless it determines the state court’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record evidence. That standard of review proves fatal to Petitioner’s habeas claims. While one might reasonably come to a different conclusion than the Supreme Court of Virginia, the court’s decision was far from unreasonable. View "Cameron Crockett v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 84-month sentence for distribution of child pornography. He argued that the district court procedurally erred when it applied two enhancements which increased the suggested sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s application of that enhancement, vacated Defendant’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing.   The five-level exchange-for-value enhancement under Section 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines. In applying this enhancement over Defendant’s objection, the district court looked to the Fourth Circuit’s 2013 decision in United States v. McManus, 734 F.3d 315. Defendant argued that this was an error because McManus does not provide the proper test for defendants, like him, who were sentenced after a 2016 amendment to the Guidelines took effect.   The Fourth Circuit held that the district court procedurally erred when it applied two enhancements that increased the suggested sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, one of those enhancements is a five-level increase under Section 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) of the Guidelines. The court reasoned that the 2016 Guidelines amendment abrogated its holding in McManus for defendants sentenced after the effective date of the 2016 Guidelines. In light of the new standard imposed by the 2016 Guidelines, the district court’s application of the enhancement was an error, and that error was not harmless. View "US v. Jonathan Morehouse" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former federal prison guard, was indicted for sexually assaulting a prisoner twice and then lying to law enforcement about it. A jury convicted Defendant only of making a false statement to law enforcement while acquitting him of the more substantial sex-crime charges. Following that verdict, the district court made two decisions that increased Defendant’s sentence. First, it imposed an enhanced statutory maximum that was neither charged nor submitted to the jury. Second, it varied upward to impose the sentence Defendant would have faced if he had been convicted of sexually abusing the prisoner. On appeal, Defendant challenged his false-statements conviction.   The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant’s challenge to his false-statement conviction. The court held that sufficient evidence supported that conviction, and any arguable inconsistency with the jury’s acquittal on other counts does not invalidate the false-statement conviction. The court reasoned that sufficient evidence supported the finding that both of Defendant’s statements were false for the reason charged—that is, Defendant had performed a sexual act on an inmate.   Further, the court agreed that the district court judge improperly imposed an enhanced statutory maximum penalty based on a judicial finding not in the indictment or found by the jury. However, the court found the error harmless, reasoning that although Defendant could have been charged, he was not. And absent a charge and conviction, Defendant was not subject to the 8-year statutory maximum sentence. Finally, the court held that the district court did not impose an unreasonable sentence. View "US v. Chikosi Legins" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his felon in possession of a firearm conviction and sentence. Regarding his conviction, Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about the gun involved in the felon-in-possession charge. Regarding his sentence, he argues that the district court’s application of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement, based on its finding that Defendant used the firearm to commit a carjacking, violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it was based on acquitted conduct.   The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant’s Sixth Amendment violation claims and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the district court did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by admitting the uncounseled statements that he made to Maryland police after he was appointed counsel in his D.C. case. The court reasoned that Defendant did not request his attorney, ask for the interview to stop or say anything that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand to be a request for an attorney.   Further, the court held that Defendant’s Sixth Amendment challenge to the use of acquitted conduct as the basis for his Guidelines sentence enhancement is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent. Finally, the district court did not err by enhancing Defendant’s sentence when it found, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that he used the firearm in connection with the carjacking at issue. View "US v. Jovon Medley" on Justia Law