Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner is serving a life sentence upon a South Carolina conviction for assault and battery with intent to kill. One claim in Petitioner’s state habeas petition alleged that his state appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeals. The district court granted Section 2254 relief, but not on the ground Petitioner raised. Instead, the district court determined Petitioner was entitled to relief because his appellate counsel (1) failed “to timely advise him of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals on his direct appeal and of his right to seek further appellate review,” and (2) sent a letter containing counsel’s “forged signature” that “inaccurately informed Petitioner that his state court appellate rights had been exhausted.” South Carolina appealed, arguing that the district court’s judgment conflicts with the rigorous standards that apply when a state prisoner seeks to challenge the constitutionality of his state sentence in federal court.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and denied Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. The court held that no ineffective assistance of counsel claim can arise based on conduct relating to discretionary, subsequent appeals. The court reasoned that the district court impermissibly altered the claim presented in Petitioner’s sec. 2254 petition. As for the claim Petitioner actually raised, the district court properly held that he had not shown that he was entitled to relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). View "Clinton Folkes v. Warden Nelsen" on Justia Law

Defendant used counterfeit $20 bills to purchase a firearm and ammunition. A federal grand jury indicted Defendant on possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon and passing counterfeit money. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, and the government dismissed the other count.At sentencing, the district court applied a sentencing enhancement under Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines based on the fact that used the firearm "in connection with another felony offense." The court then sentenced Defendant to sixty-two months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed, challenging the application of the Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement, claiming he did not use the firearm in connection with the offense of passing counterfeit money.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence, determining that any error the district court may have committed, such error was harmless. The court noted that, in its opinion, the district court explained that, even without the enhancement, Defendant's sentence would have been the same.The court also rejected Defendant's claims under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), finding that the presentence report put Defendant on notice that his sentence might include discretionary conditions of supervised release. View "US v. Robert Cisson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to Continuing a Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) and Money Laundering and the district court sentenced Defendant to 420 months incarceration on the CCE offense and 240 months’ incarceration for money laundering, to be served concurrently. Defendant filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), which the district court denied on grounds that Defendant’s convictions were not covered offenses. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling denying Defendant’s pro se motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), holding that Defendant’s conviction under Sections 848 (a) and (c) is not a covered offense under the FSA. The court reasoned that although Defendant’s conviction for Sections 848(a) and (c) required a finding that he committed a continuing series of drug violations, the quantity and drug type of these violations made no difference for sentencing purposes, whereas they would matter to secure a conviction and sentence under Section 848(b). Further, since the Act altered drug quantities required to trigger the penalties for 841(b)(1)(A) or 841(b)(1)(B), it also modified the drug quantities required to sustain a conviction under 848(b). Thus, after Woodson and before Terry, since the Act modified the statutory penalties applicable to 848(b) and (e), 8 it would have been conceivable that the Act modified the statutory penalties for Defendant’s “statute of conviction,” thus rendering his 848 (c) conviction a covered offense under the FSA. View "US v. Jerrell Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to Continuing a Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) and Money Laundering. During his sentencing, and under the 1994 Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced Defendant to 420 months’ incarceration on the CCE offense and 240 months’ incarceration for money laundering, to be served concurrently. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), which the district court denied on grounds that Defendant’s convictions were not covered offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that his CCE offense is a covered offense under the FSA because Congress amended the crack cocaine drug weight required to trigger a mandatory life sentence under Section 848(b).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision finding that Defendant’s conviction under Sections 848 (a) and (c) and pursuant to Terry is not a covered offense under the First Step Act of 2018. The court reasoned that though the Act did modify the penalties for Defendant’s predicate violations under 841(a)(1) and 846, Defendant’s statutory penalty range for violating 848(a) and (c) remained the same before and after the FSA. Thus, because Defendant is serving a sentence for violating 848(a) and (c), his offense is not a covered offense under the FSA. View "US v. Jerrell Thomas" on Justia Law

The jury found Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, and witness tampering. On appeal, Defendant asserted four evidentiary challenges. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions holding that Defendant’s guilt was so overwhelming that the erroneously admitted evidence did not affect the trial’s outcome.   The court agreed with Defendant that the district court erred when it allowed the victim store employees to testify about how the robberies affected their lives and when it allowed a law enforcement agent to interpret the recorded phone calls. However, the court held that the district court properly permitted the victim store employees to testify that Defendant was the decoy guy and was trying to act like he was afraid during a previous robbery. Further, the court held that the district court appropriately allowed a co-conspirator to testify that Defendant was dangerous and admitted the screenshots that the co-conspirator received of the photographs of the letters saying that he was an informant. View "US v. Charles Walker, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant, a naturalized United States citizen, received advice from counsel in 2010 that because of his newly obtained citizenship, his guilty plea to a narcotics offense would not subject him to deportation. However, Defendant's citizenship was revoked in 2016. In 2018, Defendant received a Notice to Appear informing him that he would be removed from the country because his 2010 conviction was an aggravated felony. Upon receiving that notice, he filed a collateral attack upon his 2010 guilty plea under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. The district court found that Defendant’s 2018 petition was untimely under Sec. 2255(f)(4).The court reasoned that Sec. 2255 petitions must typically be filed within one year of the date “on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” But petitions based on facts that arise after a conviction becomes final must instead be filed within one year of “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.Defendant testified that his Alexandria-based attorney told him in 2016 that his conviction was an aggravated felony. The court found that notice alone triggered Sec. 2255(f)(4)’s limitations period. Second, even setting aside that admission, the nature of Defendant’s sentencing proceedings on July 8, 2016, put him on inquiry notice that his 2010 conviction was an aggravated felony. Therefore, the court held that the district court correctly dismissed the petition as untimely. View "US v. Jose Nunez-Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant moved for relief under Sec. 2255 after he was convicted of causing the death of another through the use of a firearm during a “crime of violence” and sentenced to death. Defendant claims that the Government failed to prove that he committed a “crime of violence.”The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant's petition. The court reasoned that to support a conviction for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence,” the Government need only prove one qualifying predicate offense. That crime must be a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Further, the court must ask whether the “most innocent conduct” criminalized by the statute meets the definition of a “crime of violence.” In certain situations, the court applies a “variant” of the categorical approach referred to as the modified categorical approach. The court uses the modified categorical approach when the statute at issue is divisible. Divisible statutes set forth “multiple, alternative versions of the crime” with distinct elements, while indivisible statutes merely set out different means of completing the crime.The court applied the modified categorical approach. The court found that federal premeditated first-degree murder is a “crime of violence.” Moreover, federal premeditated murder requires an intentional mens rea and thus does not in any way violate Borden’s requirement. Thus, premeditated murder in violation of Sec. 1111(a) is categorically a “crime of violence.” View "US v. Richard Jackson" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the district court initially applied a 15-year enhancement under the Armed Career Criminals Act ("ACCA"). However, following the United States Supreme Court decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) and Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016), the district court vacated the 15-year ACCA enhancement and sentenced Petitioner to time served.Petitioner then petitioned the district court for a certificate of innocence under 28 U.S.C. 2513(a). The district court declined to issue the certificate, finding Petitioner failed to meet the statutory requirements.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 2513 requires a petitioner seeking a certificate of innocence to prove that his conviction was overturned because he was not guilty of the charged offense. Here, Petitioner concedes that his conviction was not overturned. Petitioner must first overturn his conviction before seeking a certificate of innocence. View "US v. Richard Moon" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a single count of cocaine distribution. He was tried for that offense in the Court of General Sessions for Horry County, South Carolina (the “trial court”). He brought federal habeas corpus proceedings in the District of South Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Concluding that the court had not unreasonably applied the standards set forth in Strickland. The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability relative to his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the stand-up order.The trial court jury was initially unable to arrive at a verdict and requested that petitioner stand beside the enlarged image. The court inquired if petitioner's counsel had any objection. The court interjected before an objection could be lodged and directed petitioner to stand as the jury wished. The circuit court found that the PCR court unreasonably applied Strickland to the facts of the case in finding trial counsel’s performance was not deficient. The circuit court reasoned that trial counsel cannot be found to have operated within the broad scope of Strickland’s measure of competence when she only attempted — and thereby failed — to object to the stand-up order. Thus, petitioner’s trial counsel’s failure to object to the stand-up order constituted objectively deficient performance, that her performance prejudiced the defense and that she thereby rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. View "Lynel Witherspoon v. Donnie Stonebreaker" on Justia Law

Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion because the officers abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop and deliberately delayed their investigation so the canine unit could conduct its dog sniff. He also contends that the court clearly erred by crediting the officer’s testimony after he impeached the officer with a prior inconsistent statement.The circuit court found that though the stop could have been shorter (and begun more efficiently), it wasn’t impermissibly prolonged, and the officers’ actions were reasonably related to investigating an expired license plate. Reasoning that the acceptable length of a routine traffic stop can’t be stated with mathematical precision,” but the officers here were diligent enough to pass constitutional muster. United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2011).Regarding the other officer’s testimony, the circuit court was not persuaded that the district court erred in finding him credible. The district court acknowledged that the defendant impeached the officer with a prior inconsistent statement yet otherwise found the officer credible. The circuit court declined to disturb the district court’s credibility assessment. As such, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "US v. Joffrey Perez" on Justia Law