Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Although the court agreed with defendant that application of a bright-line rule based on CDC risk categories would be overly restrictive, the court concluded that the district court did not apply such a rule and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion. The court stated, in light of the circumstances, that the district court provided sufficient explanation to allow for meaningful appellate review. In this case, the judge knew of defendant's circumstances, both favorable and unfavorable, and referenced them in the balancing of the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, noting that defendant had returned to the same criminal behavior after his first prison stint and that post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts did not outweigh the considerations that led the court to sentence him to 103 months in prison in the first place. View "United States v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 162-month sentence for possessing with the intent to distribute cocaine base and being a felon in possession of ammunition. The court concluded that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the district court's finding that defendant possessed a firearm on each occasion, and that all three incidents were sufficiently connected temporally and involved a regular pattern of similar conduct: illegal possession of like-kind firearms. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err when applying a base offense level of twenty-two. Furthermore, the district court did not clearly err in applying the three-firearm enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and the connection-with-another-felony-offense enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Finally, the court concluded that the district court adequately addressed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of methamphetamine. Defendant argued that the district court's jury instructions at his trial constructively amended his indictment by permitting the jury to convict on a basis not included in the indictment.The court previously held in United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706 (4th Cir. 1994), that constructive amendments must always be reversed without reference to the four factors of plain error review. However, Floresca's reasoning and holding are inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court opinions and thus no longer tenable. Rather, the court concluded that Supreme Court authority requires plain error review. In this case, defendant failed to establish that his conviction for possession with intent to distribute would seriously affect the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings. The court rejected defendant's other challenges to his conviction, concluding that the jury instructions were not duplicitous, and there was no error in the admission of the Facebook certificate and messages. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that a party, like the plaintiff here, who previously consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge, but who sought to withdraw such consent before any other party consented, need not show good cause to withdraw that consent. In this case, the district court erred in requiring plaintiff to show good cause to withdraw his consent. The court saw no reason that plaintiff should not have been allowed to withdraw his consent to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge and concluded that, on the record, plaintiff's request to withdraw should have been allowed. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion; vacated the magistrate judge's order entering final judgment; and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Muhammad v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to correct his sentence. The court agreed with defendant that the force clause under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is inapplicable because one of his predicate convictions—Maryland assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension or detainer—is not a categorically "violent felony" for ACCA purposes. The court explained that Maryland courts have clearly held that an assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension can be accomplished with de minimis conduct such as an offensive touching. Therefore, because such conduct does not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force against another, the assault-with-intent-to-prevent-lawful-apprehension offense is not categorically a violent felony under the force clause. The court remanded with instructions to correct defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Proctor" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition, holding that the district court erred in finding that defendant's prior South Carolina convictions qualified as serious drug offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The court explained that South Carolina's definition of "marijuana," as defined in 2013, is broader than the definition of "marijuana," as defined by the 2018 Farm Bill in 21 U.S.C. 802, and thus there is no categorical match. Therefore, defendant's prior state convictions do not meet the definition of a serious drug offense and should not have triggered the ACCA minimum enhancement. Even if the court were to adopt plain error review, rather than de novo review, the outcome would be the same. In this case, the error affected defendant's substantial rights and the district court remanded. View "United States v. Hope" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of various offenses stemming from a series of armed home-invasion robberies. The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence for carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court agreed with defendant that Hobbs Act conspiracy does not constitute a crime of violence, but concluded that the district court's contrary jury instruction was not plain error because the jury's special verdict form reveals that defendant was convicted under a Pinkerton theory of liability, which remains valid. In this case, defendant was not prejudiced by the improper jury instruction. The court also concluded that defendant's bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose a sentence reduction where the "greed" and "extensive" violence characterizing defendant's offenses did not warrant a lesser sentence. View "United States v. Gillespie" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to petitioner on the issue of whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the State's introduction and use of prison-conditions evidence at the penalty phase. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to state officials, concluding that the state postconviction court properly applied Strickland v. Washington to petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim, and in doing so, it was not unreasonable in finding no reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's errors, the jury would not have sentenced petitioner to death.Applying the prejudice analysis in Sigmon v. Stirling, 956 F.3d 183, 193 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1094 (2021), the court did not think it was unreasonable for the state court to have found that the substantial aggravating evidence overcame petitioner's offered mitigation case based on his mental health. With that conclusion firmly in mind, the state court weighed the effect of the prison-conditions evidence and determined that there was a relative equality of presentation by both sides on this evidence and that the defense scored as many points if not more than the State. In this case, the court could not say that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it weighed the prison-conditions evidence and found its effect on the verdict inconsequential. Furthermore, petitioner's challenges to the state court's consideration of his mitigation evidence are unavailing. The court also rejected petitioner's contention that the state court unreasonably discounted his mental health evidence; nor did the state court unreasonably conflate the adaptability and prison-conditions testimony. Finally, the court did not fault the state court for not expressly considering the jury's deadlock in its prejudice analysis. View "Wood v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Duroseau, a naturalized U.S. citizen, served in Afghanistan in the Marines and suffered PTSD and a possible traumatic brain injury. He was convicted of unlawful exportation and (Count Five) transporting firearms to the Haitian Army, an entity that is not a licensed firearms importer or dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(5), springing from his attempt to take weapons to his native Haiti in an attempt to help the Haitian government quell gang violence. He was sentenced to 63 months’ imprisonment.Duroseau challenged the conviction on Count Five. The Fourth Circuit vacated that conviction. The government failed to prove a violation of section 922(a)(5), which provides that it is unlawful for any unlicensed person “to transfer, sell, trade, give, transport, or deliver any firearm to any [unlicensed] person” who does not reside in the defendant’s state of residence. Count Five alleged that Duroseau “willfully transport[ed] firearms . . . to the Haitian Army.” The government is bound by the allegations of the indictment and cannot now claim that the conviction was based on the police seizure of the firearms at the airport, a theory that was never presented to the jury. The statute does not criminalize attempts. View "United States v. Duroseau" on Justia Law

Said and six other Somali citizens attacked the USS Ashland. Said and another held loaded AK–47s. The codefendant fired at the Ashland. The Ashland returned fire, killing one attacker. Six survivors were brought to Virginia for prosecution.Said was convicted of conspiracy to commit hostage-taking, 18 U.S.C. 1203(a); conspiracy to commit kidnapping, (1201(a)(2), (c)); conspiracy to perform an act of violence against persons on a vessel, (2291(a)(6), (9)); conspiracy to use and carry a firearm and a destructive device during and in relation to, and to possess a firearm and a destructive device in furtherance of, a crime of violence, (924(o)) (Count 4); piracy, (1651); attack to plunder a vessel, (1659); assault with a dangerous weapon on a federal officer or employee, (111(a)(1), (b)); performing an act of violence against persons on a vessel, (2291(a)(6)); using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of, a crime of violence, (924(c)(1)(A)) (Count 9); and using, carrying, and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, (924(c)(1)(A)(iii)) (Count 10). The verdict form did not require the jury to identify the predicate offenses upon which the firearms convictions were based.On habeas review, the district court vacated Said’s convictions on two firearm counts because the Count 1-3 convictions on which they could be based were no longer valid after the Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” defining crimes of violence. The Fourth Circuit reversed. Said did not establish that the error in the jury instructions had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” View "United States v. Said" on Justia Law