Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officers approached Buster as he was walking; 30 minutes earlier, the officers had responded to “a domestic assault where a firearm discharged in the air.” The officers believed Buster matched descriptions of the assailant and that he was the person they had seen outside the victim’s apartment earlier. Buster declined to stop and eventually ran but tripped. The officers tackled him. Buster was wearing a cross-body bag. The officers pulled the bag to Buster’s back and handcuffed him. Buster said the strap was choking him. An officer cut the strap, removed the bag, which felt “[h]ard to the touch,” then opened the bag and found a gun and ammunition. The officers questioned Buster without giving the Miranda warnings. At the police station, an officer gave Buster the Miranda warnings, and elicited “‘essentially’ the same material discussed in the pre-Miranda interview.”The government agreed not to use the pre-Miranda statements. The court suppressed Buster’s post-Miranda statements, as “the product of an impermissible two-step interview tactic” but concluded the initial stop was valid and that “the pat-down of Buster’s person and the search of his bag were reasonable.” Buster was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit reversed. The “Terry” exception does not cover a warrantless search of a bag recently possessed by a person who was—by the time the bag was opened— handcuffed and face-down on the ground. View "United States v. Buster" on Justia Law

Then-lieutenant Hasson was arrested at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. Agents found 196 Tramadol pills in Hasson’s backpack and another 106 in his desk. A search of Hasson’s residence uncovered another 122 Tramadol pills; 15 firearms; silencers; hundreds of rounds of ammunition, hormones, and steroids. Hasson had Tramadol in his bloodstream. The government alleged Hasson was “a domestic terrorist,” contemplating “biological attacks followed by attack on food supply” and “a bombing/sniper campaign.” His emails stated: Looking to Russia ... or any land that despises the west’s liberalism. … appropriate individual targets, to bring greatest impact. Professors, DR’s, Politian’s, Judges, leftists in general. He compiled manifestos of murderers and terrorists and information about explosives and other weapons.Hasson was charged with unlawful possession of unregistered firearm silencers, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d); unlawful possession of firearm silencers unidentified by serial number, 5861(i); possession of firearms by an unlawful user of and addict to a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3); and possession of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 844(a). The district court rejected Hasson's argument that Section 922(g)(3)'s phrases “unlawful user” and “addicted to” were unconstitutionally vague on their face and increased Hasson’s Guidelines range (U.S.S.G. 3A1.4), concluding that his offense was intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Section 922(g)(3) is facially vague and that Section 3A1.4 cannot apply because he was not convicted of a federal crime of terrorism. View "United States v. Hasson" on Justia Law

Barringer was the Executive Vice President and a Board member of J&R, a Virginia manufacturing company. By 2014, J&R was delinquent on filing and paying its 941 (employee withholding) taxes. Fearing personal liability, Barringer submitted a Hardship Withdrawal Form requesting $311,859.04 from her 401(k) account “[t]o prevent eviction or ... foreclosure of the mortgage on [her] principal residence.” Barringer deposited the funds into J&R's account to pay the delinquent taxes. Barringer’s mortgage balance was approximately $200,000 at the time; her payments were not delinquent. In 2016, J&R was again behind on its 941 taxes. Barringer requested a final distribution from her 401(k) account, falsely citing the end of her employment with J&R. Barringer again deposited the funds, plus some of her personal savings, into the J&R account. Instead of paying delinquent taxes, Barringer paid herself and vendors. After providing misinformation to federal agents, Barringer was convicted of willfully failing to collect and truthfully account for and pay taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7202, and making materially false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and 36-month sentence. Any error in the denial of Barringer’s pretrial motion to dismiss the wire fraud counts was harmless because the court subsequently granted her motion for a judgment of acquittal on those charges. Barringer’s false statements to investigators were “material to a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency.” The court upheld an abuse-of-trust enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1. View "United States v. Barringer" on Justia Law

West Virginia State Troopers Elliott and Cornelius received three 911 calls about Crumbley. Two different callers stated that Crumbley was armed and dangerous and keeping his family hostage. Another caller stated Crumbley made threats about shooting the police. The troopers, heading to Crumbley’s property, discussed Crumbley’s rumored drug connections. Crumbley came out of the house screaming and threatened a shootout. He had nothing in his hands but threatened to get a weapon. Crumbley went between the yard where the troopers were and the house, threatening to get a weapon and shoot the troopers. Crumbley pulled down his pants to expose his genitals while spinning in a circle. Crumbley then got a shovel, threatened the troopers with it, then ran, throwing the shovel. Cornelius fell in the snow. When Elliott turned a corner, he saw Crumbley turned away from him. Crumbley then abruptly turned toward Elliott and began to raise his hands, causing Elliot to believe that he might have a gun. Elliott fatally shot him. Crumbley did not have a gun.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Elliott. Crumbley was shot in the back, raising a genuine dispute about Elliot’s version of events. The facts might show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. View "Stanton v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Faver, a practicing Muslim inmate, sued, alleging the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC), had denied him the ability to practice tenets of his religion, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. He alleged that, because of the VDOC’s single-vendor policy for its commissaries, he was required to purchase “his perfumed oils [for prayer] from Keefe,” which also sells “swine and idols” to other inmates. While he did not allege that the Keefe prayer oil was itself unsuitable, he alleged that “Islam prohibits the acquisition of religious accouterments from a company that sells swine and idols.” VDOC explained that before 2013, under a multiple-vendor policy, VDOC experienced “negative and harmful results” to the security, safety, and efficiency of its facilities.The Fourth Circuit affirmed that VDOC did not violate Faver’s rights under RLUIPA. While Faver had a sincerely-held religious belief and his religious exercise was substantially burdened by the single-vendor policy, the policy furthered the VDOC’s compelling interest of “preventing contraband, which promotes prison safety and security, and reducing the time prison personnel must devote to checking commissary shipments, which controls costs.” The policy was “the least restrictive means to further its compelling interests.” View "Faver v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Hobbs’ former girlfriend, Foreman, called Baltimore police around 7:00 p.m. and stated that Hobbs had come to her home, brandished a semi-automatic handgun, broke a window, forcibly entered the home, removed a television, threatened to kill Foreman and her seven-year-old daughter, and stated that he also would kill responding officers. Detective Nesbitt verified that Hobbs had a violent criminal history and concluded that there was “an extreme urgent threat.” Around midnight, he submitted an “exigent form” to T-Mobile, Hobbs’ cell phone provider. T-Mobile responded with real-time “pings” that alerted Nesbitt to Hobbs’ general location. Another detective used call logs obtained from T-Mobile to determine which of Hobbs’ associates lived within the geographical range of each “ping.” About six hours after the domestic incident, officers attempted a traffic stop. Hobbs tried to flee but collided with a parked vehicle. Officers placed Hobbs under arrest and recovered a loaded handgun.Hobbs moved to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the use of the cell phone “pings” and call logs. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The court also rejected an argument that the jury was not instructed to find that Hobbs knew he was a felon at the time of the offense, as required by the Supreme Court’s “Rehaif” decision. View "United States v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Two months after he turned 18, Doe was caught having sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend. Doe could have been charged with “carnal knowledge of a child,” a Class 4 felony but instead pleaded to “taking indecent liberties with children,” which only prohibits behavior like propositioning a child for sex, which resulted in a shorter prison sentence. Both crimes generally put an offender on the highest tier of the sex-offender registry for life, but for carnal knowledge convictions, an offender less than five years older than his victim may be removed from the registry in time. Doe, in his 30s, sought removal from the registry, raising an equal protection claim and an Eighth Amendment claim, arguing that a lifelong registration is not an appropriate sanction for a single nonviolent crime committed by a high-school student.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Virginia’s sex-offender registry complies with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Even if Doe is similarly situated to an offender convicted of carnal knowledge, the differential treatment between the offenders satisfies rational-basis scrutiny. The government has a legitimate interest in not imposing its harshest collateral consequences on children. The registry is a regulatory scheme, not a punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes. View "Doe v. Settle" on Justia Law

White was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In determining White’s sentence, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on three prior convictions for “violent felonies,” including Virginia common law robbery. The court imposed the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. White argued that he did not qualify as an armed career criminal because Virginia common law robbery can be committed without the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force, by threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy. The Virginia Supreme Court responded to a certified question: Under Virginia common law, an individual can be convicted of robbery by means of threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy “if the accusation of ‘sodomy’ involves a crime against nature under extant criminal law.” The Eighth Circuit then vacated the sentence. Virginia common law robbery can be committed without proving as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” an element required for prior convictions to qualify as predicate offenses under the “violent force” provision of the ACCA. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

On rehearing en banc, the court vacated defendant's sentence for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone and oxycodone. Instead of pursuing defendant's objections, counsel relied entirely on a motion to enter a drug court diversion program (the BRIDGE program) that could have permitted defendant, if admitted, to enter treatment instead of going to prison.The court concluded that defendant clearly received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel was unequivocally wrong on the law when he waived her meritorious objections to the PSR on the ground that none of those objections reduce the number that is relevant to this court. Rather, if successful, defendant's objections would have reduced the low end of her Sentencing Guidelines range by almost ten years. Because counsel's deficient performance prejudiced plaintiff, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion seeking to vacate his sentence. The district court found that defendant qualified as an armed career criminal by relying on prior convictions that were not identified as predicates in defendant's presentence report and of which he had no notice at sentencing. The court concluded that the district court's finding was contrary to United States v. Hodge, 902 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2018), which held that the government cannot rely on collateral review on ACCA predicates that were not identified at sentencing, in order to preserve an enhancement that no longer can be sustained by the original predicates. Because there was a Hodge violation in this case, the court vacated defendant's 18 U.S.C. 922(g) sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law